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Abstract	
	This	 thesis	 is	about	 nationalism	 and	national	 identification	 in	 a	 multicultural	 setting.	The	 study	examines	 the	 young	Singaporeans	sense	of	national	belonging	and	how	the	Singaporean	nation-state	is	imagined	to	exist.	Singapore	is	a	post-colonial	multiethnic	nation-state	where	 the	 government	has	been	determined	 to	unite	 the	heterogeneous	population	under	one	nation.	The	study	analyses	how	the	different	strategies	and	discourses	developed	to	unite	the	people	affect	the	younger	generation	of	Singaporeans	sense	of	the	nation,	and	what	kind	of	discourses	of	Singaporeanness	exist.	The	aim	is	to	show	how	a	nation	can	be	conceptualized	both	in	the	level	of	a	state	and	its	people	and	how	national	ideology,	often	promoted	by	the	state,	is	reproduced	in	the	experiences	and	practices	of	the	daily	life.	
	The	study	is	based	on	a	three	month	ethnographic	fieldwork	conducted	in	Singapore	from	October	to	December	in	2014.	The	 study	 combines	 various	 qualitative	 research	 methods:	 go-along	 ethnography,	 participant	 observation,	 informal	discussions,	 questionnaire,	 observation	 in	 events	 and	 in	 academic	 seminars	 and	 media	 follow-up.	 There	 were	 13	informants	(6	males	and	7	females)	between	21	and	31	years	old	involved	in	the	study.	
	The	study	follows	grounded	theory	approach.	The	data	is	thus	analyzed	in	reference	to	anthropological	theories	of	nations	and	nationalism	and	by	looking	at	everyday	nationalism.	The	Singaporeanness	is	analyzed	from	three	perspectives:	The	shared	experience	of	growing	up	and	living	in	Singapore’s	specific	socio-political	reality	The	imagination	of	the	nation	as	culturally	coherent	but	at	the	same	time	essentially	diverse	The	global	Singaporeanness	as	also	a	localized	identity	
	The	dominant	discourses	suggest	that	Singaporeans	should	work	hard	 for	the	national	unity	since	 it	 is	 imagined	to	be	always	under	threat.	This	creates	a	constant	feeling	of	not	being	a	plausible	nation,	and	subsequently	the	inability	to	have	
a	national	identity.	Discourses	are	also	used	to	legitimate	the	authoritarian	rule,	which	creates	shared	nationalized	life	experiences.	Also,	due	to	the	discourse	of	vulnerability,	the	society	is	driven	by	pragmatic	values	and	economic	motives.	This	is	reflected	in	people’s	“Singaporean	behavior”,	which	is	recognized	as	part	of	common	Singaporean	culture.	At	the	same	time	the	managing	of	diversity	and	ideal	national	identity	get	different	meanings	in	the	everyday	level	of	life.	These	mediated	meanings	eventually	form	the	foundation	of	global	but	local	Singaporeanness.	
	The	thesis	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	the	Singaporeanness	the	informants	of	the	study	express	and	experience	differs	from	 the	 ideal	national	 identity	and	belonging	 that	 the	government	wants	 to	promote.	Young	people	have	 their	own	personal	 way	 to	 be	 Singaporean,	 which	 makes	 their	 sense	 of	 national	 belonging	 significant	 for	 them.	 However,	 the	understandings	of	Singaporeanness	are	created	and	produced	in	the	dialogue	between	the	government’s	nation-building	project	and	popular,	collective	understandings	of	Singaporeanness	
	Theoretically	the	study	shows	how	intimate	and	daily	life	is	connected	to	understanding	of	nation	and	national	belonging.	The	thesis	indicates	that	nationalism	is	not	only	a	state-driven	force	that	aims	to	homogenize	people	in	the	local	level,	but	it	also	creates	differentiated	identities	that	get	their	meaning	in	global	level	and	become	part	of	people’s	personal	daily	life.	
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Tiivistelmä	
	Tässä	Pro	gradu	–	tutkielmassa	pohditaan	nationalismia	ja	kansallista	samaistumista	monikulttuurisessa	ympäristössä.	Tutkimuksessa	 tarkastellaan	 nuorten	 singaporelaisten	 kansallisen	 kuuluvuuden	 tunnetta	 ja	 kuinka	 Singaporen	kansallisvaltion	olemassaolo	kuvitellaan.	Singapore	on	jälkikolonialistinen	monietninen	kansallisvaltio,	jossa	valtionjohto	on	 määrätietoisesti	 pyrkinyt	 yhdistämään	 hajanaisen	 väestön	 yhdeksi	 kansaksi.	 Tutkimuksessa	 analysoidaan	 kuinka	erilaiset	strategiat	ja	diskurssit,	jotka	on	kehitetty	yhdistämää	ihmisiä,	vaikuttavat	nuorten	singaporelaisten	tuntemuksiin	kansakunnasta.	 Lisäksi	 pohditaan	millaisia	 singaporelaisuuden	 käsityksiä	 on	 olemassa.	 Tavoitteena	 on	 nähdä	 kuinka	kansakunta	voidaan	käsittää	sekä	valtion	että	 ihmisten	 tasolla,	 ja	kuinka	valtion	suosimaa	kansallismielistä	 ideologiaa	uusinnetaan	arkipäivän	kokemuksissa	ja	käytännöissä.	
	Tutkimus	 perustuu	 kolmen	 kuukauden	 kenttätyöhön,	 joka	 toteutettiin	 Singaporessa	 loka-joulukuussa	 2014.	Tutkimuksessa	 yhdistellään	 erilaisia	 laadullisen	 tutkimuksen	 menetelmiä:	 nk.	 go-along-etnografiaa,	 osallistuvaa	havainnointia,	 epämuodollisia	 keskusteluja,	 kyselytutkimusta,	 havainnointia	 tapahtumissa	 ja	 akateemisissa	seminaareissa	sekä	mediaseurantaa.	Tutkimuksessa	oli	mukana	13	21–31-vuotiasta	informanttia	(6	miestä	ja	7	naista).	
	Tutkimus	 seurailee	 grouded	 theory	 –	 menetelmää,	 ja	 aineistoa	 on	 analysoitu	 suhteessa	 antropologisiin	 teorioihin	kansakunnista	 ja	 nationalismista.	 Tutkimuksessa	 tarkastellaan	 erityisesti	 ”jokapäiväisen	 nationalismin”	 käsitettä.	Analyysiluvuissa	käsitellään	singaporelaisuutta	kolmesta	näkökulmasta:	
- Nuorten	yhteinen	kokemus	Singaporen	sosiopoliittisessa	todellisuudessa	varttumisesta	ja	siellä	asumisesta.	
- Kansakunnan	kuvittelu	kulttuurisesti	yhtenäiseksi	mutta	samaan	aikaan	perimmiltään	monimuotoiseksi.	
- Globaali	singaporelaisuus	myös	paikallistettuna	identiteettinä.	
	Analyysissa	esitetään,	että	vallitsevat	diskurssit	kehottavat	singaporelaisia	näkemään	vaivaa	kansallisen	yhtenäisyyden	eteen,	sillä	se	on	jatkuvasti	uhattuna.	Tämä	tekee	Singaporesta	näennäisesti	epäuskottavan	kansakunnan	ja	ihmisillä	ei	vaikuta	olevan	kansallista	identiteettiä.	Diskursseja	käytetään	myös	oikeuttamaan	autoritääristä	valtaa,	mikä	luo	yhteisiä	kansallistettuja	kokemuksia.	Alttius-diskurssin	vuoksi	yhteiskuntaa	ohjaavat	pragmaattiset	arvot	ja	taloudelliset	motiivit.	Tämä	näkyy	ihmisten	”singaporelaistetussa”	käytöksessä,	joka	tunnistetaan	osaksi	yhteistä	kansallista	kulttuuria.	Samalla	monimuotoisuuden	 ohjailu	 ja	 ideaali	 kansallisidentiteetti	 saavat	 erilaisia	 merkityksiä	 arkielämässä.	Nämä	 välittyneet	merkitykset	muodostavat	 lopulta	globaalin	 ja	paikallisen	singaporelaisuuden	perustan,	 jota	valtionjohto	ei	kuitenkaan	tunnusta	samalla	tavalla	kuin	nuoret	singaporelaiset	sen	kokevat.	
	Tutkielman	 johtopäätös	on,	että	 informanttien	 ilmaisema	 ja	kokema	singaporelaisuus	eroaa	siitä,	millaista	kansallista	identiteettiä	ja	kuuluvuutta	valtionjohto	haluaa	edistää.	Nuorilla	on	oma	tapansa	olla	singaporelaisia,	mikä	tekee	heidän	kansallisesta	 kuuluvuuden	 tunteestaan	 heille	 merkittävää.	 Ymmärrys	 singaporelaisuudesta	 kuitenkin	 luodaan	 ja	uusinnetaan	valtionjohdon	kansanluomisprojektin	ja	yleisen	ja	yhteisöllisen	käsityksen	välisessä	vuoropuhelussa.	
	Teoreettisesti	tutkielma	esittää,	kuinka	jokapäiväinen	elämä	on	yhteydessä	ymmärrykseen	kansallisesta	identiteetistä	ja	kuuluvuudesta.	Tutkielma	osoittaa,	että	nationalismi	ei	ole	vain	valtion	ajama	voima	joka	pyrkii	yhtenäistämään	ihmisiä	paikallistasolla.	 Sen	 sijaan	 nationalismi	 luo	 myös	 erilaistuneita	 identiteettejä,	 jotka	 saavat	 merkityksensä	 globaalilla	tasolla	ja	tulevat	osaksi	ihmisten	henkilökohtaista	päivittäistä	elämää.	
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1 Introduction
“I	wait	for	the	day	when	I	can	just	say	“I’m	a	human	being.””	
	It	was	just	another	hot	and	humid	night	in	Singapore.	I	was	in	a	night	bus	with	my	Singaporean	 friend.	 We	 were	 having	 an	 intense	 conversation	 about	multiculturalism,	 ethnic	 identities	 and	 nationality	 after	 a	 seminar	 where	 local	academics	had	given	presentations	about	these	issues	in	Singapore.	My	friend	was	frustrated	with	the	 fact	that	 in	today’s	world	we	define	others	according	to	their	nationality	or	home	country.	When	we	meet	new	people	allegedly	outside	your	own	national	category,	we	often	ask	“where	are	you	from”	to	figure	out	which	place	in	the	world	that	person	belongs	in.	We	might	also	make	presumptions	of	someone’s	nationality,	 or	 belonging,	 based	 on	 their	 physical	 appearance,	 language,	 accent,	dressing	style	or	religious	conviction.	If	someone’s	appearance	or	accent	does	not	fit	to	our	expectations	of	that	nationality,	we	ask	for	further	explanations:	“where	are	you	really	or	originally	from?”	How	can	the	countries	we	have	grew	up	or	lived	in	tend	 to	 define	 us	 so	 much?	 How	 can	 a	 country	 be	 a	 fundamental	 basis	 for	understanding	human	beings?	
	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 explore	 the	 significance	 of	 national	 identification	 and	 national	thinking	in	a	multicultural	setting.	The	study	is	based	on	an	ethnographic	fieldwork	conducted	in	the	city-state	of	Singapore	in	autumn	2014.	I	will	examine	the	sense	of	national	belonging	in	young	Singaporeans	and	how	the	Singaporean	nation-state	is	imagined	to	exist.	I	refer	to	the	anthropological	theories	of	nationalism	and	analyze	how	 national	 ideology,	 often	 promoted	 by	 the	 state,	 is	 reproduced	 in	 daily	 life	experiences	 and	 practices.	 Analytically	 I	 delve	 into	 normative,	 state-driven	 and	popular	national	discourses.	By	observing	 the	 everyday	practices	 that	 represent	these	discourses	we	can	better	understand	how	people	experience	and	understand	
a	nation.	
	The	 city-state	 of	 Singapore	 is	 an	 interesting	 place	 to	 study	 nationalism.	 Firstly,	throughout	the	50	years	of	Singapore’s	independent	history,	the	government’s	task	has	been	 to	build	and	uphold	 a	nation-state	 that	would	be	 a	place	 for	 incredibly	
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heterogeneous	 population.	 As	 an	 originally	 immigrant	 society,	 post-colonial	Singapore	 is	nowadays	one	of	the	most	complex	multi-ethnic	nation-states	 in	the	world.	Singaporeans	themselves	are	mainly	Chinese,	Malay	and	Indian	descent,	but	in	addition	to	this,	about	35%	of	the	people	living	in	the	city-state	are	foreigners.	Secondly,	 the	 island	 is	only	714	 square	kilometers.	The	city-state	 is	an	 intensive	urban	space	where	the	Singaporean	nation	should	exist.	
	These	 two	 factors,	heterogeneity	and	 intensity,	generate	an	 interesting	setting	 to	study	nationalism,	which	generally	refers	to	people’s	desire	to	form	a	distinct	group,	
a	nation,	with	each	other.	Do	Singaporeans	have	this	desire	or	feeling	that	there	is	a	nation	where	they	belong	to?	How	has	the	state	contributed	in	this?	These	are	some	of	the	questions	I	will	reflect	it	this	thesis.	In	the	end,	my	aim	is	also	to	consider	how	and	why	a	country	can	define	us,	and	why	we	are	not	(yet)	just	human	beings.	
1.1 Research	questions	and	perspective	of	the	study	Singapore	is	rather	interesting	place	to	study	nationalism	if	one	considers	not	only	it’s	being	 as	multi-ethnic	 city-state,	but	 also	 for	 its	post-colonial	nation-building	process.	 Since	becoming	 independent	 in	1965,	 the	 Singaporean	 government	has	been	 determined	 to	 build	 a	 nationally	 coherent	 and	 harmonious	 society.	 I	 will	consider	 how	 these	 nation-building	 efforts	 affect	 the	 younger	 generation	 of	Singaporeans	sense	of	the	nation,	and	what	kind	of	discourses	of	Singaporeanness	exist.	 While	 concentrating	 on	 the	 notions	 of	 sense	 of	 national	 belonging	 and	
imagining	of	the	nation,	my	aim	is	to	see	the	bigger	picture	of	how	a	nation	can	be	conceptualized	both	in	the	level	of	a	state	and	its	people.	By	analyzing	the	national	discourses	in	Singapore,	I	will	indicate	how	dominant	ideas	of	a	nation	make	it	look	like	 a	 “natural	 order”	 of	 the	 society,	 and	 how	 people	 in	 everyday	 presence	 and	practices	might	express	their	own	kinds	of	representations	of	those	discourses.		
	My	 two	 research	questions	are:	 “What	kind	of	daily	experiences	and	 ideas	unite	people,	creating	affinity	and	mutual	feeling	of	being	one	nation?”	and	“How	do	these	experiences	and	ideas	relate	to	the	state’s	efforts	and	discursive	practices	to	build	a	nation?”	I	have	elaborated	these	questions	in	the	following	chapters	to	focus	more	on	the	issue	at	hand.	The	key	concept	is	being	Singaporean,	to	which	I	will	now	on	
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refer	as	Singaporeanness.	The	analysis	is	based	on	my	ethnographic	observations	on	how	Singaporeans	act,	speak	and	behave	as	part	of	their	normal	and	daily	life,	and	how	Singaporeanness	could	be	interpreted	based	on	those	observations.	
	My	 main	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 Singaporeanness	 my	 informants	 express	 and	experience	 differs	 from	 the	 ideal	 national	 identity	 and	 belonging	 that	 their	government	wants	to	promote.	Young	people	have	their	own	way	to	be	Singaporean,	which	makes	their	sense	of	national	belonging	significant	for	them.	At	the	same	time	the	official	national	discourses	feel	empty	and	forced.	However,	the	understanding	of	 Singaporeanness	 is	 created	 and	 produced	 in	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	government’s	 nation-building	 project	 and	 popular,	 collective	 understandings	 of	Singaporeanness.	
	
I	 analyze	 my	 argument	 from	 three	 perspectives.	 First	 I	 will	 discuss	 about	 the	authoritarian	nature	of	Singaporean	society,	and	how	my	informants	connect	that	to	the	Singaporeanness.	Then	I	will	consider	how	Singaporeanness	can	be	imagined	as	 culturally	 coherent	 through	 stereotypical	 definitions.	 Last	 I	 consider	 the	(multi)cultural	aspects	of	Singaporeanness	and	its	mediated	nature.	All	these	will	be	analyzed	in	relation	to	the	official	national	discourses.	
	This	study	is	purely	qualitative	and	anthropological.	Besides	ethnographic	methods	the	study	follows	the	grounded	theory	approach	(Bryman	2012	[2001],	387),	which	means	that	the	theoretical	framework	emerges	from	my	data	and	thus	focuses	on	everyday	nationalism	and	the	pervasiveness	of	national	ideology.	I	follow	the	idea	of	nationalism	as	discursive	formation.	Sociologist	Craig	Calhoun	(2002,	27)	defines	this	discursiveness	as	“…a	way	of	talking,	writing,	and	thinking	about	the	basic	units	of	culture,	politics,	 and	 belonging	 that	 helps	 to	 constitute	 nations	 as	 real	 and	powerful	dimensions	of	social	life”.	
	By	observing	and	describing	how	official	national	ideology	and	national	discourses	promoted	 by	 the	 state	 are	 received	 and	 accepted	 among	 people,	 we	 can	 try	 to	understand	the	sense	of	a	nation	those	people	have.	On	the	other	hand,	I	will	also	interpret	 the	national	 community	 the	people	 themselves	produce;	 through	what	
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kinds	of	situations,	experiences	and	realities	the	sense	of	a	nation	is	produced,	and	is	there	consistency	between	the	state	and	people’s	ideas	of	a	nation?	
	National	ideology	and	national	discourses	get	different	forms	in	different	societies	and	 countries.	 Anthropologist	 Bruce	 Kapferer	 (1989)	 writes	 how	 ideology	 is	connected	 to	 ontology:	we	 should	 try	 to	understand	 the	 structure	 of	nationalist	reasoning,	and	how	nationalist	 ideology	works	as	 a	particular	orientation	 to	 the	world.	 Ontologically	 grounded	 ideology	 becomes	 a	 part	 of	 life	 and	 practices	 of	human	action.	(Kapferer	1989,	202-4.)	In	other	words,	national	ideology	is	not	only	something	 that	 a	 state	 is	 trying	 to	 promote,	 but	 a	 way	 in	 which	 people	 might	understand	and	define	their	world,	as	their	moral,	emotional	and	political	lives	get	articulated	 as	 national	 ideology.	 National	 thinking	 has	 a	 huge	 impact	 in	 today’s	world,	 so	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 how	 it	 works	 in	 different	 societies.	 My	example	from	Singapore	is	just	one	among	others,	and	the	same	questions	could	be	asked	in	different	national	contexts.		
	In	wider	perspective	this	means	that	nationalism	is	not	only	a	state-driven	force	that	aims	 to	 homogenize	 people	 in	 the	 local	 level,	 but	 it	 also	 creates	 differentiated	identities	 that	 aquire	 meaning	 in	 globalized	 level	 and	 become	 part	 of	 people’s	personal	daily	 life.	My	aim	 is	give	 insights	on	how	daily	 life	can	be	connected	 to	understandings	of	nationness	and	belonging,	as	I	move	between	micro	and	macro	level	of	nationalism.	
	
I	focus	on	the	construction	of	a	nation	on	a	very	general	level.	In	the	case	of	multi-ethnic	Singapore,	I	am	interested	to	analyze	an	emerging	supra-ethnic	nationalism	and	 how	 it	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 official	 national	 discourses.	 This	 is	 why	 I	 am	consciously	dismissing	such	significant	factors	as	ethnicity,	class	and	gender	in	my	analysis.	 It	 would	 be	 impossible	 to	 include	 these	 intersectional	 ties	 in	 a	 mere	Master’s	thesis,	which	already	aims	to	summarize	something	about	such	a	vast	topic	as	nationalism.	If	I	would	continue	this	study	further	in	the	future,	I	could	use	those	factors	to	say	something	more	about	the	issues	presented	here.	
	5	
1.2 Previous	studies	about	Singapore	Anthropological	research	about	Singapore	is	almost	non-existent,	and	mostly	local	sociologists	 have	 conducted	 ethnographic	 studies	 in	 Singapore.	 There	 is	 an	abundance	of	research	about	ethnic	relations	and	national	integration	in	Singapore	(e.g.	Chua,	Siddique,	Ackermann,	Ortmann),	and	especially	after	the	1990’s,	when	the	government	started	 to	actively	promote	nationalism,	sparking	an	 increase	 in	academic	studies	on	the	topic	(Ortmann	2009,	31).	
	Interestingly,	the	studies	about	national	identity	have	come	to	almost	contradictory	conclusions	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Singapore.	 Many	 survey-based	 (and	often	government-financed)	empirical	researches	show	 that	Singaporeans	have	 a	strong	sense	of	belonging,	but	other	kind	of	studies	claim	the	opposite	(Ortmann	2009,	 34).	 More	 recently,	 the	 studies	 of	 Singaporean	 nation	 have	 taken	 a	transnational	approach	that	concentrates	on	Singaporean	emigrants	and	their	ties	to	home	country	(see	e.g.	Velayutham	2007;	Brenda	S.A.	Yeoh	&	Lily	Kong	2003;	Elaine	Ho	2006).		
	Academic	literature	about	Singaporean	nation	has	often	concentrated	on	examining	the	effectiveness	and	achievements	of	post-colonial	nation	building,	and	according	to	sociologist	Selvaraj	Velayutham	(2007,	35-43),	most	studies	have	argued	that	the	government	has	performed	well	in	its	task.	Velayutham	sees	that	one	reason	behind	this	is	that	the	idea	of	nation,	national	identification,	and	nationalism	has	not	been	properly	 problematized	 in	 Singaporean	 scholarly	 writing.	 Instead,	 the	 quest	 for	national	identity	and	notion	of	nationality	are	normalized	and	accepted	as	natural	objectives	 (ibid,	 39).	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 there	 would	 not	 be	 any	 critical	approaches.	 There	 are	 several	 studies,	 which	 indicate	 the	 challenges	 and	shortcomings	of	nation	building	(See	e.g.	Barr	&	Skrbis	2008;	Beng-Huat	Chua	1995;	Cherian	George	2000;	Souchou	Yao	2007;	Chris	Hudson	2013;	Nasir	&	Turner	2014).	
	Extensive	studies	have	been	made	about	how	the	state	has	carried	out	its	nation-building	project,	but	 they	 still	do	not	 look	at	 the	nationalist	preoccupations.	The	emphasis	is	often	on	the	problematic	beginning	of	the	state	and	how	post-colonial	Singapore	has	had	to	form	the	nation	from	scratch.	This	has	framed	the	studies	to	
	6	
concentrate	on	how	the	construction	of	national	identity	should	be	understood	in	the	 Singaporean	 context.	 (Velayutham	 2007,	 36-37.)	 The	 socio-political	construction	 of	 national	 identity	 has	 been	 commonly	 studied	 through	 social	institutions	 like	 educational	 system,	 work	 place,	 the	 public	 housing,	multiculturalism,	 social	 policies,	 media	 and	 national	 celebrations	 (Velayutham	2007,	39).	
	Thus	anthropological	study	can	shed	new	 light	on	nationhood	 in	Singapore.	With	the	ethnographic	 fieldwork	 the	 study	 can	get	 closer	 to	 the	people’s	 sense	of	 the	nation;	instead	of	merely	evaluating	how	the	different	initiatives	and	policies	have	contributed	to	developing	that	sense,	or	if	the	nation-building	has	worked	or	not.	I	will	analyze	the	ways	the	nation	is	understood	as	an	outcome	of	that	nation	building.	As	my	analysis	is	relying	rather	heavily	on	these	previous	studies	about	Singaporean	society,	 my	 aim	 is	 combine	 their	 perceptions	 to	 mine,	 and	 reflect	 my	 own	ethnographic	data	on	them.	
1.3 Central	concepts	and	structure	of	the	thesis	
I	will	use	several	complex	terms	and	concepts,	which	could	be	a	topic	for	a	thesis	on	their	own.	They	will	be	clarified	on	the	way,	but	I	briefly	explain	some	of	their	usage	here.	 Some	 concepts	 are	 explained	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Merriam-Webster	 online	thesaurus	and	dictionary1.	
	According	to	the	classical	anthropological	definition,	culture	refers	to	the	customs,	habits,	 behavior,	 speech	 and	 conduct	 shared	 by	 a	 certain	 group	 or	 community.	Culture	 is	 not	 static	 or	 systematic,	 but	 constantly	 reproduced	 and	 recreated	 by	people	 and	 their	 practices.	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 there	 are	 no	 straightforward	definitions	 for	 culture.	 Therefore,	 in	 this	 study	 culture	 is	 understood	 in	 its	Singaporean,	post-colonial	context,	where	culture	and	ethnicity	are	interwoven	and	refer	 to	various	 traditions,	beliefs,	religions	and	 language	used	by	ethnic	groups.	Also	the	words	ethnicity	and	race	are	used	as	synonyms	on	a	daily	basis.	Talk	about	people’s	 ethnic	 origins	 and	 race	 is	 common,	 and	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 in	
																																																								1	http://www.merriam-webster.com/	
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negative	 terms.	 Ethnicity	 and	 race	 have	 fixed	 institutionalized	 and	 practical	meaning	in	Singapore,	and	they	are	used	in	very	concrete	terms	(Chua	2003,	58).	
		The	 word	 nation	 and	 its	 derivatives	 are	 used	 widely	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Nation	 is	 a	community	of	people	who	are	assumed	to	belong	together	based	on	their	common	
nationality,	 defined	 territory	 or	 history.	 With	 the	 adjective	 national,	 I	 refer	 to	things	shared	by	the	people	of	a	certain	nation.	Nation-states	are	formed	when	a	nation	lives	under	a	particular	area	and	government.	Nationalism	is	consciousness	about	the	nation	and	its	definitions,	and	this	sense	of	belonging	to	a	nation	creates	national	identity.	Nationalism	turns	into	national	ideology,	when	it	is	used	as	an	(political)	orientation	to	organize	people	or	the	state.	
		
National	discourse	 is	one	 of	 the	main	 concepts	 in	my	 study.	For	me	discourse	means	the	 formal	or	established	way	of	thinking	about	the	nation.	Discourse	 is	a	widely	accepted	 idea	by	a	group	of	people,	of	how	things	are	or	should	be,	and	a	means	 of	 defining	 the	 reality	 and	 conveying	 meaning	 (Bryman	 2012,	 528-540).	Within	this	thesis,	discourse	explains	the	strategies	that	are	used	to	argue	for	the	dominant	ideas.	
	
The	structure	of	the	thesis	is	the	following:	In	the	next	methodology	chapter	I	describe	the	research	methods	used	in	this	study,	explaining	the	conditions	of	my	ethnographic	 fieldwork	and	 further	argument	on	certain	definitions	and	limitations	of	the	study.	In	chapter	three	I	present	the	overall	theoretical	 framework	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	 the	 relevant	 concepts	 coming	up	 in	 the	analysis.	Chapter	 four	 is	an	overview	on	Singaporean	society	and	 its	history	and	presents	the	context	of	my	analysis.	Chapters	five,	six,	and	seven	are	the	main	data	analysis	 chapters	 in	 which	 I	 use	 several	 different	 case	 studies	 to	 exemplify	nationalism	 in	Singapore.	 In	 chapter	eight	 I	make	 concluding	 remarks	about	 the	thesis	 and	 summarize	 the	 main	 arguments	 derived	 from	 my	 analysis.	 The	bibliography	and	a	list	of	other	references	are	at	the	end	of	the	thesis.	
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2 Methodology
Anthropological	 research	 is	 about	 describing	 individuals	 as	 part	 of	 a	 group	 or	community,	and	most	anthropologists	conduct	an	ethnographic	fieldwork	to	collect	this	 data	 (Bernard	 2006,	 23-25).	 Put	 simply,	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 could	 be	defined	as	process	of	“joining	a	group,	watching	what	goes	on,	making	some	notes,	and	writing	 it	all	up”,	as	 the	researcher	 is	supposed	 to	 involve	extensively	 in	 the	social	 life	 of	 the	people	 studied	 (Bryman	2012,	431).	 Specific	 research	methods	anthropologists	 are	 using	 during	 an	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 include	 participant	observation,	 interviews	and	questionnaires,	and	collecting	stories	and	narratives	from	specific	informants.	Depending	on	the	data,	there	are	various	ways	to	process	it:	 text	 and	 narrative	 analysis,	 discourse	 analysis	 or	 coding	 the	 field	 notes	 and	transcribed	 interviews.	Nowadays	 these	 traditional	methods	are	also	applied	 for	example	to	the	online	world.	Anthropological	qualitative	studies	are	empirical	and	when	analyzing	the	data,	most	researchers	 follow	 interpretivist	 tradition	 and	 phenomenological	 approach	(Bernard	2006,	24).	An	ethnographic	 study	 is	not	meant	 to	produce	generalized	information	about	an	issue,	but	rather	a	glance	into	a	specific	case	or	phenomenon.	Anthropologists	are	not	giving	answers	about	what	people	 think	or	why	 they	do	something.	Instead	they	suggest	how	people’s	thoughts,	feelings	and	behavior	can	be	interpreted	and	what	this	might	tell	about	the	phenomenon	or	issue	at	hand.	
	Anthropologists	have	to	balance	between	objectivity	and	subjectivity,	and	a	part	of	the	research	 is	to	reflect	your	own	position	on	the	 field.	The	observations	on	the	field	 and	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	data	 are	 researcher’s	 subjective	perspectives,	even	 though	 scientific	 study	 should	 be	 objective.	 There	 are	 also	 some	 ethical	challenges	 especially	what	 come	 to	 the	 informants.	 Anthropologist	 may	 become	friends	with	 their	 informants,	and	at	 the	 same	 time	 is	 treating	 them	as	 research	subjects.	Sometimes	dealing	with	sensitive	issues	may	even	put	the	informants	in	danger.	 In	 this	 study	 I	 follow	 the	 code	 of	 ethics	 by	 American	 Anthropological	Association.	
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2.1 Field	and	informants	
I	 conducted	 my	 three	 month	 fieldwork,	 or	 better	 to	 say	 micro-ethnography,	 in	Singapore	 from	 October	 to	 December	 in	 2014.	 I	 chose	 Singapore	 because	 I	had	familiarized	myself	with	the	area	and	its	history	while	writing	my	Bachelor’s	thesis	about	 ethnic	 issues	 in	 Malaysia.	 I	 have	 also	 spent	 two	 months	 in	 Singapore’s	neighboring	city,	Johor	Bahru	in	Malaysia	in	2012,	and	had	visited	Singapore	couple	of	times	then.	
	The	history	of	modern	Singapore	started	in	1819	when	a	British	statesman	Thomas	Stamford	 Raffles	 set	 foot	 and	 founded	 Singapore	 to	 be	 a	 trading	 settlement	 for	British	 East	 Asian	 Company.	 During	 the	 colonial	 times	 the	 administrative	foundations	were	put	up	and	rapid	development	of	Singapore	started.	The	city	was	made	to	be	a	thriving	trading	port	in	Southeast	Asia.	Immigrants	mainly	from	China,	India	and	surrounding	Malay	areas	came	in	search	for	economic	opportunities	and	settled	on	the	island.	Singapore	became	independent	in	1965	and	is	now	an	urban	city-state	 in	 Malay	 Peninsula.	 In	 past	 50	 years	 Singapore	 has	 gone	 from	 two	 to	almost	six	million	 inhabitants,	and	GDP	per	capita	grew	 from	$2500	 in	1960’s	to	almost	$37,000	per	person	in	2013	(Trading	Economics	2015).	
	Singapore	 is	 indisputably	 an	 economic	 success	 story	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	modernized	societies	in	Asia.	It	is	a	financial	capital	of	Asia	with	an	authoritarian	regime	and	so-called	one-party	democracy.	People’s	Action	Party	(PAP)	has	been	in	charge	for	all	of	Singapore’s	50-year	history,	and	the	opposition	has	had	very	little	leverage	 in	the	parliament.	The	PAP	has	been	the	ruling	party	 in	Singapore	since	1959.	Singapore	has	parliamentary	democracy,	and	PAP	has	always	won	most	of	the	seats	 in	the	parliament2.	The	 first	Prime	Minister	Lee	Kuan	Yew	 led	PAP	and	the	country	dictatorially	until	1990,	and	the	current	Prime	Minister	is	his	son	Lee	Hsien	Long.	
	Cherian	George	(2000)	has	described	Singapore	aptly	as	an	air-conditioned	nation,	which	 provides	 comfortable	 and	 convenient	 life	 in	 the	 tropics	 as	 a	 reward	 for	
																																																								2	In	the	latest	General	Elections	in	2015	PAP	won	83	out	of	89	seats.	The	worst	result	PAP	had	in	the	previous	elections	in	2011	when	it	won	81	out	of	87	seats.	(www.eld.gov.sg)	
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subjecting	oneself	 to	 centralized	 control.	The	authoritarian	nature	of	 the	 regime	stretches	to	people’s	intimate	lives	as	will	be	described	later.	For	tourists	the	city-state	is	famous	for	its	strict	laws	and	penalties:	chewing	gum	is	banned,	jaywalking	prohibited,	and	one	can	be	fined	for	littering	and	for	not	flushing	the	toilet.	Besides	the	restricted	and	conservative	political	atmosphere,	Singapore	is	also	well	known	for	 the	 iconic	 skyline	 of	 Marina	 Bay	 area,	 which	 symbolizes	 the	 prosperity,	modernity,	and	global	progress	the	city-state	wants	to	represent.	
	Singapore	works	as	 a	 laboratory	example	 for	 studying	nationalism.	The	 island	 is	only	50km	from	east	to	west,	and	26km	from	north	to	south.	People	are	squeezed	into	the	island	making	the	population	density	one	of	the	highest	in	the	world,	7,600	people	per	sq.km.	Out	of	the	island’s	5.46	million	inhabitants	only	3.43	million	are	Singaporean	 citizens.	 When	 excluding	 permanent	 residents	 and	 naturalized	citizens,	only	half	of	the	population	are	real	born	and	bred	Singaporeans	 in	daily	understanding.	The	remaining	2	million	people	are	mainly	immigrants	working	in	manufacturing,	 construction	 and	 domestic	 services	 (foreign	 workers)	 and	 in	professional	duties	(foreign	talents),	or	expatriates.	Singapore	has	an	ethnic	Chinese	majority	(75%)	despite	being	surrounded	by	dominantly	Malay-Muslim	countries.	Other	significant	ethnic	groups	are	Malays	(13%)	and	Indians	(9%).	Singapore	is	a	throughout	 immigrant	 society,	as	even	 the	Malays,	 recognized	as	 the	 indigenous	people,	 are	 mainly	 from	 Malaysia	 and	 Indonesia.	 (Singapore	 Department	 of	Statistics	2015.)	
	Before	the	fieldwork,	I	did	an	extensive	background	reading	about	Singapore	and	followed	 actively	 the	 news	 and	 social	 media	 around	 the	 topic.	 I	 also	 found	 two	Singaporean	contacts	based	in	Finland	and	UK.	I	discussed	with	them	about	my	topic	to	get	some	comments	and	help	from	them.	This	guided	me	to	get	a	more	accurate	idea	of	where	I	am	going	and	what	to	expect.	They	both	also	linked	me	up	with	their	friends	in	Singapore,	so	that	once	I	arrived	I	had	already	some	people	to	meet	and	discuss	with.	
	Before	moving	to	Singapore	I	also	contacted	the	Asia	Research	Institute	(ARI)	in	the	National	University	of	Singapore	(NUS)	to	ask	if	they	could	aid	me	to	get	an	access	
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to	 the	NUS	 library	 and	 its	 resources.	 I	 ended	up	being	 attached	 to	 the	ARI	 as	 a	voluntary	 intern	and	was	able	 to	use	 their	 facilities	during	my	 stay.	 I	also	had	 a	supervisor	for	my	study,	Dr.	Tabea	Bork-Hüffer,	who	gave	me	advice,	contacts	and	comments	to	proceed	with	my	fieldwork.	
	Despite	my	efforts	to	find	an	accommodation	from	an	average	Singaporean	public	housing	neighborhood,	I	ended	up	staying	in	a	condominium	in	an	upmarket	area	known	 for	 its	 expat	 communities.	 This	 was	 a	 pity	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 80%	 of	Singaporeans	live	in	public	housing	estates,	and	condominiums	are	often	filled	up	with	expats	and	affluent	Singaporeans.	However,	I	was	lucky	that	my	landlords,	a	Singaporean	woman	and	her	American	companion,	kindly	took	me	as	part	of	their	daily	 life	 from	 weekly	 grocery	 shopping	 to	 countless	 dinner	 parties	 with	 their	friends	and	family.	I	met	lots	of	Singapore-based	people	from	various	backgrounds,	and	got	some	valuable	insights	into	my	topic	and	life	in	Singapore	in	general.	
	
I	 quickly	 noticed	 that	 younger	 and	 older	 generation	 of	 Singaporeans	 have	 very	different,	if	not	controversial	perspectives	on	my	topic.	I	decided	to	concentrate	on	the	younger	generation	 for	mainly	practical	reasons.	 I	 felt	 that	 it	would	be	more	natural	for	me	to	do	the	study	among	people	around	my	age,	and	it	was	easier	to	get	into	contact	with	them,	getting	their	trust	and	speaking	to	them	than	what	would	have	been	with	the	older	people.	
	
I	found	most	of	my	informants	through	the	first	two	Singaporean	contacts	I	had	in	Europe,	 and	 later	 through	 website	 Couchsurfing.com.	 Couchsurfing	 is	 an	international	online	platform	for	hospitality	exchange,	where	locals	can	offer	to	host	travelers	or	organize	events	in	their	hometowns.	I	often	attended	weekly	meetings	of	local	couchsurfer’s	community	to	get	into	contact	with	Singaporeans.	I	also	posted	
a	message	on	the	Singapore	discussion	forum	asking	if	there	were	any	locals	willing	to	 help	 me	 with	 my	 study,	 or	 otherwise	 just	 meet	 me	 and	 show	 me	 around	 in	Singapore.	
	
I	got	loads	of	replies	and	tried	to	meet	all	the	people	individually	at	least	once,	and	
a	few	of	them	couple	of	times.	I	asked	them	to	show	me	around	the	places	of	their	
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choice,	preferably	 in	their	own	neighborhood.	 I	emphasized	that	 I	want	to	get	an	insight	into	local	way	of	life.	This	gave	me	already	an	idea	about	the	places	that	these	Singaporeans	found	important	for	them,	or	what	they	thought	was	relevant	for	me	to	see	in	the	context	of	my	study,	Singaporeans	sense	of	national	belonging.	Usually	we	had	lunch	or	dinner	together,	after	that	we	would	tour	the	neighborhoods	and	discuss	about	the	life	in	Singapore.	Sometimes,	I	met	them	in	groups	of	two	or	three	usually	in	a	café,	bar	or	restaurant.	
	This	 way	 of	 meeting	 people	 led	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 did	 not	 do	 any	 recorded	 or	structured	 interviews.	 Instead,	 I	had	 free-flowing	discussions	where	 I	most	often	posed	 similar	 questions	 to	 everyone,	 and	 observed	 to	 what	 direction	 the	conversation	went.	After	these	meetings	I	tried	to	write	down	my	observations	and	important	parts	of	the	discussion.	When	I	asked	my	main	informants	if	they	agreed	to	be	 interviewed	after	 the	 initial	meetings,	but	 they	did	not	want	 to.	As	will	be	explained	 later,	 I	 was	 studying	 rather	 sensitive	 issue	 in	 Singapore.	 I	 will	 use	pseudonyms	of	my	 informants	and	avoid	 sharing	any	 specific	 information	about	their	personal	backgrounds.	
	
A	couple	of	these	 informants	turned	out	to	be	almost	 like	my	research	assistants	accompanying	me	on	various	events	and	suggesting	things	to	read	and	see.	They	worked	also	as	cultural	 interpreters	when	there	was	something	happening	that	 I	could	not	understand	as	an	outsider.	After	the	fieldwork	one	of	them	continued	to	help	me	by	sharing	some	information	and	material	from	events	held	after	my	stay.	
	To	finish	off	my	 fieldwork,	 I	made	a	short	questionnaire	for	my	 informants	as	an	experiment	of	what	kind	of	data	I	would	get	with	different	kind	of	method,	and	if	there	would	be	some	new	perspectives	emerging.	As	I	had	already	discussed	with	them	about	the	questions,	I	somewhat	knew	the	replies	I	would	get,	and	I	was	able	to	analyze	them	better.	However,	because	of	the	highly	un-professional	nature	of	the	questionnaire	I	have	not	included	it	as	a	formal	source	of	data	to	this	thesis.	I	have	used	 the	 responds	 to	 support	 the	 conversations	 I	 already	 had	 had	 with	 these	informants.	
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Altogether,	 in	 this	 study	 I	have	13	 informants	 (6	males	 and	 7	 females)	who	 are	between	21	and	31	years	old.	They	all	are	at	least	second-generation	Singaporeans.	
A	couple	of	them	were	students	in	a	university	or	polytechnic,	but	most	had	already	graduated	and	working	 full-time.	They	 represent	all	 the	official	ethnic	groups	of	Singapore,	following	roughly	the	percentage	of	each	ethnic	group	in	the	population.	Most	of	my	informants	had	traveled	or	stayed	abroad	for	longer	times.	Especially	those	who	contacted	me	through	Couchsurfing;	they	were	 interested	 in	traveling,	sharing	their	culture	and	learning	from	mine.	This	fact	might	increase	a	bit	of	bias	towards	my	study,	as	my	informants	might	be	more	open	and	tolerant	compared	to	more	patriotic	Singaporeans,	who	would	have	stronger	nationalist	views.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 is	also	an	asset	 that	my	 informants	have	experiences	abroad,	as	 it	might	give	them	wider	insight	into	Singaporeanness.	
2.2 Collecting	data	Instead	of	doing	in-depth	interviews,	which	would	only	give	me	someone’s	personal	opinions	on	my	questions,	 I	 focused	on	 so-called	 “go-along	ethnography”	by	 just	spending	 time	 with	 the	 informants	 in	 places	 where	 they	 liked	 to	 spend	 time	 in	(Kusenbach	2003).	Obviously	many	of	the	meetings	were	planned	for	me	to	see	or	experience	 something	new	 in	 Singapore.	 I	mainly	 trusted	 in	naturally	 occurring	discourse	 what	 comes	 to	 the	 things	 Singaporeans	 were	 telling	 to	 me	 or	 talking	about.	 	Following	 the	 idea	of	 sociologists	Fox	 &	Miller-Idriss	 (2008,	540;	560),	 I	wanted	to	listen	the	“talk	about	the	nation”,	which	would	reveal	how	my	informants	“give	 discursive	 shape	 and	 content	 to	 their	 otherwise	 taken-for-granted	understanding	of	the	nation”.	
	As	vague	as	 it	might	 sound,	 the	daily	 life	 in	 Singapore	was	 the	main	participant	observation	 I	 did.	 Every	 day	 I	 noticed	 or	 overheard	 something	 that	 I	 felt	 was	relevant	for	my	topic,	and	in	very	random	and	surprising	situations	I	got	new	ideas	for	 analysis.	 Being	 Singaporean	 is	 negotiated	 in	 very	 basic	 daily	 situations	 and	encounters.	These	negotiations	happen	in	the	metro,	at	the	queue	of	a	coffee	shop	or	during	a	meal	with	friends.	
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I	collected	data	in	several	ways:	with	participant	observation,	informal	discussions,	and	 questionnaire,	 analyzed	 nationalist	 campaigns,	 observed	 in	 events	 and	 in	academic	seminars,	and	generally	paid	attention	on	things	and	happenings	around	me.	I	also	actively	followed	up	alternative	news	sites,	social	media	and	discussion	online	 since	 early	 2014	 until	 summer	 2015.	 Because	 of	 the	 extensive	 press	censorship	 in	 Singapore,	 the	 internet	 is	 an	 important	 platform	 for	 expressing	opinions	and	commenting	political	issues	anonymously.	Also	Facebook	turned	out	to	be	a	resourceful	platform	to	 follow	debates	when	people	commented	on	posts	shared	by	news	websites.	
	As	part	of	my	 fieldwork	 I	 familiarized	myself	with	 the	 local	academic	discussion	about	nation	building	in	Singapore	by	spending	half	of	the	weeks	in	the	library	of	the	NUS.	One	 local	 researcher	 told	me	about	 a	 seminar	 series	 called	Living	with	
Myths,	 which	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 crucial	 for	 structuring	 my	 whole	 thesis.	 These	seminars	also	gave	me	an	interesting	perspective	on	the	way	my	topic	was	discussed	among	academia,	and	I	made	some	very	valuable	observations	about	the	dominant	discourses	about	Singaporeanness.	
	Living	with	Myths	is	a	“project	on	exploring	Singapore’s	pasts	and	futures”	started	by	three	local	historians.	The	aim	of	the	project	is	to	unpack	the	myths	of	Singapore’s	history.	The	project	started	in	July	2014	with	monthly	seminars,	where	researchers	give	presentations	around	various	themes	in	the	context	of	Singaporean	historical	myths.	During	 the	 fieldwork	 I	attend	 three	seminars,	but	as	 the	events	are	video	recorded,	I	have	had	an	access	to	all	of	them	online.	The	project	is	not	connected	to	universities,	 research	 institutes	 or	 any	 other	 official	 institutions,	 and	 the	 events	were	held	in	the	premises	of	a	theatre	company.	There	was	a	pre-registration,	as	the	events	were	quite	popular.	There	was	roughly	50-100	people	attending,	depending	on	the	date	and	theme	of	the	seminar.	Most	of	the	participants	were	probably	local	students	and	researchers,	or	otherwise	academically	aware	people.	
	Attending	these	seminars	made	me	realize	how	the	government’s	nation-building	efforts	 are	 really	 an	 important	 issue	 in	 Singapore.	The	 amount	 of	 attention	 and	interest	these	issues	get	among	the	local	academia	indicates	that	it	is	significant	to	
	15
understand	 the	 discourses	 of	 Singaporeanness	 created	 with	 these	 myths.	 The	speakers	 of	 the	 seminars	 were	 giving	 presentations	 about	 historical	 events	 and	realities,	which	are	usually	dismissed	in	official	historical	narrative.	They	were	thus	suggesting	 that	 there	 are	 some	 alternative	 narratives	 and	 ways	 to	 understand	Singapore,	which	 should	be	discussed	about	more.	 In	chapter	 four	 I	will	explore	these	discourses	more	while	they	also	function	as	a	framework	for	the	analysis.	
2.3 Self-reflection	and	limitations	of	the	study	Ethnographic	 fieldwork	 is	always	 full	of	 surprises,	and	unexpected	when	on	 the	field.	 My	 topic	 changed	 and	 specified	 on	 the	 way	 as	 I	 learned	 more	 about	Singaporean	way	of	life.	My	initial	research	plan	focused	on	memories	and	nostalgia	as	I	wanted	to	use	a	certain	online	project	as	my	case	study.	Unfortunately,	once	I	was	on	the	field	this	plan	did	not	work	out,	and	I	had	to	come	up	with	a	new	one.	I	ended	up	discussing	with	my	informants	about	their	experiences	of	growing	up	and	living	in	Singapore,	and	what	kind	of	meaning	Singaporeanness	has	for	them.	This	data	 shaped	 the	 framework	of	my	 thesis	and	 led	me	 to	write	about	nationalism.	However,	the	rapid	changes	in	the	relatively	short	period	of	time	does	mean	that	the	data	I	have	obtained	is	not	as	thick	and	rich	as	I	hoped.	I	felt	that	it	is	better	to	try	to	grasp	as	much	data	and	meet	as	many	Singaporeans	 I	could	 rather	 than	use	 the	scarce	time	to	come	up	with	a	more	specific	focus.	
	What	 comes	 to	 the	 ethnography	 and	participant	observation	 as	 a	method,	 I	had	moments	when	I	doubted	my	research	ethics	even	though	I	do	my	best	to	follow	the	code	of	ethics	by	American	Anthropological	Association.	Even	though	I	tried	to	be	clear	about	my	study,	I	felt	that	some	of	the	people	I	met	did	not	really	realize	that	I	might	 use	 their	 sayings	 in	 my	 thesis,	 and	 that	 I	 was	 constantly	 observing	 their	behavior	and	speech.	For	example,	one	informant	kept	joking	how	I	am	observing	the	people	on	the	street,	although	I	was	mainly	listening	and	observing	him.	
	Sometimes	 I	 felt	 uncomfortable	 with	 my	 Singaporean	 friends,	 when	 they	 talked	about	something	I	found	very	interesting,	but	did	not	dare	to	start	taking	notes.	Once	this	happened	 in	a	bar	at	1am:	“Can	 I	quote	that	 in	my	thesis?”	 I	asked	and	got	a	laugh	and	“Sure!”	as	a	response.	Can	I	then	really	use	it?	One	of	my	best	friends	was	
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surprised	when	 I	said	 I	would	quote	him	 in	my	 thesis	even	 though	he	had	been	consciously	helping	me	for	three	months	to	do	the	study.	I	was	all	the	time	balancing	between	being	an	anthropologist	and	a	friend.	
	
I	 often	 got	 some	 interesting	 first	 reactions	 and	 comments	 about	 my	 topic	 from	random	people	 I	met.	 I	wrote	those	things	down	since	 I	considered	 it	as	valuable	data.	 I	did	not	meet	these	people	ever	again,	and	 I	know	nothing	about	them	 like	name,	 age,	 occupation	 or	 family	 background.	 Nevertheless,	 those	 comments	revealed	the	impression	people	had	about	the	sense	of	belonging	in	Singapore.	
	
I	also	had	to	consider	my	status	as	a	European	student	in	Singapore.	As	around	35%	of	inhabitants	are	foreigners,	and	the	Caucasian	expat	communities	are	part	of	the	society,	my	physical	presence	in	Singapore	as	such	was	nothing	unusual.	“Are	you	here	 for	business?”	was	 a	 common	question.	Most	people	 assumed	me	 to	be	 an	exchange	student	or	an	expat.		When	I	told	my	real	purpose	of	staying	in	Singapore,	most	people	were	positively	surprised	that	I	had	such	a	genuine	interest	for	their	country	and	the	people.	After	chatting	for	a	while	they	noticed	that	I	knew	lots	about	Singapore,	as	some	said	“more	than	Singaporeans	themselves”.	
	As	a	disclaimer,	my	informants	or	the	data	I	gathered	is	by	no	means	representative	of	 the	 whole	 Singaporean	 society.	 The	 purpose	 of	 qualitative	 study	 is	 not	 to	generalize,	give	answers	or	measure	anything	(Bryman	2012,	380.)	As	my	data	is	very	 limited,	 the	purpose	of	 the	 study	 is	 to	give	 an	 example	how	 these	 selected	Singaporeans	reflect	nationalism,	and	what	kind	of	analysis	and	conclusion	can	be	drawn	from	that.	Qualitative	study	is	about	“seeing	through	the	eyes	of	the	research	participants”	 (Bryman	 2012,	 412),	 so	 this	 study	 is	 not	 eligible	 to	 generalize	Singaporeans	perceptions	about	the	nation.	That	said,	I	suggest	my	study	gives	an	alternative	insight	into	understanding	of	Singaporeanness	from	the	perspective	of	young	Singaporean	adults.	
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3 Theory: Anthropology of nations
Theoretical	framework	of	this	study	follows	the	grounded	theory	approach,	where	the	theory	emerges	from	the	collection	and	analysis	of	the	data	(Bryman	2014,	387).	As	I	was	going	through	my	field	notes,	I	realized	that	the	connecting	factor	for	the	various	 conversations	 about	 life	 in	 multicultural	 Singapore	 was	 not	 the	 ethnic	identities	or	cultural	differences	between	Singaporeans,	but	instead	something	else	that	was	binding	them	together	as	a	nation.	I	thus	decided	to	concentrate	on	theories	of	nationalism,	which	could	explain	how	Singaporeans	are	bounded	together.	I	am	focusing	 on	 the	 notions	 of	 common	 culture,	 intimacy	 and	 negotiations	 in	nationalism,	themes	appeared	strongly	in	my	data.	The	study	of	nationalism	and	modern	nation-states	was	for	many	years	in	the	hands	of	 political	 scientists,	 sociologists,	 and	 historians	 before	 anthropologists	 took	 a	bigger	role	in	the	discussion	during	1980’s	(Eriksen	(2010	[1994],	118-9).	Nations	were	 often	 thought	 to	 be	 rather	 Western	 and	 large-scale	 phenomena	 for	anthropologists	to	study,	and	it	seemed	inconvenient	to	carry	out	a	classic	fieldwork	among	 a	nation.	 In	his	 influential	book	 Imagined	Communities.	Reflections	on	 the	
Origin	 and	 Spread	 of	 Nationalism	 (1983)	 political	 scientist	 Benedict	 Anderson	started	 using	 anthropological	 language	 to	 define	 nationalism	 as	 he	 wrote	 about	imagination,	narratives	and	communities,	and	saw	nationalism	as	a	cultural	artefact	similar	 to	kinship	and	religion	(Anderson	1983,	13-15).	This	caused	 the	study	of	nations	to	expand	to	the	new	directions	in	different	disciplines,	and	affected	also	too	the	 anthropological	 research	 of	 nationalism,	 both	 as	 source	 of	 inspiration	 and	criticism.	
	The	general	focus	on	Euro-American	national	histories	has	created	a	bias	in	theory	and	research	on	nationalism.	However,	there	are	insightful	anthropological	studies,	which	shed	light	on	alternative	and	contemporary	approaches	on	nationalism.	E.g.	Bruce	Kapferer	(1988)	has	studied	the	similarities	of	nationalism	in	Sri	Lanka	and	Australia,	Danilyn	Rutherford	 (2003)	 the	national	belonging	 in	 Indonesian	West	Papua,	 and	 John	 Kelly	 &	 Martha	 Kaplan	 (2001)	 criticize	 Anderson	 in	 their	 co-authored	book	about	origins	of	nation-state	in	multi-ethnic	Fiji.	
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The	overall	academic	discussion	about	nationalism	is	vast.	In	this	chapter	I	discuss	only	those	anthropological	theories	of	nationalism	that	are	relevant	 for	my	topic.	Later	 in	 my	 analysis	 chapters	 I	 will	 bring	 up	 some	 specific	 theoretical	 insight	applicable	in	the	issue	in	hand.	I	consciously	ignore	some	major	theories	and	trends	because	 of	 the	 limited	 scope	 of	 the	 thesis.	 I	 will	 start	 with	 classic	 theories	 on	nationalism	and	move	on	to	the	critique	and	new	insights	brought	by	post-colonial	studies.	 I	also	 look	briefly	at	theories	of	cosmopolitanism	and	their	connection	to	the	 notion	 of	 nation	 in	 Singapore.	 Last	 I	 focus	 on	 more	 recent	 approach	 called	everyday	nationalism,	which	is	central	for	my	analysis.	
3.1 Classic	ideas	on	nationalism	The	modernist	writers	understand	nationalism	as	 largely	Western	and	European	ideology	(Gellner	1983;	Henley	1995,	294).	 In	 industrializing	Europe	there	was	a	need	to	create	loyalty	and	cohesion,	as	people	were	not	organized	by	their	kins	or	villages	anymore.	People’s	attachment	was	directed	 to	 the	state	 instead.	For	 this	nationalist	ideology	to	work	the	state	had	to	be	politically	effective	and	the	people,	i.e.	nation,	should	be	the	embodiment	of	that	effective	state.	Anthropologist	Thomas	Hylland	 Eriksen	 (2010,	 126)	 argues	 that	 nationalist	 ideology	 aims	 to	 “re-create	sentiment	 of	 wholeness	 and	 continuity”	 so	 that	 the	 modern	 rupture	 between	individual	and	society	can	be	transcended.	However,	for	nationhood	to	emerge	there	has	to	be	nationalist	people	who	believe	and	imagine	it	possible.	Nationhood	has	to	appeal	to	wider	masses	for	it	to	be	an	effective	political	tool.	(Ibid)		
	The	most	 influential	writings	of	nationalism	 came	 from	Ernest	Gellner,	Anthony	Smith	 and	 Benedict	 Anderson	 (Sabra	 2007).	 Ernest	 Gellner	 was	 a	 social	anthropologist	 and	 a	well-known	 scholar	 of	 nationalism.	For	him	nationalism	 is	primarily	a	political	concept,	and	national	unit	should	be	consistent	with	it.	Gellner	(1983)	saw	that	there	is	a	link	between	ethnicity	and	state,	and	that	nationalism	is	foremost	an	ethnic	ideology.	In	the	core	of	a	nation-state	there	should	be	a	dominant	ethnic	 group,	whose	 identity	markers	 are	used	 as	 official	national	 symbols.	The	members	of	 the	nation	 should	 recognize	mutual	 rights	and	duties	 to	each	other.	(Gellner	1983.)	In	other	words,	there	is	a	strong	normative	idea	that	nation	should	be	ethnically	consistent.	
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Another	 scholar	of	nationalism,	 sociologist	Anthony	Smith,	also	 sees	nationalism	and	ethnicity	interwoven,	but	so	that	nations	might	have	existed	before	nationalist	ideology	 took	 root.	 Ethnic	 communities	 were	 so-called	 pre-nations.	For	 Smith	 a	nation-state	is	a	powerful	and	ubiquitous	reality	that	defines	our	cultural	outlook	and	political	endeavors.	It	is	also	a	source	of	international	legitimacy.	(Smith	1995.)	
	Political	 scientist	Benedict	Anderson	 (1983)	emphasizes	 the	 individuals’	need	 to	identify	themselves	as	part	of	collective.	Anderson	sees	nations	as	imagined	political	and	sovereign	communities	where	people	have	a	sense	of	belonging	without	really	knowing	each	other.	Each	nation	is	imagined	as	unique	in	space	and	time,	and	thus	nations	should	be	distinguished	by	 the	style	 they	 imagine	 themselves	 (Anderson	1983,	15).	Anderson	is	also	interested	in	the	force	and	persistence	of	a	nation,	and	asks	why	people	are	prepared	to	die	for	such	an	abstract	community	as	a	nation.	
	Classic	 modernist	 theories	 often	 essentialize	 nations.	 They	 are	 seen	 as	 natural	development	of	the	world	even	though	being	constructions	of	the	modern	era	(see	e.g.	Gellner	1983).	These	accounts	fall	short	when	we	look	at	plural	and	post-colonial	origins	of	societies,	or	more	recently,	the	effects	of	globalization.	Even	though	the	classic	writers	agree	that	nationalism	is	not	natural	per	se,	there	is	still	a	presumed	connection	between	a	nation,	a	state	and	territory.	This	idea	has	been	criticized	by	post-colonial	writers,	as	it	is	a	rather	Eurocentric	perspective.	(Sabra	2007,	78.)	
3.2 Post-colonial	critique	on	nationalism	After	decolonization	there	were	plenty	of	new	states	coming	up	around	the	world,	Singapore	being	one	of	them.	Following	the	globally	dominant	nationalist	ideology,	the	task	for	new	states	was	to	create	a	homogenous	and	politically	effective	nation-state.	 Anderson	 sees	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 nationalism	 is	 in	 fact	 linked	 to	 the	decolonization	processes	rather	than	only	to	European	state	formation.	However,	for	Anderson	(2001)	nationalism	works	in	the	same	way	everywhere,	regardless	of	the	differences	in	societies:	the	European	nationalism	would	be	adopted	as	creole	way.	
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This	 idea	 has	 been	 widely	 contested	 by	 post-colonial	 critiques.	 Kelly	 &	 Kaplan	(2001)	highlight	 especially	 that	nation-states	are	 a	de-colonial	 construction	 that	gained	ground	only	after	Second	World	War	and	founding	of	the	United	Nations,	and	that	 the	history	of	nationalism	should	be	understood	 in	dialogical	rather	 than	 in	dialectic	sense	(Kelly	&	Kaplan	2001,	420).	
	The	classic	theorists	see	nations	as	political	and	cultural	units	of	people	who	share	commonalities,	such	as	language,	ethnicity,	history,	territory,	and	religion.	Together	these	commonalities	are	understood	as	a	culture	that	unifies	people	as	a	nation.	The	states	 emphasize	 these	 aspects	 to	 maintain	 nationalist	 ideology	 (Eriksen	 1994,	549.)	 However,	 the	 post-colonial	 states,	 such	 as	 Singapore,	 are	 very	 often	 poly-ethnic,	and	even	 though	 there	would	be	 a	dominant	ethnic	group,	 shared	ethnic	identity	is	usually	not	enough	to	build	nationhood.	Many	regions	e.g.	in	Africa	had	two	or	more	ethno-nationalist	movements,	whose	fight	over	dominance	is	going	on	even	today.	Overall,	the	problem	for	these	poly-ethnic	states	is	to	create	a	nation	out	of	very	heterogeneous	population,	but	at	the	same	time	follow	the	logic	of	nationalist	ideology	in	their	state	formation.	
	Decolonized	 nation-states	 were	 mainly	 institutional	 and	 ideological	 formations	(Gupta	2001).	Their	first	task	was	to	write	the	history	of	the	nation,	which	would	legitimate	its	existence	in	the	world	order	of	nation-states.	In	face	of	multi-ethnicity,	the	equality	of	the	citizens	had	to	be	enshrined	constitutionally,	and	the	meaning	of	the	 new	 state’s	 sovereignty	 had	 to	 be	 considered.	 This	 led	 often	 to	 aggressive	development	 of	 national	 discourses	 and	 practices	 within	 the	 country.	 The	protection	of	spatial	borders	and	economic	independence	was	important,	since	the	states	wanted	and	needed	to	survive	on	their	own	now.	(Ibid,	189-191.)	There	also	had	 to	 be	 compromise	 between	 different	 ethnic	 groups	 and	 supra-ethnic	symbolisms	for	everybody	to	feel	being	part	of	the	new	nation	(Eriksen	2010,	141).	In	 Singapore	 the	 separation	 from	 Malaysia	 in	 1965	 created	 this	 critical	 need	 to	survive	on	their	own	as	economically	independent	and	ethnically	harmonious	city-state.	In	chapter	four	I	will	demonstrate	how	this	process	went	in	Singapore.	
	
	21
These	post-colonial	nation-building	processes	have	contested	 the	classic	 ideas	of	nationalism,	as	the	understanding	of	a	nation	has	expanded.	They	show	that	national	identification	can	be	based	on	shared	historical	and	territorial	experiences	instead	of	common	ethnic	or	cultural	background.	In	multi-ethnic	states,	nationalism	has	to	be	 future-orientated	 instead	 of	 relying	 on	 colonial	 history.	 (Eriksen	 2010,	 142.)	However,	nation	building	in	multi-ethnic	states	is	often	seen	as	problematic,	failed	or	superficial	project,	as	 the	 ideal	model	of	nation-state	 is	still	 thought	 to	be	 the	classic	 European	 pure	 nation-state,	 which	 fulfils	 the	 criteria	 of	 different	commonalities.	
	Nowadays	nationalism	should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	cultural	systems	out	of	which	it	came	into	being	(Billig	1995,	23).	In	post-colonial	states	like	Singapore,	the	 nation-state	 model	 was	 brought	 by	 colonial	 imperialism.	 In	 principle,	 the	Singaporean	government	has	to	fight	against	Western	forms	and	structures,	but	at	the	 same	 time	adopt	 those	 to	be	 a	plausible	nation-state	 (Ong	2005,	17).	 In	 this	thesis	I	will	present	this	cultural	and	socio-political	context	and	conditions	in	which	the	nationalism	may	or	may	not	flourish	in	Singapore.	Singapore	is	a	good	example	of	a	place	where	the	national	ideology	promoted	by	the	state	does	not	makes	sense	to	the	people,	as	I	will	show	in	my	analysis.	
3.3 National	culture,	identity,	and	discursive	practices	Thomas	Hylland	Eriksen	has	 studied	nationalism	 in	Trinidad	 and	Mauritius	 and	concludes	 that	 the	 previously	 dominant	 idea	 of	 ethnic	 nationalism	 being	 more	natural	can	be	radically	challenged.	When	the	nation-states	face	the	“problem”	of	multi-ethnicity,	new	kind	of	national	cultures	may	emerge	in	diverse	settings,	and	nationalism	 can	 create	new	 supra-ethnic	national	 cultures.	 (Eriksen	1994,	550.)	Immigrant	societies	like	Singapore	is	an	example	how	the	politically	created	concept	of	civic	nationalism	(instead	of	the	ethnic	one)	is	needed	in	order	to	maintain	the	predominant	construction	of	a	nation-state,	and	to	control	the	diverse	population.	The	point	is	that	anybody	born	in	a	country	can	adopt	the	national	identity,	since	it	is	not	linked	with	the	people	themselves,	but	with	the	physical	territory,	history	and	lifestyle	shared	by	those	people.	
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Nevertheless,	 despite	 being	 a	 beautiful	 idea,	 even	 civic	 nationalism	 can	 have	underlying	commitments	to	certain	cultural	or	racial	definitions	of	who	is	a	proper	citizen	(Calhoun	2007,	42).	According	to	sociologist	and	cultural	theorist	Stuart	Hall	(2002,	 28)	 civic	 nationalism	 does	 not	 serve	 its	 purpose,	 because	 people’s	identification	cannot	be	constructed	in	relation	to	a	political	system	alone.	It	has	to	be	based	on	cultural	meanings	and	embedded	in	imagined	community,	which	has	certain	cultural	particularities.	In	my	analysis	 I	will	suggest	that	 in	Singapore	the	intended	civic	nationalism	has	turned	out	to	be	more	culturally	particular	than	 it	politically	 should	 be,	 creating	 new	 kind	 of	 popular	 understanding	 of	Singaporeanness.	
	Anthropologist	Aihwa	Ong	(2005)	emphasizes	that	in	Asian	societies,	like	Singapore,	the	state	and	nation	should	be	seen	as	two	different,	yet	conjoined	categories.	There	is	a	constant	need	to	defend	the	local	and	national	Asian	culture	against	the	Western	state	 form	 due	 to	 the	 colonial	 history	 and	 adopting	 of	 Western	 modernity.	 The	modernization	 and	 development	 has	 to	 be	 justified	 and	 connected	 to	 the	 Asian	nation,	so	national	culture	becomes	an	important	strategy	of	the	state	control	over	its	people.	Culture	 is	emphasized	as	a	 framework	for	everything	and	works	as	an	argument	in	political	discourse.	(Ong	2005,	17-19.)	This	idea	is	very	present	also	in	Singapore,	and	will	be	highlighted	in	later	chapters.	
	Besides	politically	defined	national	culture	peculiar	 in	many	Asian	countries,	 the	experience	of	common	and	shared	culture	is	also	relevant	for	the	people’s	national	identity.	Nationalism	has	constituted	an	 ideology	about	primary	 identities,	where	national	identity	is	above	other	means	of	identification,	and	a	new	way	for	a	state	to	claim	political	legitimacy	(Calhoun	2007,	48).	Stuart	Hall	(1992)	claims	that	national	cultures	are	one	of	the	main	sources	of	identity	in	the	modern	world,	as	we	tend	to	see	national	identity	as	essential	part	of	our	nature.	National	culture	is	collectively	represented	in	national	identity,	and	people	participate	in	constructing	the	nation	when	the	national	culture	produces	identifiable	meanings	about	that	nation.	(Hall	1992,	291-3.)	National	 identity	and	culture	 thus	appear	as	 self-reflections	of	 the	imagined	national	collective.	They	are	interconnected	as	nation	is	imagined	to	be	a	culturally	 coherent	 community,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 people	 are	 reflecting	
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themselves	on	that	imagination,	whether	they	are	responding	to	that	image	or	not.	(Velayutham	2007,	42.)	
	Anthropologists	Gupta	&	Ferguson	(2001,	39)	note	that	ideas	of	culturally	distinct	places	reflect	the	fact	how	imagined	communities	are	attached	to	equally	imagined	national	 spaces.	 The	 meaning	 of	 a	 nation	 is	 created	 and	 contained	 in	 national	narrative,	which	is	based	on	imagined	common	origins,	traditions	and	heritage	of	the	nation	and	its	people.	The	national	narrative	produces	discursive	practices	that	contribute	 in	constructing	 the	unifying	national	 identities.	This	 involves	 a	power	play	of	who	has	the	right	for	this	discursive	definition	and	narrating	of	nation.	(Hall	1992,	292-5.)	Nationalism	as	imagining	and	narrating	culturally	coherent	nations	is	based	on	 seeing	 certain	national	practices	as	 the	essence	of	 the	people	 (Hudson	2013,	6;	Ong	2005,	19).	
	Post-colonial	 theorist	 Homi	 Bhabha	 (1990)	 sees	 that	 the	 so-called	 counter-narratives	of	the	nation	may	challenge	this	essentialising	and	change	the	totalizing	discourse.	Nation	is	a	modern,	diverse	space	where	there	is	a	constant	anxiety	over	differences.	Representations	of	national	unity	try	to	overcome	the	uncontrollable	diversity.	For	Bhabha	 national	unity	 is	 thus	 inherently	 impossible	 and	nation	 is	ideologically	ambivalent	structure	for	understanding	the	cultural	representations.	Narrative	authority	and	power	regime	is	always	disrupted	and	nation’s	discursive	formation	is	fragile.	(Bhabha	1990.)	This	means	that	there	is	a	tension	between	the	national	discourses,	and	what	people	actually	do	in	their	daily	lives.	By	founding	out	this	tension	we	can	understand	the	nation	better,	and	in	the	case	of	Singapore	this	ambivalence	of	nation	is	especially	clear	(Hudson	2013,	11.),	as	I	will	state	later.	
	Anthropologist	 Ana	 Maria	 Alonso	 (1994)	 has	 stressed	 the	 mutually	 reinforcing	dynamic	between	state	formation	and	ethnogenesis.	In	her	argument,	homogenizing	state	formation	produces	an	imagined	sense	of	community	that	creates	a	misplaced	concreteness	 of	 the	 state	 and	 nation.	 It	 would	 be	 important	 to	 identify	 “the	strategies	through	which	the	imagined	becomes	a	structure	of	feeling	embodied	in	material	practices	and	lived	experience”	(Alonso	1994,	382).	
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My	aim	is	to	demonstrate	the	connection	between	the	Singaporean	state	formation	and	the	understanding	of	Singaporean	nation,	and	how	the	dominant	discourses	and	people’s	 everyday	 experiences	 resonate	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 imagined	 national	communities	are	made	real	to	the	people	in	different	discourses	that	produce	and	transmit	nationalist	ideology.	My	analysis	will	focus	on	how	Singaporean	nation	and	national	culture	are	understood,	and	how	the	government	disciplines	this	national	imagination	 through	 specific	 discursive	 practices	 in	 order	 to	 uphold	 the	 official	national	ideology	(see	also	Hudson	2013,	5).	
3.4 Thinking	beyond	the	nation	For	past	two	decades	the	theories	of	nationalism	have	been	contested	by	studies	of	globalization	and	cosmopolitanism.	Sociologist	Michael	Skey	(2013)	sees	a	paradox	in	these	contemporary	studies	of	nationalism.	On	the	one	hand,	many	researchers	are	eager	 to	 indicate	 the	end	of	nation-states	and	highlight	globalizing	economic	systems,	transnational	and	cosmopolitan	solidarities,	and	multi-ethnic	societies.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 there	 are	 political-minded	 debates	 about	 multiculturalism	 and	immigration	which	point	to	the	increasing	relevance	of	nationality	e.g.	in	the	USA,	Western	Europe,	and	Australia	(Skey	2013,	94;	Brown	1998,	35).	
	Unarguably	nation-states	have	not	yet	vanished,	and	they	still	form	the	political	and	economic	order	of	the	world,	and	our	nationality	defines	us	even	though	maybe	in	more	complex	ways	than	before.	National	ideology	has	remained	hegemonic	despite	the	fact	that	people	have	simultaneous	loyalties	and	identities,	which	do	not	follow	national	 lines	 at	 all	 (Eriksen	 2010,	 210).	 Studies	 about	 transnationalism 3 	have	shown	 how	 people	 are	 still	 sticking	 with	 their	 national	 identification,	 and	globalization	has	not	made	everybody	“the	same”	as	was	supposed.	So	it	is	relevant	to	 ask	 why	 nation-states	 and	 national	 identities	 are	 still	 so	 pervasive	 mode	 of	identification	in	the	modern	world.	
	Globalization,	understood	as	a	free	movement	of	capital,	and	global	spread	of	ideas	and	 practices,	 has	 been	 shaking	 the	 ideological	 constructions	 of	 nation-states.	
																																																								3	Transnationalism	refers	to	the	interconnectivity	of	people	across	the	boundaries	of	nation-states	(see	e.g.	Steven	Vertovec).	
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However,	 instead	of	 just	 threatening	and	weakening	 the	nation,	 the	effects	have	been	 far	 more	 complex,	 especially	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 cultural	 aspects	 of	nationalism.	 While	 certain	 concepts	 and	 structures	 spread	 globally,	 cultural	peculiarities	 evolve	 as	 they	 get	 compared	 to	 each	other.	 In	 this	process	 identity	politics	has	gained	in	importance	as	has	happened	in	Singapore.	
	According	 to	 Gupta	 &	 Ferguson	 (2001),	 especially	 in	 post-colonial	 context	nationalism	 and	 national	 identity	 should	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 context	 of	globalization	 and	 global	 capitalism,	 which	 both	 produce	 and	 problematize	 the	nation	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 As	 mentioned	 before,	 many	 Asian	 nation-states	 are	balancing	between	Western	influences	and	Asian	traditions	and	values	what	comes	to	the	nation	building	(Ong	2005).	In	my	analysis	I	will	show	how	Singapore	is	facing	
a	situation	where	it	has	to	be	both	global	and	modern,	and	traditional	and	locally	Asian.	
	In	our	globalizing	world,	the	concept	of	cosmopolitan	has	been	used	to	indicate	the	tolerance	 and	 respect	 for	 other	 cultures,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 live	 together	 with	differences	 (Werbner	2008).	Cosmopolitanism	 is	often	seen	as	an	alternative	 for	nationalism,	a	nationally	rootless	being	in	the	world,	and	as	thinking	“beyond	the	nation”.	More	recently,	 the	 theories	have	concentrated	on	cosmopolitan	 loyalties	and	localities	instead	of	lack	of	belonging	(Werbner	2008,	2).	
	Sociologist	 Craig	 Calhoun	 (2008)	 has	 criticized	 how	 people	 proclaiming	 to	 be	cosmopolitans	do	not	recognize	the	social	conditions	of	their	own	discourse,	as	they	see	 themselves	 being	 free	 from	 social	 belonging.	 Calhoun	 claims	 that	cosmopolitanism	is	often	presented	as	enemy	of	national	solidarity,	even	though	it	could	 be	 seen	 just	 as	 special	 sort	 of	 belonging	 and	 complementing	 national	solidarity	(Calhoun	2008,	441-2).	
	Following	Calhoun,	I	will	argue	that	in	Singapore	cosmopolitanism	is	in	fact	strongly	linked	to	nationalism.	Both	Singapore	as	a	state	and	Singaporeans	themselves	can	be	 seen	 as	 inherently	 cosmopolitan.	 Multi-ethnic	 nation	 can	 work	 as	 a	 space	 of	myriad	cosmopolitan	encounters	and	experiences,	where	even	patriotism	is	in	fact	
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by	definition	cosmopolitan	(Werbner	2008,	13).	In	multi-ethnic	nation-states	there,	has	to	be	a	certain	cosmopolitan	aspirations	for	people	to	have	a	sense	of	national	belonging,	and	 for	 the	nationalist	 ideology	 to	be	effective	(ibid,	238).	Ambiguous	concept	of	vernacular	cosmopolitanism	that	combines	the	notion	on	local	and	global	is	probably	the	best	term	to	describe	the	Singaporean	understanding	of	nationalism	in	 this	sense.	Further	presentation	and	analysis	of	cosmopolitanism	 in	Singapore	will	be	presented	in	chapters	4.3	and	6.4.	
3.5 Everyday	nationalism	Compared	to	modernist	ideas	of	nationalism,	post-colonial	studies	and	more	recent	studies	about	globalization	and	cosmopolitanism	have	suggested	new	insights	into	understanding	of	nations,	national	 identities	and	nationalism	 in	today’s	world.	 In	this	thesis	Singapore	works	as	a	case	study	for	these	new	insights.	However,	to	study	Singaporean	 nationalism	 in	 more	 detail,	 I	 approach	 it	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
everyday	nationalism	that	elaborates	the	criticism	of	the	essentialist	idea	of	national	identity	as	something	natural	based	on	political	principles	of	nationalism.	
	Modern	 nationalist	 ideology	 is	 aimed	 to	 serve	 bureaucratic	 state	 and	 social	organization,	but	the	nations,	as	communities	of	people,	have	emotional	and	even	religious-like	 meanings	 (Eriksen	 1993,	 2).	 Imagining	 the	 nation	 is	 a	 conscious	practice	that	makes	the	nation	exist	 in	peoples’	minds	and	 lives.	New	scholars	of	nationalism	suggest	that	we	should	examine	the	presence	of	a	nation	in	everyday	life	 and	 how	 nationalism	 is	 used	 in	 contemporary	 nationalist	 settings	 (Calhoun	2008,	28-9).	Also,	in	order	to	analyze	the	cultural	battles	over	national	identity	and	to	 understand	 nationalism,	 we	 have	 to	 understand	 how	 people	 inhabit	 those	identities	and	how	it	shapes	their	life	(Reicher	&	Hopkins	2001,	3).	
	Nations,	 nationalism	 and	 national	 identification	 are	 relevant	 area	 of	 study	 for	anthropologists,	when	nation	can	be	seen	as	a	form	of	life	(Sabra	2007;	Billig	1995)	Rather	 than	 understanding	 the	 nation	 as	 an	 actual	 bounded	 entity,	 with	 a	homogeneous	 character,	 most	 anthropologists	 now	 concentrate	 on	 the	 idea	 of	"national	character"	and	 the	emphasis	 is	often	placed	on	core	national	values	as	discursive	 constructions,	which	have	emerged	 in	battles	over	 the	 right	 to	define	national	identity	(Hall	1992;	Sabra	2007,	95).	
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Cultural	theorist	Greg	Noble	though	has	criticized	the	focus	of	research	being	too	much	on	the	role	of	narrative	and	discursive	construction	of	national	identities,	as	it	does	not	explain	how	nation	 is	present	 in	our	everyday	 lives	(Noble	2002,	53).	Nationalism	 is	 not	 only	 an	 ideology	 promoted	 by	 the	 nation-states.	 It	 can	 be	 a	particular	orientation	to	the	world	and	a	deep	part	of	human	actions	and	practices	(Kapferer	 1989,	 202-3).	 Thus	 my	 aim	 is	 to	 first	 look	 at	 the	 official	 discursive	construction	of	nationalism,	and	then	how	it	is	linked	to	the	presence	of	nation	in	everyday	 life,	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 nationalism	 Singaporeans	 themselves	 might	promote.	
	Social	psychologist	Michael	Billig	was	interested	in	relationship	between	ideologies	and	 common	 sense	 and	 is	 well-known	 for	 his	 usage	 of	 everyday	 nationalism	 -approach.	 In	 his	 book	 Banal	 Nationalism	 (1995)	 Billig	 argues	 that	 the	 nation	 is	indicated	in	the	daily	lives,	and	nationalism	is	in	fact	the	endemic	condition,	a	form	of	life.	National	identity	means	the	possessing	of	ways	of	talking	about	nationhood,	and	 it	 is	 embodied	 in	 the	 banal	 habits	 of	 social	 life,	 such	 as	 using	 the	 national	language.	(Billig	1995,	8.)	So	for	Billig,	nationalism	is	something	normal	and	even	normative.		
	Sociologist	Michael	Skey	has	studied	everyday	nationalism	among	the	white	British	majority	in	UK	and	criticizes	Billig	for	the	lack	of	complexity	and	dynamism	in	his	study.	Instead	of	just	examining	the	banal	ways	to	belong	to	the	nation,	Skey	(2013)	asks	why	belonging	 to	 a	nation	might	matter	and	 to	whom,	and	when	 a	national	framework	 is	used	 to	make	 sense	 of	 a	particular	 issue	 (Skey	2013,	82;	 see	 also	Calhoun	 2007).	 In	 his	 study	 Skey	 is	 theorizing	 the	 micro-social	 dimension	 of	everyday	belonging	and	the	practical	and	psychological	benefits	of	having	a	settled	sense	of	 identity,	place	and	community.	National	 forms	of	 life	also	underpin	our	sense	of	ordered	reality	(Skey	2013,	94).	Unlike	Billig,	Skey	sees	that	nationalism	is	
a	concept,	which	organizes	life,	instead	of	being	a	norm	itself.	
	
A	social	anthropologist	Bruce	Kapferer	(1989)	sees	nationalism	as	ontology,	as	 it	instils	emotions	and	uses	symbols,	which	are	significant	for	people	and	represent	the	 nation-state.	 In	 other	 words,	 nationalism	 draws	 on	 meanings	 and	 symbols,	
	28
which	are	important	in	people’s	everyday	life	in	their	cultural	context.	Nationalism	organizes	the	normal	daily	life	to	be	a	conscious	experience	and	gives	meaning	to	it,	but	is	thus	not	same	thing	as	the	course	of	everyday	life.	(Kapferer	1989)	
	Sociologists	Jon	Fox	&	Cynthia	Miller-Idriss	(2008)	see	that	nation	is	constructed	in	the	 practices	 where	 people	 discursively	 construct	 the	 nation	 by	 talking.	 The	nationhood	also	frames	the	choices	people	make	and	the	opportunities	they	have	in	their	daily	life.	Similar	to	Kapferer,	they	see	that	nation	is	performed	by	meanings	embedded	 in	 national	 symbols	 and	 consumed	 when	 national	 differences	 are	expressed	through	consumption	habits	(ibid,	537-8).	
	Anthropologist	Michael	Herzfeld	(2005)	has	also	criticized	the	theories	on	imagined	national	communities	for	not	being	grounded	in	the	details	of	everyday	life,	which	makes	it	look	like	ordinary	people	would	not	have	an	impact	on	the	form	of	their	local	nationalism.	Official	nationalist	ideologies	are	often	taken	as	accurate	accounts	of	what	the	nation-states	are	actually	about.	Thus	anthropology	has	a	lot	to	give	for	the	study	of	nationalism,	as	it	looks	at	the	significance	of	particular:	how	living	social	actors	understand	nationalism	and	how	it	emerges	in	intimate	social	spaces,	which	ethnographers	 explore.	 Herzfeld	 emphasizes	 the	 localized	 specifies	 that	 give	nationalism	 distinctive	 meaning	 in	 an	 enormous	 range	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	settings.	(Ibid,	6-11.)	The	nation-state	and	its	essentializing	functions	should	not	be	treated	as	“enemies	of	everyday	experience”,	but	they	have	to	be	understood	as	part	of	the	social	life.	(Herzfeld	2005.)	
	In	 this	 chapter	 I	have	discussed	how	 the	 theories	of	nations	has	developed,	and	presented	the	relevant	debates	in	the	context	of	Singapore.	The	interest	lies	mainly	in	 two	 issues:	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 state’s	 strategic	 nation	 building	 resonates	 in	people’s	daily	experiences	of	the	nation,	and	nationalism’s	homogenizing	force	in	a	culturally	diverse	setting.	Following	Bryman	(2012,	536),	I	ask	how	social	reality	of	
a	 nation	 is	 produced	 and	 made	 real	 through	 national	 discourses	 and	 how	 the	relationship	between	nationalist	discourses	and	reality	is	manifested.	
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4 Formation of national discourses in Singapore
As	I	mentioned	earlier,	the	Living	with	Myths	–	project	and	seminars	directed	me	to	assemble	 the	 thesis	 around	 different	 national	 discourses,	 which	 are	 part	 of	 the	formation	and	understanding	of	Singaporeanness.	This	project	looks	at	five	different	myths	about	Singapore	and	Singaporeans4:	
The	Singapore	Story:	The	myth	 that	 all	 Singaporeans	have	 a	 shared	history	
Vulnerability:	 The	 myth	 that	 Singapore	 is	 vulnerable,	 and	 young	Singaporeans	must	not	take	our	security	for	granted	
Pioneers:	The	myth	that	people’s	life	experiences	mirrored	the	nation’s	progress	from	Third	to	First	World	
Apathy:	 The	 myth	 that	 Singaporeans	 are	 inert	 and	 require	 constant	intervention	from	the	government	
Faultlines:	 Myths	 of	 race,	 religion	 and	 culture,	 both	 in	 framing	dangerous	faultiness	and	an	encompassing	multiculturalism	
	In	this	chapter	I	present	four	different	national	discourses	I	have	derived	from	these	myths	and	from	academic	studies	about	nation	building	in	Singapore.	The	chapter	functions	also	as	an	overview	to	Singaporean	society	and	its	history.	
	
I	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 dominant	 discourses	 are	 connected	 to	 the	 nation	building	and	construction	of	national	identity.	In	the	chapters	entailing	my	analysis	
I	will	show	how	they	contribute	to	the	idea	of	Singaporeanness.	When	considering	about	 the	 discourses,	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 both	 national	 ideology	 and	idealistic	definitions	of	 a	nation-state.	The	nation-formation	 in	Singapore	reflects	the	 Eurocentric	 ideas	 of	 nations	 and	 ideals	 of	 Asian	 society.	 The	 national	imagination	 of	 Singaporeanness	 is	 disciplined	 strongly	 with	 these	 discourses	(Hudson	2013).	
4.1 Discourse	of	vulnerability	–	Nation	under	a	threat	The	historical	narrative	of	Singapore	is	commonly	known	as	“The	Singapore	Story”5,	which	describes	the	island’s	development	from	a	small	fishing	village	to	a	modern,	prosperous	city-state	and	financial	hub	in	Asia	in	mere	50	years.	In	1959	the	British	granted	 self-governance	 for	 Singapore	 after	 140	 years	 of	 colonial	 rule.	 People’s	
																																																								4	http://livingwithmyths.wix.com/livingwithmyths#!about/c1enr	5	Interestingly,	it	is	also	the	title	of	former,	rather	dictatorial,	PM	Lee	Kuan	Yew’s	memoirs.	
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Action	Party	(PAP),	led	by	Lee	Kuan	Yew,	won	the	first	elections	and	took	charge	of	the	new	country.	Neighboring	Malaysia	was	formed	in	1963	and	the	point	was	that	Singapore	would	merge	with	Malaysia.	However,	 this	plan	did	not	work	out	and	Singapore	 was	 “kicked	 out	 from	 Malaysia”,	 as	 the	 popular	 phrase	 goes,	 and	Singapore	became	an	independent	state	in	August	1965.	This	chain	of	events	is	said	to	be	a	traumatic	beginning	for	Singaporean	state,	since	even	the	new	state	leaders	from	PAP	did	not	believe	 that	 the	 tiny	 city-state	would	ever	 survive	on	 its	own.	(Hudson	2013,	36-7.)	
	The	beginning	of	the	Singaporean	nation	is	another	story.	Theoretically,	Singapore	started	as	a	state	without	a	nation:	there	was	no	peoplehood	upon	which	to	build	the	state,	and	people	did	not	necessarily	have	an	interest	to	form	a	nation.	Thus	the	new	government	took	an	active	role	in	building	the	nation	from	above	in	order	for	Singapore	to	become	a	plausible	state	 in	the	world.	(Kwok	&	Ali	1998,	113.)	The	point	was	to	unify	the	diverse	immigrant	population	under	one	nation	so	that	people	would	identify	themselves	collectively	as	Singaporeans.	The	construction	national	identity	was	purely	 a	 state-driven	project.	 (Velayutham	2007,	10-1.)	The	 strong	transnational	ties	people	had	with	their	former	home	countries	were	oversimplified	or	totally	dismissed	in	history	writing	to	enable	the	creation	of	new,	pure	national	and	historical	narrative	of	Singapore	(ibid,	25).	
	The	 national	 narrative	 thus	 emerged	 from	 the	 circumstances	 of	 becoming	 an	independent	 city-state	 unwillingly,	 coupled	 with	 having	 an	 ethnically	 diverse	population	on	a	small	island	without	any	natural	resources.	The	people	were	seen	as	the	only	resource	the	new	state	had,	thus	managing	this	resource	has	since	been	the	main	 concern	of	 the	 government,	 in	order	 for	 them	 to	build	 a	 coherent	 and	efficient	nation-state.	(Hudson	2013,	36-	37.)	The	government	turned	Singapore’s	challenges	 into	 its	 strength,	 and	 so	 the	 discourse	 of	 a	 “vulnerable	 nation”	 and	constantly	 looming	 crisis	 of	 disunity	 became	 a	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	Singaporean	nation.		
	To	answer	the	lack	of	homogeneity	and	cultural	commonalities	integral	for	nation-states,	the	government	promoted	the	idea	of	“unity	in	diversity”.	This	is	thought	to	
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bring	cohesion	in	multi-ethnic	societies.	Furthermore,	the	government	turned	the	idea	into	an	entire	ideology.	The	disunity	of	the	nation	would	be	a	great	threat	for	everyone	(Ang	&	Stratton	1995,	80-1).	As	the	nation	was	imagined	to	be	fragile,	fear	became	a	resource	for	nation-building	and	social	control	in	Singapore.	Through-out	the	years,	there	has	been	a	fear	of	communism,	of	slow	economy,	of	both	population	increase	and	decrease,	of	racial	violence,	of	Westernization	and	spread	of	 liberal	values,	 and	 lastly,	 a	 fear	 of	 lack	 of	 national	 identity	 and	 inappropriate	 national	behavior.	This	means	that	the	society	and	its	people	themselves	are	imagined	to	be	the	biggest	threat	to	a	durable	nation.	(Hudson	2013,	39.)	
	Historically	Singapore	has	always	been	in	transition:	from	colony	to	a	post-colonial	state,	and	all	 the	way	 to	 a	booming	 first-world	economy	 in	50	years.	This	 is	also	embedded	 in	 its	national	narrative,	which	 focuses	on	 fragility	and	survival	 in	the	face	 of	 constant	 societal	 changes.	 (Velayutham	 2007,	 27).	 The	 government	 is	constantly	 reminding	 people	 that	 developing	 shared	 national	 identity	 and	sustaining	 economic	development	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 survival	 of	 Singapore	 (Sim	2011,	747).	
	With	this	kind	of	discourse	the	state	has	been	able	to	change	its	policies	and	mobilize	people	 to	 support	 the	 government’s	 aims	 at	 relatively	 short	notice	 (Velayutham	2007,	12.)	This	discourse	also	shapes	and	institutes	the	acceptance	of	government’s	capitalist	and	pragmatic	approaches	to	nation	building.	The	idea	of	“not	having	any	other	choice	than	to	do	what	the	government	thinks	is	the	best”	is	well	embedded	in	the	reality	of	life	in	Singapore	(Sidhu	2003,	174.)	
	Alongside	 the	government,	 the	protagonist	of	The	Singapore	Story	 is	 the	pioneer	generation:	 the	 immigrants	 who	 had	 settled	 in	 Singapore	 and	 contributed	 in	building	 the	nation	 together.	This	 “Pioneer	 Spirit”	 is	 something	 the	 government	wants	to	transmit	to	the	younger	generation.	As	most	young	Singaporeans	grew	up	in	an	affluent	and	comfortable	era,	 the	government	wants	 to	remind	them	of	 the	work	 and	 scarifices	 their	 parents	 and	 older	 generation	 have	 had	 to	 go	 through	(Tarulevicz	2010,	26).	Some	think	that	the	young	Singaporeans	are	merely	enjoying	the	fruits	while	the	older	Singaporeans	ones	have	had	a	first-hand	experience	of	how	
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Singapore	went	from	rags	to	riche;	how	hard	everyone	had	worked	alongside	the	government	for	that	to	happen.	The	young	people	in	the	present	times	do	not	share	these	experiences.	
	To	 fix	 this	disjuncture	between	old	and	young	generations’	different	national	 life	experiences,	and	for	the	national	narrative	to	be	justified,	the	state	has	had	to	instill	the	national	discourse	to	young	Singaporeans	already	in	their	childhood.	One	way	to	do	this	has	been	the	National	Education	curriculum	implemented	in	schools	since	1997.	The	national	education	plays	a	big	part	in	shaping	the	collective	memory	of	young	 Singaporeans.	 This	 education	 started	 already	 in	 primary	 schools	 and	subsequently	 introduced	 upwards	 to	 the	 college	 level.	 The	 argument	 for	 the	curriculum	has	been	that	since	the	young	Singaporeans	do	not	share	the	experience	of	 hardships,	 and	 do	 not	 recognize	 the	 vulnerable	 nature	 of	 the	 society,	 the	government	has	to	“shape	their	attitudes”	for	them	to	“understand	how	we	got	to	where	we	are”	(Tarulevicz	2010,	31).		
	According	to	Ministry	of	Education	(MoE),	the	aim	of	National	Education	is	“…to	develop	national	cohesion,	cultivate	instinct	for	survival	as	a	nation,	and	instill	in	our	students	confidence	in	our	nation's	future	by	fostering	
a	sense	of	identity,	pride	and	self-respect	as	Singaporeans”	
	The	key	to	this	is	that	the	students	have	to	acquire	the	knowledge	of	the	Singapore	story	 and	 understand	 “how	 Singapore	 succeeded	 against	 the	 odds	 to	 become	 a	nation”,	and	to	recognize	“Singapore's	unique	 challenges,	 constraints	 and	 vulnerabilities,	which	make	us	different	from	other	countries”	
	This	 instillation	of	the	core	values	of	how	a	Singaporean	way	of	 life	should	be,	 is	presumed	 to	 ensure	 the	 continued	 success	 and	 well-being	 of	 Singapore.	 The	emphasis	is	on	the	unique	nature	of	Singaporean	society	and	the	constant	need	for	cohesion	and	confidence	for	the	sake	of	the	future.	In	addition,	the	official	messages	of	National	Education	tell	the	story	of	vulnerability,	as	these	extracts	reveal:	“We	take	pride	in	shaping	our	own	unique	way	of	life”	“We	 find	our	own	way	 to	 survive	and	prosper,	 turning	challenge	 into	opportunity”	“We	are	proud	to	defend	Singapore	ourselves,	no	one	else	is	responsible	for	our	security	and	well-being”		
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“We	value	our	diversity	and	are	determined	to	stay	a	united	people”	“United,	determined	and	well-prepared,	we	have	what	it	takes	to	build	a	bright	future	for	ourselves,	and	to	progress	together	as	one	nation.”	
	With	this	discourse	of	a	vulnerable	nation,	Singaporeans	are	directed	to	a	constant	national	soul	searching	exercise	as	a	way	for	the	state	to	demand	people	to	be	self-reflecting	and	conscious	of	their	nationness	(Velayutham	2007,	39;	Koh	2005,	76).	It	has	also	been	the	driving	idea	and	legitimation	behind	the	social	engineering	and	strict	population	control	politics	in	Singapore.	The	discourse	of	crisis	and	survival	has	been	maintained	through	the	50	years	of	history,	and	works	as	a	strategy	for	the	government	 to	 sustain	 its	 ideological	 control	over	 the	nation	 (Hudson	2013,	39;	Nasir	&	Turner	2013,	436;	Sidhu	2002;	Brown	1998).	Such	instilled	national	ethos	has	encouraged	Singaporeans	to	work	hard	for	their	country	and	made	the	society	into	what	is	today	(Yao	2007,	47).		
4.2 Multicultural	discourse	–	Unity	in	diversity	One	of	the	first	challenges	for	the	new	state	was	to	unite	the	culturally	and	ethnically	diverse	 population.	 However,	 the	 government	 focused	 first	 on	 developing	 the	economic	and	 infrastructural	basis	of	 the	 state	and	 “postponed	 the	nationhood”.	(Kwok	 &	 Ali	 1998,	 113).	 The	 nation	 building	 was	 also	 “de-culturalised”	 as	 the	government	 did	 not	 want	 to	 emphasize	 any	 ethnic	 tradition	 or	 heritage	 over	another.	Thus	the	state	adopted	the	common	unity-in-diversity	approach	to	ensure	that	 people	 could	 form	 a	 coherent	 nation.	 (Chua	 1995,	 30-1.)	 With	 this	 new	constitution,	 all	 groups	 are	 guaranteed	 equality,	 access	 to	 public	 services	 and	infrastructures,	 and	 the	 same	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 that	 everyone	 has	inherited,	 as	 the	 new	 state	 was	 declared	 to	 be	 multiracial,	 multilingual,	 multi-religious,	and	multicultural	(Ackermann	1997,	456).	
	However,	 to	 control	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 the	 population,	 and	 various	 ethnic	communities	and	dialect	groups,	people	were	officially	categorized	into	four	ethnic	groups.	Following	the	census	categories	used	by	British	colonial	rule,	people	were	marked	as	Chinese,	Malay,	Indian	or	Others	(mainly	Eurasians).	This	is	commonly	known	as	CMIO-model.	These	categories	structure	one’s	identity	both	in	legal	and	social	ways	and	solidify	culturally	mixed	backgrounds	(Ong	2005,	7).	Every	group	
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has	its	own	allocated	mother	language,	while	English	is	the	second	language	and	also	the	 language	 in	 education	 (Siddique	 1990,	 36.)	 The	 different	 religions	 and	traditional	 festivals	of	 these	groups	are	equally	 respected	e.g.	 in	 terms	of	public	holidays	(Chua	2003,	61).	
	Ethnicity,	or	race,	 is	 thus	 institutionalized	and	 the	categories	are	relevant	also	 in	daily	 life	 (Siddique	1990,	37).	 A	Singaporean’s	 race	 is	 stated	 in	 ID	 cards,	 and	 in	school	one	has	 to	study	 the	respective	mother	 language.	Also	 the	public	housing	blocks	have	racial	quotas,	which	follow	the	percentual	proportion	of	ethnic	groups	of	the	total	population.	Racial	category	is	inherited	and	determined	by	one’s	father,	which	 ensures	 that	 the	 four	 categories	 are	 maintained	 and	 reproduced	automatically	 despite	 possible	 mixed	 marriage.	 This	 means	 that	 any	 mixed	ethnicities	 are	 officially	 dismissed.	 The	 CMIO	 scheme	 is	 also	 encoded	 in	 every	cultural	sphere	from	food	and	clothes	to	arts	and	entertainment	(Chua	2003,	74),	as	almost	everything	can	be	easily	indicated	belonging	to	certain	culture.	
	Ethnic	categorization	is	therefore	a	way	for	the	state	to	control	multiculturalism	by	using	race	as	a	tool	of	governance	and	a	form	of	social	control	(Chua	2003).	These	categories	are	the	basis	of	a	Singaporean’s	understanding	of	multiculturalism	and	an	essential	part	of	Singaporeanness	itself.	Ethnicity	offers	multiple	identities	to	be	Singaporean,	but	also	 limits	 the	emergence	of	 the	possible	 supra-ethnic	national	identification	of	being	only	Singaporean	without	ethnic	affixes	(Siddique	1990,	37;	also	Eriksen	1993).	
	This	multicultural	discourse	in	Singapore	is	in	fact	quite	narrow.	The	fixed	ethnic	categories	 ignore	that	there	are	35%	foreigners	 in	the	country,	who	might	not	fit	into	 this	model.	 In	Living	with	Myths	–seminar	on	14th	of	February	 in	2015,	Dr.	Christine	 Han	 shared,	 that	 in	 schools	 young	 Singaporeans	 understood	multiculturalism	according	to	CMIO-model.	Han	points	out	further	that	there	should	be	wider	understanding	of	plural	society	in	Singapore	and	cites	London’s	diversity	as	an	example.	
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The	vast	debate	of	immigration	in	Singapore	also	indicates	this	tendency.	Despite	the	multicultural	approach	deeply	embedded	in	the	society,	there	are	limits	to	who	might	and	can	be	accepted	into	the	racial	structure.	The	CMIO-model	affects	clearly	to	the	immigration	patterns,	since	it	is	in	the	government’s	interest	to	maintain	the	racial	balance	and	integrate	immigrants	in	the	existing	model	(Nasir	&	Turner	2014,	14;	28).	This	explains	 the	amount	of	Chinese,	Malaysian,	 Indonesian,	and	 Indian	immigrants	 in	Singapore.	However,	Singaporean	social	scientist	Hong	Liu	 (2014)	argues	 that	co-ethnicity	and	common	cultural	heritage	play	 little	 role	 in	 shaping	local	Singaporeans’	view	of	the	current	diaspora	groups	in	the	country.	A	Chinese	permanent	resident	would	not	be	seen	as	Singaporean.	Despite	being	an	immigrant	society	where	everyone’s	ancestry	 is	somewhere	else,	 the	celebrated	diversity	 is	limited	only	to	Singaporeans.	
4.3 Cosmopolitan	discourse	–	Eastern	values,	Western	lifestyle	Post-colonial	Singapore	faced	a	dilemma:	how	to	adopt	the	Western	modernity	but	also	defend	the	Asian	traditions	and	values?	Singapore’s	mental	position	between	East	and	West	has	posed	a	problem	for	nation	building.	It	is	important	to	understand	that	 not	 only	 the	 colonial	 history,	 but	 also	 the	 politics	 of	 national	 and	 cultural	development	have	made	Singapore	both	an	Eastern	and	Western	country.	Eastern	cultural	influences	are	nowadays	represented	mainly	in	local	practices,	traditions	and	values.	(Ho,	Debbie	2006,	18.)	Western	influences	originate	from	the	colonial	times	 and	 are	 emphasized	 to	maintain	 Singapore’s	place	 in	 global	 economy	 and	modern,	Western	world.	
	The	 government’s	 dilemma	 is	 that	 the	 West	 also	 represents	 moral	 decay	 and	cultural	regression	in	relation	to	Eastern	Asian	aspects	of	the	nation	(Yao	2007,	53).	Ang	 &	 Sratton	 (1995,	72)	 call	 this	 “the	bastard	 complex	of	 Singapore’s	Western	parentage”.	 In	 1980’s	 there	 was	 a	 growing	 concern	 about	 how	 the	 global	 and	Western	 influences	 might	 affect	 the	 Singaporean	 mind-set	 and	 functioning	 as	 a	nation.	The	solution	was	the	culturalization	of	economic	and	political	issues	(Sidhu	2003,	176).	PM	Lee	Kuan	Yew	made	a	distinction	between	soft	and	hard	cultures,	the	 latter	 referring	 to	 East	 Asian	 cultures,	 which	 are	 tough,	 resilient	 and	economically	 successful	 (Hudson	 2013,	 18).	 This	 defined	 Singapore	 more	 as	 a	
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Chinese	country	despite	the	multicultural	politics,	and	Chinese	culture	has	indeed	claimed	to	be	the	practical	and	ideological	basis	for	Singapore’s	success.	Lee	Kuan	Yew	did	not	hide	his	fondness	of	Chinese	and	Confucian	heritage	over	other	ethnic	cultures	 in	 Singapore,	 despite	 this	 kind	 of	 favoring	 was	 officially	 denied	 in	constitution	(Hudson	2013,	26-28).	
	In	1990’s	the	fight	against	the	spread	of	decadent	Western	values	continued	with	a	new	tactic.	The	PM	Goh	Chok	Tong	demanded	for	a	new	national	ideology	on	which	“to	anchor	a	Singaporean	identity”	(Yao	2007,	21).	In	1991	a	White	Paper	on	Asian	
values	 was	 declared	 to	 correct	 the	 national	 and	 cultural	 direction	 of	Singaporeanness.	 The	 Confucian	 values	 of	 self-discipline,	 hard	 work,	 filial	responsibility,	and	 respect	of	authority	were	declared	as	cultural	dimension	and	basis	of	Singaporean	nation.	Official	five	values	were:	i) the	nation	before	community	and	individual	ii) family	as	the	basic	unit	of	the	society	iii) community	supporting	for	their	individuals	iv) racial	and	religious	harmony	v) consensus	in	policy	making	(Yao	2007,	21).	These	Asian	values	have	been	used	to	explain	the	success	and	achievements	of	other	economies	of	Asian	Tigers	too,	as	“Asian	interpretation	of	modernity”	(Velayutham	2007,	 4).	 This	 constructed	 national	 culture	 functions	 as	 a	 strategy	 for	 political	control,	when	culture	is	used	to	explain	the	functioning	of	a	society	(Ong	2005,	17-19).	
	The	state	wants	to	produce	the	Asian	kind	of	“good	culture”	embodied	in	individual	behavior,	which	would	 then	 collectively	 represent	national	 Singaporean	 identity	(Yao	2007,	72).	In	a	sense,	Singapore	 is	trying	to	be	non-Western	although	 it	has	already	been	westernized	 from	 the	very	beginning	of	 its	national	history	 (Ang	&	Stratton	1995,	67).	This	cultural	complexity	is	problematic	for	national	ideology,	as	Singapore	is	neither	Western	nor	Eastern	enough	to	be	culturally	coherent	nation.	It	also	makes	national	identity	to	be	signified	negatively	and	as	defective	(ibid,	71).	Furthermore,	 this	 ambivalence	 has	 significantly	 shaped	 the	 social	 and	 political	reality	of	Singapore	(ibid,	71).		
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Besides	promoting	of	Asian	values	and	rejecting	Western	influences,	the	state	has	also	 tried	 to	combine	 these	 two	approaches	 so	 that	people’s	 sense	of	 the	nation	ought	 to	 be	 both	 global	 and	 cosmopolitan,	 local	 and	 patriotic	 at	 the	 same	 time.	People	 should	have	 a	cosmopolitan	national	 spirit,	as	Singapore	 is	made	 to	be	 a	global	 playground,	 where	 people	 are	 expected	 to	 embrace	 globalization	 and	cosmopolitanism	(Yeoh	2004,	2436).	The	western	modernity,	urban	 lifestyle,	and	materialistic	consumption	should	be	enjoyed	while	being	thoroughly	Asian	national	subjects	 (Yao	 2007,	 73).	 Officially	 cosmopolitanism	 in	 Singapore	 is	defined	 as	 a	quality	 of	 someone	 “who	 is	 familiar	 with	 global	 trends	 and	 lifestyles	 and	 feels	comfortable	working	and	 living	 in	Singapore	as	well	as	overseas”	 (Singapore	21	Committee).	
	There	are	clearly	two	contradictory	expectations	for	Singaporean	national	identity.		The	younger	generation	is	seen	especially	to	be	inclined	towards	the	Western	values	and	 lifestyle,	 which	 makes	 them	 lacking	 the	 ideal	 Singaporean	 identity.	 For	 the	state’s	perspective,	national	identity	should	be	fixed	and	unchanging;	any	hybridity	signals	the	lack	of	such	national	identity,	which	again	threatens	national	unity	(Ang	
&	Stratton	1995,	80-1).	This	 is	also	why	 the	government	has	 ignored	 the	hybrid	sociological	realities	of	Singaporean	everyday	life	(Velayutham	2007,	39),	as	will	be	highlighted	in	my	analysis.	
4.4 Pragmatic	discourse	-	A	gift	of	social	life	Classic	theories	of	nationalism	have	often	concluded	that	nationalism	is	a	product	of	modern	 conditions.	 In	Singapore,	 the	government	has	attempted	 to	 create	 those	conditions	 that	 would	 advance	 the	 emergence	 of	 homogenous	 national	 identity	(Velayutham	2007,	43)	and	has	been	admittedly	successful	 in	 it	 in	the	sense	that	Singapore	 is	the	most	modernized	country	 in	Southeast	Asia.	The	nation	building	has	been	guided	above	all	by	pragmatic	politics	where	any	action	that	aids	economic	development	is	good	and	legitimated	(Chua	1995).	Unlike	other	former	colonies	of	Southeast	Asia,	Singapore	has	maintained	close	cultural	and	economic	connections	with	 its	 colonial	 powers	 and	 embraced	 capitalism,	 whereas	 the	 neighboring	countries	have	fought	against	capitalist	exploitation	of	their	resources	(Sidhu	2003,	173-4).		
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The	cultural	development	of	Singaporean	nation	has	also	been	very	pragmatic,	as	it	should	not	jeopardize	the	economic	progress	(Chua	1995,	105;	Chang	2012,	693).	The	government	has	been	actively	creating	national	identity,	which	would	fit	and	respond	to	global	economic	demands.	Cultural	practices	have	to	be	modified	so	that	they	 would	 not	 hinder	 development,	 and	 Singaporean	 citizens	 should	 have	appropriate	attitudes	to	labor	and	consumption.	(Hudson	2013,	25.)	By	creating	a	sense	 of	 prosperous	 future	 and	 embedding	 a	 developmentalist	 ideology	 to	 the	people,	the	government	has	assured	that	they	would	be	prepared	to	pay	the	cost,	however	 high	 for	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 nation-state.	 The	 result	 has	 been	 goal-orientated	 meritocratic	 society,	 a	 system	 that	 rewards	 those	 who	 succeed	 and	perform	the	best	(Hudson	2013,	27;	Chua	2000,	186).	
	Also	the	social	conditions	of	Singaporean	society	are	disciplined	in	order	to	create	an	economically	efficient	nation	(Chua	2000,	186).	Deriving	from	the	discourse	of	vulnerability	 as	 much	 as	 from	 pragmatism,	 the	 state	 exercises	 strong	 social	engineering	 to	 control	 the	 imagined,	 looming	 national	 crisis.	 The	 promise	 of	economic	prosperity,	improvement	of	Singaporeans	living	standards,	and	delivering	of	 material	 goods	 and	 well-being	 has	 been	 a	 powerful	 ideological	 tool	 for	 the	government	 to	 legitimate	 its	 social	 engineering	 and	 interventions,	 and	 even	 the	limitations	 of	 individual	 freedom	 and	 press	 censorship	 (Wee	 2001,	 238).	 The	government	 has	 indeed	 gained	 strong	 support	 from	 the	 people	 in	 this	 sense	(Velayutham	2007,	30).	
	Even	the	multicultural	CMIO-model	falls	under	the	 logic	of	economics,	as	cultural	hybridity	would	interfere	the	nation-building	project,	which	focuses	on	developing	an	 internationally	 competitive	 entrepreneurial	 culture	 (Sidhu	 2003,	 197.)	 For	example,	the	bilingual	language	policy	works	as	an	argument	for	economic	progress.	English	provides	cosmopolitan	cultural	capital,	making	migration	and	working	 in	other	countries	an	easy	option.	(Plüss	2009,	200.)	On	the	other	hand,	the	Chinese	emphasis	on	culture	and	society	also	implies	the	importance	of	strong	economic	and	diplomatic	relations	with	China.	
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The	life	of	Singaporeans	has	been	politicized	when	the	government	has	intervened	in	 almost	 every	 aspect	 of	 social	 life:	 housing,	 education,	 culture,	 language,	reproduction	and	 family	 life,	religion,	car	ownership,	 the	keeping	of	pets,	buying	chewing	gum,	flushing	the	toilet…	you	name	it	(Hudson	2013,	34-5.)		According	to	Chua	(1995,	204),	the	relationship	between	the	people	and	the	government	is	so-called	 father-knows-best	 leadership.	 Sociologists	 Nasir	 &	 Turner	 (2014)	 have	named	it	as	soft	authoritanism,	when	citizen’s	duties	are	more	important	than	rights,	there	is	low	trust	between	leaders	and	electorate,	and	state	is	guiding	and	shaping	people’s	 voluntary	 private	 choices.	 They	 also	 use	 a	 metaphor	 of	 gardening	 to	describe	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 leadership	 and	 society:	 it	 is	 about	weeding	out	the	ones	who	do	not	fit	and	cultivating	the	others	with	education	and	Asian	values	(ibid,	34).	
	The	 regime	 is	 both	 economically	 liberal,	 politically	 authoritarian	 and	communitarian	(Nasir	&	Turner	2013,	344).	There	is	a	mutual	obligation	between	the	state	and	citizens,	as	the	state	provides	“a	gift	of	social	life”	and	expects	loyalty	and	commitment	in	return	from	the	citizens	(Velayutham	2007,	162).	Singaporeans	are	like	subjects,	whose	loyalty	and	support	for	the	government	is	reciprocated	by	protecting	 and	provision	 (Sim	2011,	758).	The	 government	 assumes	 that	 strong	economy	is	sufficient	basis	for	a	good	life,	and	that	Singaporeans	favor	the	right	for	better	 life	over	political	 ideology.	The	official	narrative	of	this	reciprocity	(safety,	security	and	prosperity	in	exchange	for	economic	discipline	and	social	conformity)	has	been	the	basis	of	the	nation	 formation	(ibid,	747-8),	and	 it	still	affects	to	the	young	Singaporeans	view	of	the	nation,	as	I	will	show	in	my	analysis.	
4.5 Singapore	today	Today’s	 Singapore	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 country	 where	 either	 ethnic	 diversity	 or	globalization	has	not	inhibited	the	development	of	nation-state	(Brown	1998,	35),	even	though	they	have	been	generally	regarded	to	be	major	obstacles	for	national	ideology.	Above	I	have	explained	how	Singapore	has	responded	to	the	challenges	of	nation-building.	But	where	is	Singapore	now?	Has	the	government	succeeded	in	its	efforts	 to	 create	 a	 sense	of	 Singaporeanness	 that	would	bind	 the	heterogeneous	population	together?	
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Since	1990’s	Asian	values	–discourse,	the	government	has	taken	even	stronger	and	more	 active	political	 stance	on	national	 identity	 issues.	The	discourses	of	home,	roots,	and	sense	of	belonging	have	taken	place	of	the	plain	pragmatic	and	economic	reasoning	for	the	nation	(Ortmann	2009,	31;	Sidhu	2003).	The	state	is	now	trying	to	underline	 Singaporean’s	 emotional	 ties	 and	 roots	 to	 the	 nation	 while	 they	 are	“global	citizens”	(Sidhu	2003,	176-8).	On	a	National	Day	speech	the	PM	Goh	Chok	Tong	(2002)	asked	Singaporeans	to	decide	whether	they	are	“stayers	or	quitters”.	This	 provocation	 was	 intended	 to	 question	 the	 emotional	 attachment	 and	 the	national	sense	of	belonging	Singaporeans	should	have	to	their	home	country	if	they	plan	to	emigrate.	
	The	lack	of	patriotism	and	national	identification	is	nowadays	an	important	political	issue,	as	 the	government	has	 identified	“a	social	and	political	apathy”	among	 the	“most	globalized”	younger	generation	(Kluver	&	Weber	2003,	381).	More	recently,	the	 so-called	 SG50-initiatives	 to	 celebrate	 Singapore’s	50th	 Jubilee	 year	 in	2015	have	mainly	concentrated	on	 forging	 a	sense	of	national	belonging	and	coherent	national	 identity	 among	 Singaporeans.	 These	 national	 identity	 campaigns	 target	mainly	the	younger	generation	of	Singaporeans	who	are	also	the	focus	of	my	study.	
	Political	 scientist	 David	 Brown	 (1998,	 42)	 has	 argued,	 that	 despite	 widespread	skepticism	 towards	 the	 government’s	 “nationalist	 propaganda”,	 majority	 of	Singaporeans	seem	to	be	quite	responsive	to	it.	On	the	other	hand,	more	recently	political	economist	Stephan	Ortmann	has	claimed	that	instead	of	blindly	accepting	nationalism	 promoted	 by	 the	 government,	 part	 of	 the	 population	 is	 developing	alternative	 idea	 of	 Singaporeanness,	 which	 rejects	 the	 notions	 of	 socio-political	control,	one-party	supremacy,	and	the	idea	of	cosmopolitanism	(Ortmann	2009,	36).	
	Due	 to	 the	 influx	 of	 immigrants,	 Singaporean’s	 concerns	 about	 the	 future	 and	relevance	of	the	nation	have	been	concretized.	Around	35%	of	the	inhabitants	of	the	city-state	 are	 non-Singaporeans,	 and	 the	 number	 is	 expected	 to	 grow.	 The	government’s	White	Paper	on	Immigration	published	in	2013	suggested	that	in	2030	there	would	be	6.9	million	people	living	in	the	island.	Singaporeans	low	birth	rate	and	lack	of	workforce	are	compensated	with	immigrants,	who	would	make	nearly	
	41
half	of	the	population	in	the	future.	These	plans	triggered	a	massive	demonstration	against	immigration	policies	on	16	February	2013,	as	Singaporeans	are	worried	of	their	rights	and	position	in	their	homeland.	(BBC	2013.)	
	In	 summary,	 Singapore’s	nation-building	 is	based	 on	 the	 very	 classic	nationalist	ideology,	but	due	to	being	a	post-colonial	multi-ethnic	city-state,	the	official	national	discourses	have	provided	some	interesting	dimensions.	The	economic	survival	and	success	in	global	world	is	important	for	Singaporean	state,	and	also	forms	the	basis	of	nationhood	and	legitimates	the	state’s	strong	hold	over	its	people	lives.	National	identity	should	be	based	both	on	Eastern	values	and	Western	influences,	and	despite	being	racially	categorized,	people	should	identify	themselves	only	Singaporeans.	
	The	national	discourses	 rely	on	 the	 idea	of	 Singaporeans	who	 are	 actors	 in	 this	scheme.	Sociologists	Kwok	&	Ali	(1998,	113)	suggest	that	it	would	be	insightful	to	look	at	the	formation	of	the	Singaporean	nationhood	rather	as	a	human	aspiration	and	as	a	cultural	question.	It	seems	that	the	Singaporeans	as	people	of	a	nation	have	been	 forgotten	 in	 the	 nation-building	 process	 and	 there	 has	 been	 little	understanding	and	consideration	of	the	people’s	daily	experiences	and	notions	of	the	nation.	The	government	believed	that	a	sense	of	national	belonging	would	not	develop	naturally	in	a	society	like	Singapore,	so	it	had	to	be	consciously	constructed	(Ortmann	 2009,	 27-31).	 In	 this	 sense	 the	 whole	 nation	 is	 a	 product	 of	 social	engineering.	
	
	“Nationalism	never	exists	apart	from	the	discourse	that	constitutes	it.”	(Calhoun	1997,	6).	
	Nationalist	discourses	are	part	of	the	cultural	understanding	and	rhetoric	that	frame	people’s	aspirations	and	ideas	of	nation	and	national	identity	(ibid).	In	the	next	three	chapters	I	will	analyze	Singaporeanness	as	a	human	aspiration,	from	the	perspective	of	my	informants.	The	discourses	presented	here	will	work	as	a	framework	for	the	analysis.	With	my	ethnographic	examples	from	the	everyday	life,	I	will	also	further	demonstrate	how	these	discourses	actualize	in	the	life	of	my	informants.	
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5 Pragmatic life under authoritarian rule
Nationalism	 is	not	 only	 a	political	 ideology	 of	 a	 state,	but	 a	 lived	 and	produced	experience	 that	 gives	 meaning	 to	 life	 (Kapferer	 1981).	 People	 of	 a	 nation	 are	supposed	to	have	common	cultural	and	national	experiences	in	their	daily	life,	which	bring	them	together	as	a	nation	and	create	a	mutual	feeling	of	belonging.	In	this	first	chapter	of	analysis	I	will	discuss	about	the	authoritarian	nature,	social	engineering	and	economic	pragmatism	of	Singaporean	society,	and	how	my	informants	connect	these	factors	to	Singaporeanness.	
	Writer	Tayie	Selasi	says	that	the	experiences	in	a	certain	place	make	one	local,	not	the	official	national	statuses	or	citizenships.	Singapore	is	a	particular	place	to	reflect	this	 idea,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 compact	 city-state	 that	 inhabits	 people	 from	 various	 ethnic,	cultural	 and	 national	 backgrounds.	 Based	 on	 my	 ethnographic	 observations,	 I	analyze	what	are	those	experiences	that	makes	one	not	only	local,	but	a	Singaporean	local.	
	Many	of	my	informants	concluded	that	one	has	to	be	“born	and	bred”	in	Singapore	in	order	to	be	regarded	as	Singaporean.	This	might	seem	quite	obvious	statement	for	any	nationality,	but	 I	argue	 that	 it	has	 a	particular	 significance	 in	Singapore,	where	general	markers	of	nationality,	like	mutual	language,	ethnicity,	religion	and	traditions,	are	non-existent,	and	the	amount	of	foreign	inhabitants	is	increasing.	One	has	to	understand	and	have	first-hand	experience	of	growing	up	and	 living	in	the	social,	 political	 and	 economic	 realities	 of	 Singapore,	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	Singaporean.	
5.1 Living	in	a	nanny-state	The	Singaporean	state	is	a	combination	of	authoritarian	regime	and	liberal	capitalist	economy	(see	chapter	4.4).	Observing	the	relationship	between	everyday	 life	and	state	authority	is	thus	rather	interesting.	In	the	beginning	of	my	fieldwork	I	wanted	to	avoid	talking	about	Singaporean	politics	with	my	informants,	as	it	was	not	in	my	interest	 to	 include	 political	 issues	 in	 my	 thesis.	 Very	 soon	 I	noticed	 that	 it	 was	impossible	as	the	government,	i.e.	PAP,	got	mentioned	almost	always	at	some	point.	
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Some	of	my	informants	expressed	subtle	anxiety	over	this	social	and	political	reality	of	 their	 everyday	 life.	 Freedom	 of	 speech	 and	 expression	 of	 ones	 opinions,	 and	restricted	life	choices	came	up	in	our	conversations,	as	we	ended	up	comparing	life	in	Singapore	and	in	Finland,	or	in	other	countries	where	some	of	them	had	lived	for	
a	while.	
	Because	 of	 the	 extensive	 socio-political	 interventions,	 the	 state	 is	 literally	everywhere	and	“creeps	into	any	serious	conversation	about	anything	in	Singapore”	(Chua	2003,	117).	My	informant	Andre,	a	25-year-old	Chinese-Singaporean,	said	to	me	 before	 our	 first	 meeting	 that	 he	 does	 not	 want	 to	 talk	 about	 politics	 as	 he	“minded	his	own	business”.	However,	later	on	he	gladly	brought	political	issues	to	the	table	himself.	It	was	hard	to	avoid	political	topics	when	my	informants	told	about	their	life	in	Singapore.	Singaporean-Malay	Amin,	24,	on	the	other	hand	was	always	eager	to	talk	about	politics	and	stated	that,	“…if	you	want	to	understand	Singaporeans,	you	have	to	understand	Lee	Kuan	Yew	and	PAP”.	
	There	 is	a	culture	of	fear	 in	Singapore,	which	stems	from	the	 fact	that	any	public	affair	and	opposing	opinion	about	such	is	deemed	to	be	political	(Kwok	&	Ali	1998,	122).	Singaporean-Chinese	Michelle,	21,	explained	to	me	how	Singaporeans	fear	to	get	entangled	in	the	very	strict	laws	and	how	“everyone	here	lives	a	very	safe	life	and	don’t	want	to	take	any	risk	in	any	situation”.	Andre’s	comment	about	minding	his	 own	 business	 and	 Michelle’s	 explanation	 refer	 to	 the	 restricted	 freedom	 of	speech	 in	 Singapore.	 Some	 of	 the	 locals	 I	 met	 were	 even	 concerned	 about	 my	research	 topic,	as	 they	 felt	 that	 it	 is	daring,	or	not	so	wise	 to	write	about	nation	building	or	Singaporean’s	sense	of	belonging.	Some	were	surprised	when	I	told	that	there	are	lots	of	studies	about	the	topic	in	NUS	libraries.	Although,	I	was	told	at	ARI	that	the	researchers	have	to	come	up	with	creative	ways	to	express	their	opinion	and	write	out	their	findings	in	order	to	pass	the	censorship.	
	There	is	clearly	an	understanding	that	some	issues	cannot	be	publicly	spoken	about	in	Singapore.	Hudson	(2013,	34)	argues	that	“every	Singaporean	understands	the	limits	of	what	can	be	said”	and	the	possible	 legal	consequences	even	though	 it	 is	nothing	but	clear	where	the	boundaries	are.	The	mechanism	of	control	is	very	vague	
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in	Singapore	and	that	is	the	art	in	it;	the	boundaries	are	not	clearly	defined	until	they	are	 crossed	 (Bokhorst-Heng	 2002,	 563).	 This	 has	 become	 clear	 when	 some	Singaporean	 bloggers	 have	 been	 prosecuted	 for	 crossing	 this	 line	 online.	 The	Internal	Security	Act	permits	detention	without	 formal	charges,	and	Singapore	 is	ranked	153rd	out	of	174	 countries	by	 freedom	of	 speech	 (World	Press	Freedom	Index	2015).	
	In	March	2015,	after	former	PM	Lee	Kuan	Yew’s	funeral,	Amos	Yee,	a	17-year-old	Singaporean	 boy	 uploaded	 a	 video	 on	 YouTube	 where	 he	 criticized	 Lee	 and	compared	him	to	Jesus.	He	was	arrested	and	charged.	After	this,	there	has	been	lots	of	debate	of	what	can	be	said	aloud	and	what	not.	Especially	the	debate	about	Lee	Kuan	Yew’s	legacy	seemed	to	divide	Singaporeans	on	two	camps:	those	who	wanted	to	be	critical	about	Lee’s	dictatorial	actions,	and	those	who	thought	that	even	his	most	radial	policies	of	control	were	reasonable	in	the	name	benefitting	the	nation.	The	price	of	having	safe	and	efficient	nation	is	to	give	up	one’s	right	to	criticize	and	there	should	be	no	need	to	question	the	government’s	policies,	 interventions	and	actions,	as	they	are	in	the	end	for	best	of	the	nation.	
	This	climate	of	fear	and	restricted	expressing	of	opinions	was	noticeable	but	also	self-explanatory	for	my	informants	in	a	sense	that	they	themselves	recognized	this	aspect	being	part	of	the	Singaporean	society.	One	has	to	adjust	and	live	in	the	midst	of	 this	political	 reality.	 In	Living	 with	Myths	 –seminar	 on	24th	 of	 October	2014,	researcher	Elaine	Ho	wanted	to	underline	how	“Singaporeans	are	not	docile	bodies”.	There	 is	 a	popular	 stereotype	 about	 Singaporeans	being	 like	 sheep	 living	under	authoritarian	rule	and	not	speaking	up.	However,	many	of	informants	took	this	more	with	bantering.	My	Singaporean	 friend	who	usually	 joined	me	 in	 the	Living	with	Myths	-seminars	was	joking	that	he	would	get	in	trouble	if	the	government	caught	him	attending	such	events.	
	The	common	attitude	seemed	to	be	that	this	is	how	Singapore	is	and	you	just	have	to	deal	with	it.	This	is	also	part	of	Singaporeanness	in	a	sense	that	only	those	who	grew	up	in	Singaporean	society	are	able	to	understand	and	tolerate	it.	In	a	humorous	
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listing	of	“How	to	Piss	off	a	Singaporean”	(Seah	2013)	one	point	is	that	one	should	not	assume	that	Singaporeans	are	politically	ignorant:	“Talking	about	Singaporean	politics	is	only	exciting	when	you’ve	lived	here	long	enough	to	know	its	nuances,	so	excuse	us	if	we	don’t	bother	trying	to	clue	you	tourists	in”.	
	Another	popular	claim	is	that	there	is	no	proper	culture	of	political	participation	in	Singapore.	 Ortmann	 (2009,	 42)	 argues	 that	 while	 many	 Singaporeans	 “long	 for	greater	participation,	most	have	become	convinced	that	nothing	can	be	changed”.	Singaporean	 online	writer	 and	blogger	 Visankanv	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 the	 young	Singaporeans	feel	that	they	do	not	have	stake	on	their	own	country,	as	they	have	not	had	any	role	 in	nation	building	and	no	chance	 to	affect	 it.	According	 to	historian	Nicole	 Tarulevicz	 (2010),	 there	 is	 not	 really	 a	 proper	 democratic	 movement	 in	Singapore,	 even	 though	 historically	 young	 people	 have	 often	 facilitated	 social	changes,	and	 in	other	Southeast	Asia	 countries	 there	are	potential	 forces	on	 the	move.	Also	as	I	was	discussing	about	these	issues	with	my	informants,	few	of	them	expressed	anxiety	over	 illiberal	democracy.	When	asking	about	how	 they	see	the	political	future	of	Singapore,	they	hesitated	to	give	an	opinion	and	“I	don’t	know”	was	the	most	common	answer,	and	no	one	was	eager	to	speculate	politics	more	than	that.	
	According	 to	 social	 scientists	 Kluver	 &	 Weber	 (2003,	 381),	 the	 constrained	possibilities	 to	 criticize	 or	 affect	 the	 government	 policies	 pushes	 young	Singaporeans	to	renegotiate	their	national	identification	as	they	are	more	inclined	to	appropriate	foreign	(e.g.	Western)	cultural	forms	and	emigrate	form	the	country.	Some	of	my	informants	frankly	told	about	their	desire	to	live	somewhere	else,	where	life	would	be	less	restricted	and	controlled	by	the	state.	Interestingly,	a	Singaporean	man	 in	his	mid-40’s	 said	 to	me	 that	 those	who	have	 lived	abroad	would	have	 a	greater	 sense	 of	 national	 belonging	 because	 they	 start	 to	 respect	 the	 life	 in	Singapore.	The	ones	who	stay	“think	that	the	grass	is	greener	on	the	other	side”.	This	was	also	something	that	seemed	to	divide	Singaporeans,	as	some	said	the	opposite:	once	you	see	something	else,	you	understand	the	downsides	of	living	in	Singapore.	
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The	topic	of	Living	with	Myths	–seminar	on	18th	of	December	2014	was	“Apathy”	that	Singaporeans	are	presumed	to	have	towards	social	and	political	concerns	(also	Kluver	&	Weber	2003,	381).	Similar	to	vulnerable	nation,	the	myth	of	apathy	and	backwardness	 of	 both	 Singapore	 and	 Singaporeans	 is	 a	 story	 the	 government	maintains	to	justify	its	policies	and	control	over	“apathetic”	Singaporeans.	Historian	Loh	Kah	Seng	gave	a	presentation	titled	“Apathy,	or	How	History	is	written	by	elites”	(Living	with	Myths)	in	which	he	claimed	that	apathy	is	a	key	aspect	of	Singaporean	identity.	There	 is	 a	 lack	of	 interest	 and	 action	 among	 Singaporeans	 towards	 the	government’s	initiatives,	and	this	apathy	has	worked	as	a	handle	for	elite-led	social	changes.	The	implemented	policies	are	repeated	in	narratives	and	myths	so	that	the	need	for	their	continuation	is	guaranteed.	According	to	this	myth,	after	becoming	independent,	 Singaporeans	 were	 apathetic	 and	 lacked	 interest	 to	 contribute	 in	nation-building,	so	the	government	had	to	take	charge	of	things	and	start	taking	care	of	 the	 people	 with	 its	 intensive	 social	 policies.	 PAP	 changed	 the	 disorganized	colonial	city	to	organized	nation-state.	(Loh	2014.)	
	The	discourse	of	vulnerable	nation	gets	real	and	reproduced	in	the	discursive	talk	about	the	nation.	The	extensive	social	engineering	and	the	government	intervening	even	 the	most	 intimate	 issues	 in	 life	are	 justified	 in	 this	national	discourse.	 I	did	recognize	this	mythical	aspect	of	Singaporeanness	sometimes	in	my	informants	talk,	as	 they	explained	 to	me	how	 they	understand	 the	government’s	 interventions	as	necessary	for	Singapore:	“I	 like	 the	 government,	 they	 do	 a	 good	 job.	 It’s	 difficult	 to	 govern	 a	country	like	this	so	they	have	to	do	those	things….	The	state	is	acquiring	the	land	‘cause	it’s	scare.	Otherwise	people	would	just	take	everything	to	themselves”	-	Michelle,	21	(conversation)	
	
	“The	CPF6	is	good	‘cause	people	don’t	know	who	to	spend	their	money.”	
-	Rachel,	31	(conversation)	
	Anthropologist	Souchou	Yao	(2007)	argues	that	this	is	part	of	the	national	culture	in	 Singapore.	 Singaporeans	 are	 made	 to	 feel	 that	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 and	achievements	are	needed	and	good	life	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	(ibid,	26).	
																																																								6	CPF	is	a	compulsory	savings	plan	for	Singaporeans	to	fund	their	retirement,	health	care	and	housing	needs.	
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Herzfeld	(2005,	2)	says	that	by	contributing	to	the	essentialising	and	producing	of	dominant	narratives,	people	are	legitimizing	the	authority	of	the	state	in	their	lives.	The	 state	 is	 treated	 like	 a	 living	 human	 being	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 seen	 as	impersonal	 and	 disinterested	 authority	 (ibid,	 5.)	 Anthropologist	 Konstantinos	Kalantzis	 (2014)	 elaborates	 Herzfeld’s	 idea	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 negotiations	 of	agency	that	the	dominant	formulations	enable.	I	see	this	kind	of	schema	happening	also	 in	 Singapore.	 The	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 the	 state	 enables	 the	 dominant	national	discourses	to	be	strongly	present	in	people’s	lives,	which	leads	to	the	fact	that	in	order	to	understand	Singaporeanness,	we	must	not	underestimated	the	role	of	the	state	in	defining	it.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	people	would	blindly	adopt	the	dominant	definitions.	The	conversations	where	my	informants	expressed	and	 reflected	 their	 anxiety	 over	 authoritarian	 rule	 reveal	 their	 sentiments	 and	understanding	of	Singaporeanness.	Later	 in	 chapter	6.2	 I	will	 contemplate	 these	issues	more.	
	This	specific	nature	of	Singaporean	society	 is	something	 that	one	 is	 supposed	 to	cherish.	It	contributes	towards	the	creating	of	the	national	framework	for	life.	Aihwa	Ong	(2005,	22-23)	argues	that	this	biopolitical	relationship	forms	an	implicit	social	contract	between	the	people	and	the	state.	The	government	promises	to	respond	to	people’s	will	to	have	safe,	clean,	efficient	society	with	home	and	work	for	everyone,	but	then	they	have	to	vote	PAP	and	be	loyal	to	it.	According	to	Ong,	this	exchange	and	responding	of	people’s	created	and	imagined	wills	explains	why	Singaporeans	tolerate	the	dictatorial	and	totalitarian	society.	(Ibid)		
5.2 Public	housing	-	socially	engineered	belonging	
	“People’s	sense	of	belonging	comes	from	the	HDB	areas	because	that’s	where	we	grew	up”	-	Jason,	26	(conversation)	
	As	a	city-state,	Singapore	is	a	physically	small	place	for	a	nation	to	exist.	The	public	space	get	easily	more	intimate	meaning,	and	taking	into	account	the	authoritarian	nature,	 it	 is	 also	more	prone	 to	 state	 interventions.	One	 good	 example	 of	 social	engineering	and	“pastoral	power”	(Sidhu	2003,	174)	the	government	exercises	in	Singapore	 is	 the	 public	 housing	 program,	 commonly	 known	 as	 HDB	 (Housing	Development	Board).	Apart	the	buildings	being	a	single	major	physical	 landmark	
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and	 impossible	 to	 ignore	when	visiting	Singapore,	 the	public	housing	program	 is	world	famous	and	admittedly	very	successful.	Besides	the	fact	that	HDB	system	is	widely	studied	also	in	social	sciences,	the	housing	issues	were	also	one	of	the	major	themes	I	ended	up	discussing	with	my	informants.	In	the	opening	quote	Jason,	a	26-year-old	 Singaporean-Chinese,	 expressed	 how	 the	 HDB	 scheme	 is	 in	 fact	 the	foundation	of	Singaporeans	sense	of	belonging.	
	Nowadays,	around	80%	of	Singaporeans	(HDB	InfoWEB	2015)	live	in	government-own	 public	 housing	 estates	 with	 99-year	 lease.	 In	 the	 70’s	 the	 government	established	 the	Housing	Development	Board	 to	 rationalize	 the	use	of	 space	on	 a	small	island.	They	decided	to	demolish	kampongs7	where	people	used	to	live,	and	resettle	 them	 to	newly	build	 apartments.	By	1976	 around	63,000	 kampong	 and	squatter	 households	 had	 been	 resettled	 in	 mostly	 high-rise	 buildings.	 (Hudson	2013,	45.)	In	one	generation	the	government	made	sure	there	were	no	homeless	or	squatters,	and	no	poor	ghettos	and	ethnic	enclaves	(Liu	2015).	HDB	scheme	was	also	much	about	nation	building,	as	one	of	its	goals	was	to	unify	the	new	nation	across	ethnic	lines.	Each	building	block	has	racial	quotas,	which	match	the	percentage	of	every	ethnic	group	within	the	population.	In	a	news	article	Liu	Thai	Ker,	the	“master	planner”	of	HDB,	states:	"The	whole	 idea	was	 to	have	 the	Chinese	not	 thinking	 that	 they	were	Chinese,	or	the	Malays	thinking	they're	Malay,	or	Indians	thinking	they're	Indian.	We	want	them	to	think	as	one	Singaporean”	(Leyl	2015).	
	
	Besides	solving	the	problem	of	multiculturalism	and	homelessness,	public	housing	has	also	other	symbolic	functions	(Koh	2005,	54).	When	traveling	around	the	little	island	of	Singapore,	one	cannot	ignore	the	unique	housing	architecture.	Everywhere	around	there	are	more	or	less	identical,	sometimes	very	colorful	high-rise	buildings	reminding	Lego	blocks.	They	look	no	more	than	few	decades	old	as	facades	are	well	maintained.	The	first	floor	of	the	block	 is	an	open	space,	with	maybe	a	kiosk	and	tables	for	people	to	spend	their	time	there.	The	idea	is	that	the	residents	could	meet	and	interact	in	these	empty	spaces.	Sometimes	Chinese	funerals	or	Malay	weddings	are	held	on	void	decks,	although	less	today	than	before.	Under	the	windows	there	
																																																								7	Kampong	means	a	small	village	or	community	of	houses	in	Malay	language.	
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are	long	poles	sticking	out	from	the	wall,	where	residents	hang	their	laundry.	On	the	open-air	corridors	some	doorways	are	decorated	with	Chinese	lanterns,	pictures	of	Hindu	gods	or	symbols	of	Islam.	
	There	is	always	a	kopitiam	or	hawker	centre8	nearby,	where	locals	often	have	their	lunch	 and	dinner.	There	 are	playgrounds	between	 the	buildings	 and	usually	 the	pavement	and	walkways	leading	to	MRT	or	bus	stop	are	roofed,	so	that	in	case	of	rain	(which	occurs	basically	every	day)	no	one	will	get	wet.	In	every	area	there	are	also	community	centers	and	some	neighborhoods	resemble	small	towns	with	their	pedestrian	 streets	 full	 of	 shops.	 According	 to	 many	 studies,	 HDB	 housing	 is	 a	masterpiece	 of	 pragmatic	 architecture	 and	 social	 engineering.	 The	 blocks	 are	designed	 to	be	 social	 spaces	where	people	could	easily	 interact	with	each	other.	These	HDB	areas	are	also	called	the	“heartlands”	of	Singapore.	
	The	most	concrete	aspect	of	the	HDB	program	I	discussed	with	my	informants	was	the	housing	arrangements.	Many	of	my	 friends	were	unwillingly	 living	with	their	parents	or	relatives,	even	though	they	were	almost	30	years	old	and	working	full-time.	Usually	the	explanation	was	the	high	cost	of	living:	very	few	could	afford	the	private	properties	in	Singapore.	The	private	condominiums	are	known	to	be	filled	with	foreign	expatriates	and	the	most	affluent	Singaporeans,	so	the	HDB	flat	is	the	only	possible	choice.	
	Besides	this	financial	aspect,	the	explanation	for	housing	conditions	 is	a	bit	more	deep-rooted:	only	singles	over	35	years	old	can	apply	for	an	HDB	flat	on	their	own.	Otherwise	one	has	to	have	a	family	or	spouse	to	get	the	own	flat	with.	Renting	and	sharing	apartment	with	friends	is	also	rare,	even	though	it	would	be	possible.	The	applicants	also	have	to	have	a	steady	income	to	buy	the	flat.	(HDB	InfoWEB	2015).	My	 informant	 Rahmat,	 a	 31-year-old	 Singaporean	 Malay,	 explained	how	 he	 was	impatiently	waiting	for	“coming	of	age”	and	being	able	to	purchase	his	own	place.	He	already	looked	for	possible	apartments	and	made	furnishing	plans.	Some	of	my	informants	probably	had	enough	savings	and	income	already,	but	they	could	not	buy	
																																																								8	Kopitiam	is	a	traditional	coffee	shop.	Hawker	centre	is	an	open-air	food	court	full	of	small	stalls	selling	inexpensive	local	food.	
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a	 flat	 as	 single.	 This	 deeply	 institutionalized	 link	 between	 family,	 housing	 and	employment	is	a	good	example	of	social	engineering,	which	allows	the	government	to	define	 the	 ideal	national	 subjectivities	and	norms	around	Singaporeanness	by	controlling	household	 formation	 (Nasir	 &	Turner	2014,	69;	74-5;	Hudson	2013,	117).	
	In	Living	with	Myths	on	21st	of	November,	historian	Koh	Keng	We	questioned	the	relevance	of	HDB	system	nowadays,	as	 the	need	 for	 it	 is	another	myth	based	on	state’s	aim	to	control	the	population	by	providing	housing	for	everyone	and	to	have	
a	 hold	 on	 the	 population	 economically	 and	 socially.	 One	 good	 example	 is	 the	constant	upgrading	of	HDB	buildings.	My	informant	Jason,	a	26-year	old	engineer,	took	me	to	Hougang,	which	is	the	one	of	the	few	areas	where	the	opposition	has	won	in	the	latest	general	elections.	I	asked	Jason	what	difference	it	makes	if	the	area	is	under	PAP	or	the	opposition.	He	thought	for	a	while	and	said,	“I’m	not	sure…	But	there	is	no	upgrading.”	
	Insightful	 in	his	 comment	 is	 that	 according	 to	both	 anthropologist	 Souchou	Yao	(2007,	 184),	 and	 geographer	 Shaun	 Teo	 (2014,	 920),	 upgrading	 is	 part	 of	maintaining	the	government’s	political	legitimacy	and	creating	a	sense	of	national	community	and	space	of	Singaporeanness	in	HDB	areas.	This	is	also	connected	to	the	myth	of	vulnerability	and	need	for	state	interventions	in	a	sense	that	by	voting	the	opposition	party,	there	is	presumed	chance	that	the	area	turns	into	a	slum	(Yao	2007,	184;	Teo	2014,	931),	as	Jason	also	implied.	Jason	told	me	about	his	business	trips	to	New	York	and	Shanghai,	where	he	was	rather	shocked	about	the	homeless	people	on	 the	 streets.	These	 trips	had	made	him	 respect	 the	 Singaporean	 living	conditions.	 These	 conditions	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 maintained	 by	 PAP,	 so	 the	government	gets	associated	to	progress	and	development	and	opposition	to	unsure	future,	 which	 also	 tells	 something	 about	 how	 the	 authoritarian	 rule	 works	 in	Singapore.	
	These	heartlands	with	HDB’s,	kopitiams,	neighborhood	schools,	business	premises,	and	 sport	 facilities	 are	 indeed	 seen	 as	 places	 where	 one	 is	 believed	 to	 get	 the	greatest	 and	 most	 genuine	 feeling	 of	 Singaporeanness.	 The	 term	 “heartlanders”	
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popularly	refers	 to	 the	Singaporeans,	who	 live	 in	HDB’s	and	are	sticking	 to	 their	ethnic	traditions,	respecting	authority,	speaking	colloquial	language	(Singlish)	and	concentrating	on	their	daily	life	full	of	work	and	concerns	about	children’s	education	(Ho,	Elaine	2006).	The	local-global	dichotomy	assumes	that	Singaporeans	living	in	the	 heartlands	 are	 the	 opposite	 of	 cosmopolitan	 Singaporeans	 who	 are	 heading	abroad	and	aspiring	to	cosmopolitan	lifestyle.	(Ibid,	388-9.)	In	his	study	about	urban	liveability	 Teo	 (2014,	 928)	 concludes	 that	 heartlanders	 are	 marginalized	 from	Singapore’s	aspiration	to	be	a	global	city,	and	they	experience	difficulty	to	connect	with	the	larger	structures	and	global	spaces	of	the	nation.	Heartlanders	should	be	the	 ones	 carrying	 and	 producing	 Singaporeanness	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	cosmopolitans.	According	to	Robbie	Goh	(2005,	54),	heartlands	and	public	housing	system	address	the	clash	between	global	and	local	discourses	and	identities,	which	
I	will	discuss	more	in	chapter	6.4.	
	In	 summary,	 the	 public	 housing	 system	 contributes	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 national	belonging	 in	 many	 levels.	 It	 is	 the	 government’s	 tool	 for	 social	 engineering,	controlling	 the	 multicultural	 population	 and	 creating	 ideal	 family	 forms.	 It	 also	contributes	to	the	dichotomy	of	global	and	 local	 in	Singaporean.	HDB	can	also	be	seen	as	a	source	for	the	feeling	of	Singaporeanness	due	to	its	unique	architecture	and	character,	and	as	a	place	for	Singaporeanness	in	the	midst	of	rapid	development	and	changing	demographics.	I	argue,	that	the	HDB	program	with	its	various	impacts	on	 people	 and	 their	 lives	 is	 part	 of	 creating	 the	 national	 reality	 that	 80%	 of	Singaporean	 HDB-dwellers	 live	 in.	 As	 was	 expressed	 in	 Jason’s	 quote	 in	 the	beginning,	growing	up	in	the	heartlands	is	part	of	nationalized	experience.	Also	the	accepted	form	of	an	ideal	family	enforced	with	public	housing	program	contributes	in	 constructing	 the	 idea	 of	 being	 Singaporean.	 The	 national	 framework	 of	authoritanism	and	social	engineering	makes	the	sense	of	belonging	to	a	Singaporean	nation	reasonable.	This	also	implies	how	nationhood	can	frame	people’s	choices	and	opportunities	radically	(Fox	&	Miller-Idriss	2008,	537-8).	
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5.3 Pragmatic	nation	“Everything	is	fake	here.	Everybody	knows	it”	–	Ian,	31	(conversation)	
	After	two	months	in	Singapore,	we	did	a	day	trip	to	a	nearby	island	Pulau	Ubin	with	my	friends.	We	rented	bikes	and	cycled	around	on	dirt	roads,	swam	in	an	old	quarry	lake	and	saw	wild	boars.	I	suddenly	realized	how	much	I	had	missed	wild	nature.	In	Singapore	 even	 the	 nature	 seems	 well	 planned,	 measured	 structured	 and	immaculate.	Singapore	is	surprisingly	green	place,	officially	a	“Garden	City”,	where	every	road,	tree,	and	plant	has	their	own,	given	places.	Everything	seems	brand-new	and	older	buildings	are	constantly	upgraded.	My	Singaporean	friend	mentioned	how	European	 cities	 fascinate	 her	 because	 you	 can	 see	 and	 sense	 the	 history	 as	 the	buildings	 might	 be	 hundreds	 of	 years	 old.	 As	 I	 walked	 around	 the	 local	neighborhoods	with	my	Singaporean	friends	they	usually	pointed	me	what	used	to	be	somewhere	or	how	the	area	had	changed	since	their	childhood.	Even	those	 in	their	early	20’s	had	already	experienced	the	loss	of	their	physical	landscape	to	rapid	changes.	The	constant	progress,	development	and	change	are	in	a	sense	natural	for	the	younger	generation	as	they	are	so	used	to	it.	
	According	to	Velayutham	(2007),	the	government	actively	promotes	modernity	as	a	marker	of	nationhood	and	Singaporeans	get	the	sense	of	the	nation	from	their	actual	lived	 and	 habituated	 experience	 of	 living	 in	 the	 modern	 city	 of	 Singapore.	 My	informant	Ian,	a	31-year-old	Singaporean-Chinese,	concluded	that	while	living	in	UK	he	did	not	miss	anything	about	Singapore.	However,	he	told	how	he	suddenly	had	a	remarkable	 feeling	 of	 home	when	he	 visited	 a	big	 shopping	mall	 in	London.	He	associated	the	materialist	and	consumerist	place	to	Singapore,	which	is	also	one	of	the	common	stereotypes	of	Singaporeanness.	Especially	the	younger	generation	is	accused	to	be	very	materialistic	(Koh	2007,	192)	and	Velayutham	(2007,	172)	sees	that	 this	has	 led	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	sense	of	national	 identity	and	belonging	are	imagined	through	the	materiality	and	the	realities	of	social	modernity.	This	is	also	something	 I	realized	during	my	 fieldwork,	as	my	 informants	kept	explaining	how	Singaporean	 infrastructure	 is	 something	 they	 value	 above	 anything	 else,	 when	discussing	about	feelings	of	national	belonging.	
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Despite	 the	previously-mentioned	 frustration	over	 restricted	 life,	my	 informants	also	 gave	 several	 reasons	 for	 why	 they	 are	 proud	 and	 grateful	 for	 being	Singaporeans.	They	especially	acknowledged	the	privilege	of	growing	up	in	affluent	city-state,	compared	to	other	Southeast	Asian	countries.	When	discussing	what	they	value	 in	 Singapore,	what	makes	 them	happy	 to	 stay	 there,	or	what	makes	 them	proud,	my	informants	very	often	referred	to	very	pragmatic	and	concrete	things	like	good	education	system,	cleanliness,	safety	and	well	maintained	infrastructure.	The	public	transportation	system	was	especially	praised.	
	Singaporean-Malay	Amanda,	24-year-old	freshly	graduated	teacher	said	she	would	stay	 in	 Singapore	 for	 “family,	 familiarity,	 comfort,	 safety,	 and	 convenience”	 but	would	like	to	leave	for	“better	job	opportunities	and	a	more	easy,	laid-back,	peaceful	lifestyle”	outside	the	urban	environment.	For	21-year-old	Michelle	life	in	Singapore	is	“just	plain	boring	and	lifeless”	and	“way	too	comfortable”	and	she	feels	that	the	society	“lacks	humanity”.	Michelle	was	an	enthusiastic	traveler	and	had	big	dreams	for	her	life.	Singaporean-Chinese	Rachel,	31,	had	lived	a	year	in	Australia	and	was	working	 full	 time	 in	 creative	 industry.	 She	mentioned	 that	 the	peacefulness	 and	stability	of	Singapore	make	her	proud,	and	that	she	respects	the	efficiency	resulting	from	the	steady	society.	
	Velayutham	 (2007)	argues	 that	 the	government’s	approach	 to	nation	building	 is	based	 on	 economic	 developmentalism	 and	 pragmatic	 ideology.	 The	 sense	 of	national	identity	and	belonging	are	created	by	giving	citizens	a	material	stake	in	the	county	 (ibid,	161).	He	also	claims	 that	 the	emotional	attachment	 to	 the	nation	 is	somewhat	half-hearted	and	that	Singaporeans	take	pride	and	identify	mainly	with	the	 material	 furnishing	 of	 the	 nation	 (ibid,	 172).	 I	 somewhat	 agree	 with	 these	arguments,	 as	 that	 is	 how	 my	 informants	 mainly	 conceptualized	 their	 national	belonging,	as	my	informants	comments	above	indicate.	However,	one	aspect	in	this	issue	is	the	also	strong	discourse	of	lack	of	national	identity.	Member	of	Parliament	Inderjit	Singh	 (2014)	mentions	 in	his	 commentary	on	an	online	newspaper	 that	many	Singaporeans	have	difficulties	to	define	what	 it	means	to	be	a	Singaporean	besides	enjoying	the	country’s	material	and	economic	achievements:	
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“When	 you	 ask	 them	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 Singaporean	 they	 turn	awkwardly	and	smile,	‘Ermm	our	food’	”	(Singh	2014).	
	
	Another	thing	to	point	here	is	the	possible	impact	of	national	education	curriculum	mentioned	in	chapter	4.1.	Sometimes	the	conversations	especially	with	my	younger	informants	reflected	quite	clearly	the	official	statements	of	NE	about	what,	how,	and	why	Singapore	and	being	Singaporean	should	be	valued.	My	informant	Michelle,	21,	told	how	she	is	proud	to	be	a	Singaporean	because	of	the	quick	development	from	third	to	“first	world	country	with	rich	assets	even	though	we	are	just	a	tiny	island”.	She	 also	 emphasized	 how	 Singapore	 has	 strict	 laws	 but	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	 least	corrupted	country,	and	competitive	but	business-friendly.	In	many	instances,	both	when	 talking	 with	 my	 informants	 and	 following	 debates	 in	 social	 media,	 these	aspects	 of	 daily	 life,	 such	 as	 competitiveness	 and	 restricted	 atmosphere	 are	secondary	to	the	material	and	infrastructural	gains	given	by	the	state.	
	Prominent	Singaporean	political	writer	Catherine	Lim	(1994)	wrote	 in	 a	political	commentary	in	national	newspaper	Strait	Times	that	the	government	is	respected	mainly	for	its	efficiency,	but	is	lacking	affectionate	regard.	Lim	says	the	Singaporean	government-people	 relationship	 is	 unique,	 as	 there	 is	 unity	 of	 purpose	 and	commitment	to	boost	Singaporean	economy,	but	a	serious	bifurcation	on	emotional	level	when	considering	the	sense	of	national	belonging.	Also	Yao	(2007)	has	a	rather	pessimistic	 view	 about	 Singapore	 as	 he	 claims	 that	 the	 state	 causes	 feelings	 of	“emotional	sterility	and	oppressive	anxiety”,	even	though	the	same	state	has	also	brought	wealth	and	political	stability	for	Singaporeans	(ibid,	140).	
	Velayutham	(2007,	175)	argues	that	this	kind	of	pragmatism	and	materialism	can	be	a	source	of	pride	but	not	a	key	for	deeper	affective	nationalism.	Similarly	to	the	lack	of	political	participation,	younger	generation	of	Singaporeans	have	little	to	do	with	 the	 achievements	 of	 Singapore.	 My	 informant	 Matthew,	 28-year-old	Singaporean-Chinese	art	teacher,	said	that	he	is	happy	about	living	in	a	place	where	everything	works,	but	he	cannot	“take	credit	 for	that	though,	having	never	had	 a	hand	in	it”.	However,	Brown	(1998)	argues	that	even	if	Singaporeans	are	working	hard	to	improve	their	standard	of	life	without	any	significant	improvement,	they	are	
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likely	 to	 identify	with	 the	national	development	and	progress,	and	 take	pride	 in	them	because	of	the	hegemony	of	communitarian	discourse	(ibid,	42.)	
	For	 Velayutham	 (2007,	 161)	 this	 means	 that	 the	 sense	 of	 belonging	 is	 highly	individualized	 question,	 and	 Singaporeans	 have	 little	 interest	 of	 developing	 a	collective	sense	of	belonging.	The	national	question	 is	understood	mainly	 in	very	practical	 and	 material	 terms,	 as	 the	 dominant	 discourses	 suggest.	 Yao	 (2007)	argues,	that	the	social	good	the	government	has	provided	for	Singaporeans	is	turned	into	national	“social	enjoyment”.	The	good	Singaporean	life	is	associated	with	PAP	when	 its	 political	 rule	 is	 experienced	 in	 everyday	 level,	 as	 enjoyment	 of	 things	provided.	Social	peace	and	material	prosperity	are	signs	of	the	government’s	good	work.	(Ibid,	132).	
	Singapore’s	national	narrative	 is	the	story	of	a	struggle	to	become	a	modern	and	prosperous	 city-state.	 It	 is	based	 on	people’s	 shared	 territorial	 experiences	 that	exceed	 ethnic	or	 cultural	boundaries.	National	 identity	 is	built	on	 this	 economic	progress,	as	was	explained	in	chapter	4.4,	and	that	became	clear	to	me	as	I	discussed	with	 my	 informants.	 For	 the	 government	 this	 creates	 little	 emotional	 or	motivational	hold	over	the	people,	as	pragmatism	and	opportunism	are	the	main	values	of	presumed	national	identity,	and	economic	growth	and	material	comforts	are	promoted	as	a	source	of	national	pride	(Koh	2007,	195;	Kluver	&	Weber	2003,	378).	
	These	kinds	of	economic	and	material	achievements	may	have	symbolic	value	as	cultural	and	national	representations	that	construct	national	identity,	as	Stuart	Hall	has	suggested	(Hall	1992,	292;	also	Koh	2007,	195).	However,	Kwok	&	Ali	(1998,	117-8)	remind	that	it	would	be	wrong	to	think	that	“wealth	creation	is	Singapore’s	raison	d’être”	and	that	being	Singaporean	would	not	have	any	cultural	sense.	Even	though	it	is	easy	to	come	to	that	conclusion	from	some	of	my	informants	comments,	it	would	be	wrong	to	underestimate	the	emotional	attachment	Singaporeans	might	have	for	their	home,	and	the	deep-rooted	meanings	of	being	Singaporean.	
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In	 summary,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 shared	 experience	 of	 way	 of	 life,	 and	understanding	the	political	reality	of	the	society	are	crucial	for	Singaporeanness,	as	would	be	the	case	with	any	other	society.	However,	in	the	Singaporean	context,	this	is	 highlighted	 because	 of	 the	 strong	 political	 hold	 the	 government	 has	 over	 the	people,	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 strategic	 and	 pragmatic	 national	 discourse,	 which	defines	the	national	framework	and	socio-political	reality	Singaporeans	are	living	in.	I	argue,	that	the	shared	experiences	of	being	born	and	bred	Singaporean	is	in	fact	the	crucial	part	of	national	thinking.	
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6 Imagining Singaporeanness
Nationalist	 thinking	 assumes	 that	 there	 are	 imagined	 relations	 between	 people	(Alonso	1994,	384-5).	When	examining	nationalism,	 it	 is	thus	relevant	to	 identify	how	imagined	relations	create	a	feeling	that	is	embodied	in	material	practice	and	lived	experience	(ibid,	382).	Benedict	Anderson	(1983)	sees	nations	as	 imagined	communities	where	people	have	sense	of	belonging	to	a	group	of	people	without	knowing	each	other.	Anderson’s	idea	has	been	both	praise	and	criticized,	but	works	the	main	idea	of	imagination	still	works	as	a	good	starting	point	for	understanding	communities.	
	In	this	chapter	I	examine	the	imagined	community	of	Singaporeans.	I	will	continue	to	 analyze	 the	 previously	 presented	 discourse	 of	 vulnerable	 nation,	 and	 how	 it	actualizes	 in	the	understanding	of	Singaporeanness.	Together	with	an	example	of	national	characteristics,	I	will	consider	how	Singaporeanness	is	conceptualized	in	popular	speech.	Drawing	these	two	perspectives	together	will	give	a	contradictory	conclusion	 about	 the	 Singaporean	 community,	 if	 in	 fact	 it	 can	 be	 imagined	 or	otherwise.	
	When	discussing	about	national	identity	and	sense	of	belonging,	with	my	informants	and	any	Singaporean	or	someone	living	there,	almost	every	conversation	inevitably	lead	to	the	conclusion	these	matters	are	complex,	confusing	and	unfinished	issues	in	Singapore.	However,	the	urgent	need	to	create,	maintain	and	boost	Singaporean	identity	was	also	self-evident.	“We	aren’t	there	yet”	or	claims	such	as	“it	takes	time	for	an	identity	to	form”	revealed	the	pragmatic	approach	to	the	whole	issue	(also	Koh	2005,	78).	These	comments	also	contribute	to	the	modernist	idea	how	national	identification	is	seen	as	some	sort	of	development	and	goal	to	achieve.			
	State’s	 speech	 about	 lack	 of	 national	 identity	 is	 well	 imprinted	 in	 the	 idea	 of	Singaporeanness.	 However	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 I	 found	 out	 that	 there	 are	 some	instances	 and	 ideas	 that	 my	 informants	 were	 defining	 as	 Singaporean	 things.	Therefore	 I	 am	 asking	 if	 there	 is	 some	 code	 for	 national	 identification	 that	Singaporeans	express.	Is	there	a	Singaporean	national	culture?	Following	Stuart	Hall	
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(2002,	28),	are	there	some	cultural	meanings	embedded	in	imagined	community	in	Singapore?	
6.1 “There	are	no	Singaporeans”	-	Unimagined	community	The	state	demands	Singaporeans	 to	be	aware	of	how	problematic,	yet	extremely	important	 it	 is	 for	 everyone	 to	 work	 for	 their	 nation	 together	 to	 avoid	 racial	disharmony	and	conflicts;	to	overcome	economic	and	social	obstacles	of	vulnerable	society.	These	 ideas	are	often	repeated	 in	my	 informants	talk.	 	Matthew,	28,	who	works	as	a	teacher,	mentioned	how	young	Singaporeans	are	fed	up	with	thinking	and	conceptualizing	their	identity	in	school	projects.	In	my	field	notes	I	have	written	several	 times	 the	question	“why	does	 there	seems	 to	be	an	 identity	crisis	among	Singaporeans?”	The	state	has	an	extremely	strong	emphasis	on	 the	need	 to	have	sense	of	national	belonging	and	identity,	but	for	the	people	it	seems	an	impossible	or	frustrating	task	to	imagine	its	existence.	
	When	I	met	new	people	and	told	them	I	was	doing	a	study	about	Singaporean’s	sense	of	belonging,	this	already	aroused	some	 interesting	 first	reactions	and	comments	about	the	issue.	One	girl	laughed	and	burst	out	“there	is	no	sense	of	belonging!”,	and	one	boy’s	reaction	“Wowww…	that’s	difficult	topic!”	made	me	realize	that	from	their	perspective	I	was	studying	something	incredibly	complicated	and	impossible	topic.		
	Amaya,	a	26-year-old	history	student,	was	first	silent	for	a	while	and	said	“Sense	of	belonging…	that’s	something	we	think	about	every	day”.	When	I	met	her	she	wanted	to	introduce	me	a	Malay	area	in	the	city,	as	she	was	ethnic	Malay	herself.	She	found	it	important	that	there	is	a	place	where	Malays	find	halal	food	and	headscarves	for	Muslim	women.	For	her	being	Malay	in	Singapore	posed	even	deeper	questions	of	belonging	than	for	most	ethnic	Chinese.	
	
A	Singaporean	man	in	his	40’s	claimed	that	“…there	is	no	such	thing	as	Singaporean,	we’re	all	immigrants	you	know?	You	can’t	study	that…	people	are	very	confused	here	about	who	they	are”.	
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He	explained	how	Singapore	lacks	long	common	history	like	Japan9,	how	colloquial	Singaporean	 English	 is	 not	 really	 a	 language	 and	 how	 the	 efforts	 to	 unite	Singaporeans	 are	 just	 state’s	propaganda.	 I	noticed	 that	 the	whole	 conversation	made	him	a	bit	uncomfortable,	especially	when	I	provoked	him	by	stating	how	there	are	people	who	are	non-Singaporeans,	so	there	must	be	also	Singaporeans.	He	tried	to	give	me	an	answer	 for	what	defines	 them	but	 found	 the	question	 too	difficult,	confusing	or	complicated.	He	was	jumping	from	one	argument	to	another,	and	in	the	end	he	gave	up.	It	was	clear	that	many	Singaporeans	tried	to	link	the	nation	to	things	like	 common	 language,	 history	 and	 heritage,	 which	 are	 generally	 most	 often	associated	with	a	coherent	nation-state.	However,	in	Singapore	it	is	difficult	to	refer	to	these	things	in	terms	of	a	nation.	
	The	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 unite	 people	 and	 build	 a	 nation	 are	 seen	 as	 plain	propaganda,	 as	 surprisingly	 many	 said	 to	 me.	 Ashley,	 23-year-old	 Singaporean-Chinese	living	in	UK	wrote	me	about	her	experience	of	participating	a	Singapore	Day	celebrations	in	her	city:	“While	I	appreciate	the	effort	part	of	me	felt	that	they	were...	trying	too	hard...	that	a	sense	of	belonging	is	a	natural	thing	that	shouldn't	be	forced.	Something	about	it	felt	very	artificial	to	me	-	a	lot	of	the	state's	efforts	feel	artificial	to	us.”	
	Ashley	continued	that	for	her	it	seems	that	Singaporeans	are	“shying	away	from	the	government’s	attempts	to	unite	us	all”.	
	The	 artificiality	 and	 constructed	nature	 of	 the	 Singaporean	nation	has	 led	 some	people	to	the	conclusion	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	Singaporeans.	The	idea	that	national	belonging	should	be	a	natural	feeling	implicates	that	for	Singaporeans	the	nation	does	not	feel	natural.	The	fact	that	the	government	is	so	actively	promoting	nationalism	 is	making	 the	 identification	with	 the	nation	 even	more	problematic	since	 the	 official	 national	 discourse	 is	 in	 fact	 limiting	 the	 imagination	 of	 what	Singaporean	 nation	 could	 be	 and	 mean.	 Also	 noteworthy	 is	 the	 way	 Ashley	 is	referring	to	them	and	us.	She	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	the	two	different	levels	of	the	nation:	the	state	and	the	Singaporeans.	
																																																								9	Lee	Kuan	Yew	publicly	admired	the	Japanese	society	and	saw	it	as	an	example	how	Singaporean	nation	should	become	(Hudson	2013,	18).	
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However,	sometimes	my	informants	admitted	having	some	innate	or	unexplained	feeling	for	being	Singaporean:	“It’s	very	interesting	what	you	are	doing.	I	really	started	to	think	about	these	things,	like	the	sense	of	belonging	and	Singaporean	community.	I	don’t	know	where	it	comes	from.	I	just	know	it	is	somewhere.	It’s	there.	
I	just	know	it.”	–	Michelle,	21	(conversation)	
	Michelle	here	said	aloud	 the	principle	of	 imagined	communities:	 it	 is	 there,	even	though	you	cannot	see	or	describe	it.	There	is	some	mutual	feeling	of	belonging	even	though	people	would	have	hard	time	to	explaining	it.	Andre,	25,	was	eager	to	leave	Singapore	for	good	and	stated	how	he	never	misses	anything	about	Singapore	when	abroad,	and	assured	that	nothing	will	make	him	feel	any	attachment	to	the	country.	However,	later	on	he	started	explaining	enthusiastically	how	he	always	misses	the	proper	Singaporean	noodles	while	travelling.	Despite	being	just	a	random	comment	about	noodles,	these	kinds	of	conversations	implicate	that	many	informants	were	very	eager	to	deny	their	emotional	attachment	to	a	country	but	there	seems	to	be	something	innate	or	unconscious	attachment	to	one’s	national	background,	whether	it	is	linked	to	noodles,	buildings,	family,	or	other	things	that	they	cannot	define	or	describe	properly.		
	What	is	interesting	about	the	way	Singaporeans	imagine	their	community	or	nation,	is	 that	one	very	 easily	 gets	 the	 feeling	 that	 they	do	not	have	 any	 attachment	 to	Singapore	as	a	nation.	In	chapter	5.3	 I	wrote	about	materiality	and	modernity	as	markers	 of	 nationhood	 and	 how	 Singaporeans	 are	 thought	 to	 lack	 emotional	attachment	to	the	nation.	The	 imagined	 lack	of	 identity	and	sense	of	belonging	 is	already	 partially	 applied	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 Singaporeanness	 (Kwok	 &	 Ali	1998,	199).	 It	 could	be	 said	 that	Singapore	 is	not	an	 imagined	 community	but	 a	community	needing	to	be	constantly	imagined.	
	According	to	Koh	(2005,	76)	the	state	 is	also	demanding	Singaporeans	to	be	self-reflecting	and	conscious	of	their	lack	of	identity	by	moralizing	the	issue.	Is	the	state	in	 fact	 putting	 the	 blame	 on	 Singaporeans	 for	 the	 “problems”	 of	 not	 having	 a	coherent	nation?	By	emphasizing	how	important	it	is	to	have	a	sense	of	belonging	and	national	 identity	 it	becomes	a	self-evident	problem	 for	Singaporeans.	So	 in	a	
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sense	this	blaming	complicates	the	ability	to	imagine	Singaporeanness	even	more,	as	the	general	opinion	that	Singaporeans	as	community	do	not	exist	suggests.	
6.2 	Nationalized	behavior	
I	have	described	the	discourse	of	economic	progress,	pragmatism	and	authoritarian	rule	of	the	nation,	and	how	they	actualize	in	my	informants’	life.	Following	that,	I	have	 explained	 how	 the	 thought	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 national	 identity	 has	 major	influence	on	the	understanding	of	Singaporeanness.	Now	I	will	argue	that	there	are	some	 popular	 ideas	 about	 Singaporeanness,	 which	 emerge	 from	 the	 social	 and	political	 realities	 of	 life.	 Besides	 sharing	 and	 understanding	 the	 experience	 of	growing	up	in	Singaporean	society,	there	are	some	national	characteristics	one	is	expected	to	have	as	a	result	of	that	experience.	These	national	characteristics	and	ideas	 about	Singaporeanness	 are	used	 in	 stereotypical	manner	when	people	 are	asked	to	define	or	describe	Singaporeans.		
	For	 a	nation	 to	be	 imagined	 to	 exist,	 there	has	 to	be	 some	 identifiable,	 cultural	meanings	on	which	the	people	can	reflect	themselves	and	to	which	they	anchor	their	(national)	identity	(Hall	1992,	291-3;	Velayutham	2007;	42).	Despite	the	imagined	lack	 of	 Singaporean	 national	 identity,	 people	 were	 still	 able	 to	 list	 national	stereotypes	 and	 characteristic	behavior	of	 individual	 Singaporeans.	 I	argue,	 that	albeit	being	funny	stereotypes,	they	are	 important	 in	shaping	the	popular	 idea	of	Singaporeanness.	After	all,	essentialising	and	stereotyping	are	needed	 in	order	to	imagine	 a	 somewhat	 coherent	 community	 (Herzfeld	 2005;	 Hudson	 2013;	 Ong	2005).	
	In	his	book	about	multicultural	and	nationalist	policies	in	Australia,	anthropologist	Ghassan	Hage	(2000,	53)	borrows	Bourdieu’s	idea	of	cultural	capital	on	how	within	the	national	 territory	 some	 groups	 are	 seen	 to	be	more	national	 and	 to	possess	greater	national	cultural	capital.	There	are	plenitude	of	characteristics	and	features	used	for	national	identification	such	as	skin	color	or	ethnicity,	accent,	knowledge,	practical	skills,	tastes	and	certain	lifestyle	(Hage	1998,	53).	This	idea	can	be	clearly	applied	 in	 Singapore	 and	 used	 to	 exemplify	 how	 Singaporeanness	 can	 be	understood	as	 a	distinct	national	culture.	Also	Skey	 (2013)	writes	how	everyday	
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habits	and	particular	ways	of	speaking	or	acting	can	be	defined	in	a	national	frame	of	reference.	Also	Herzfeld	(2005)	says	that	by	seeing	the	national	stereotypes	 in	practical	way	we	can	understand	how	they	contribute	to	nation-state	ideology	(ibid,	28-29).	
	One	 of	 the	 first	 things	 Singaporeans	 themselves	 often	 associated	with	 the	word	Singaporeanness	 was	 the	 habit	 of	 complaining.	 When	 I	 told	 I	 am	 doing	 an	anthropological	study	about	Singaporeans,	one	girl	laughed	and	said	that	I	should	write	my	thesis	about	“why	we	complain	so	much”.	Complaining	can	be	anything	from	mild	coffee	shop	talk	to	the	heated	debates	online,	where	Singaporeans	can	anonymously	rant	about	the	problems	of	society,	rather	safe	from	the	censorship	legislation.	 My	 informant	 Matthew,	 28,	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 Singapore’s	 good	infrastructure	and	efficiency	have	spoiled	them	and	thus	making	them	complain	a	lot.	 The	 complaining	 about	 little	 things	 or	 “first	 world	 problems”	 is	 thought	 to	indicate	 how	 Singaporeans	 do	 not	 appreciate	 enough	 their	 comfortable	 and	convenient	lives.	
	Yao	(2007,	123)	writes	about	this	local	habit	of	“talking	cock”	(speaking	non-sense	or	 idle	bantering),	which	he	 sees	 as	 an	 everyday	 form	 of	 state	 formation,	when	Singaporeans	 “contemplate	 the	burden	and	enjoyment	of	 life	under	Singaporean	state”	 happening	 mainly	 in	 kopitiams	 and	 hawker	 centres.	 By	 this	 talking,	 or	complaining	like	many	say,	Singaporeans	reflect	the	effects	of	state	power	in	their	daily	life,	free	from	official	intrusion	of	censorship.	With	this	humorous	yet	serious	talk	about	the	state,	Singaporeans	tell	their	own	Singapore	Story	as	they	see	it.	(Ibid,	136-139.)	Researcher	Catherine	Gomes	(2014,	26)	calls	 it	 a	culture	of	complaint,	which	is	directed	towards	the	government	and	its	policies.	
	Besides	 complaining,	 there	 were	 also	 other	 characteristics	 that	 people	 used	 to	describe	Singaporeans.	When	asking	what	it	means	to	be	a	Singaporean,	the	most	common	 joke	 I	 heard	 was	 the	 Five	 C’s	 of	 Singapore:	 car,	 cash,	 credit	 card,	condominium	 and	 country	 club	 membership,	 which	 are	 the	 things	 every	Singaporean	 is	 trying	 to	 get	 in	 their	 life.	 Despite	 being	 a	 joke,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	materialistic,	pragmatic	and	meritocratic	nature	of	the	society.	
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I	often	asked	my	 informants	 to	describe	Singaporeanness.	Michelle,	21,	said	 that	Singaporeans	are	“rather	selfish	and	inconsiderate,	practical	and	well-behaved”	and	because	of	their	comfortable	lives	people	“do	not	get	out	of	their	comfort	zones”.	She	also	 mentioned	 how	 “Singaporeans	 have	 this	 ‘don’t	 care’	 mind-set”	 when	 they	should	be	helping	others	or	do	more	than	is	expected	from	them.	Also	Matthew,	28,	shared	similar	thoughts	as	he	described	Singaporeans	as	“not	very	street	smart	or	worldly,	 obedient,	 superficial”	 and	 having	 tendency	 to	 be	 self-centered	 as	 they	“want	to	have	their	cake	and	eat	it”.	Amin,	24,	who	was	always	very	critical	about	Singapore,	its	politics	and	people,	summarized	that	“…the	general	Singaporean	is	materialistic,	judgmental,	shallow	and	has	an	undying	love	for	smartphones	and	hello	kitty”.	
	The	 explanation	 for	 these	 descriptions	 could	 stem	 from	 the	 political	 and	 social	realities	 of	 life	 in	 Singapore.	 The	 strong	 meritocratic	 approach	 in	 school	 and	working	life	has	created	“a	survival	of	the	fittest”	kind	of	atmosphere,	which	might	explain	why	Singaporeans	are	usually	seen	as	selfish.	It	is	also	quite	interesting	that	most	of	my	informants	associated	Singaporeanness	with	quite	negative	terms	and	characteristics.	Ortmann	(2009,	35)	has	also	noted	the	negativity	of	the	discourse	of	Singaporeanness,	and	for	example	the	most	popular	movies	describing	Singaporean	lifestyle	emphasis	these	negative	characteristics.	
	What	makes	these	characteristics	 interesting	 is	that	there	 is	a	specific	concept	to	describe	them:	kiasu.	It	is	a	Hokkien10	word	meaning	fear	of	losing.	This	concept	has	gained	the	role	of	national	characteristic	in	Singapore	and	could	be	a	topic	for	an	anthropological	 study	 on	 its	 own.	 Kiasu	 attitude	 has	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	sides,	as	it	may	contribute	to	diligence	and	hard	work	in	order	to	be	successful	in	life,	but	on	the	other	hand	leads	to	selfish	and	ignorant	behavior	(Ho	et	al.	1998).	
	My	 informant	 Rachel,	 31,	 told	 that	 the	 she	 feels	 sometimes	 embarrassed	 when	Singaporeans	are	“branded	as	unpleasant	tourists	who	complain	about	everything”.	She	explained	that	this	behavior	is	the	embodiment	of	kiasu.	Kiasu	behavior	is	also	associated	to	the	habit	of	queuing	for	cheap	things	or	choosing	the	food	stall	with	
																																																								10	Hokkien	is	a	most	spoken	Chinese	dialect	in	Singapore.	
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the	longest	queue	in	hawker	centre	as	it	has	to	be	the	best	stall.	In	school	and	work,	everybody	is	striving	for	their	own	success	no	matter	what.	There	is	an	extensive	tuition	business	even	for	primary	school	students	to	thrive	and	get	the	best	grades	possible.	During	my	stay	in	Singapore	the	primary	school	students	had	their	PSLE’s	(Primary	School	Leaving	Examination)	and	 I	 realized	 that	 this	kiasu	attitude	has	already	been	imprinted	onto	Singaporeans	age	of	12.	In	the	daily	newspaper	Today	(22	November	2014)	a	sixth-grader	Khairul	told	about	his	preparation	for	exams:	“There	were	a	lot	of	times	when	I	wanted	to	give	up.	Sometimes	when	I	obtained	low	scores,	some	of	my	friends	would	make	fun	of	me…	it	would	take	few	days	to	toughen	myself	up”.	
	My	 informant,	 Rahmat,	 31,	 told	 how	 kiasu	 is	 a	 habit	 that	 “ticks	 me	 off	 as	 a	Singaporean”.	For	him	it	means	“…rushing	for	things,	 just	to	be	the	first,	or	be	at	an	advantage	against	others,	no	matter	how	disgraceful	it	might	make	you	look	to	others”.	
	As	 kiasu	 is	 usually	 strongly	 associated	 to	 Confucianism	 and	 Chinese	 traits,	 it	 is	noteworthy	 that	 Singaporean-Malay	Rahmat	proudly	 adopts	kiasu	 as	part	of	his	national	identity.	He	thus	sees	kiasu	as	purely	Singaporean	trait	instead	of	Chinese	one.	Kiasu	is	indeed	understood	to	be	something	very	uniquely	Singaporean,	even	though	the	origins	of	it	can	be	traced	to	Chinese	culture.	In	this	sense	kiasu	could	be	said	 to	 be	 a	 “Singaporeanised”	 concept.	 Ortmann	 (2009,	 36-7)	 emphasizes	 how	kiasu	 is	 seen	 not	 as	 a	 politically	 controlled	 national	 trait	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	considered	as	a	popular	idea	of	Singaporeanness	in	comparison	to	the	official	pro-government	discourses	of	Singaporeanness.	
	Michel	Herzfeld’s	(2005)	concept	of	cultural	intimacy	focuses	on	the	recognition	of	those	 aspects	 of	 a	 cultural	 identity	 that	 are	 considered	 as	 a	 source	 of	 external	embarrassment	 but	 that	 nevertheless	 provide	 insiders	 reassurance	 of	 common	sociability	and	familiarity.	These	aspects	also	create	sense	of	defiant	pride	in	the	face	of	 a	more	 formal	or	official	morality,	and	 sometimes	official	disapproval	as	well.	Herzfeld	calls	them	self-stereotypes	that	 insiders	express	ostensibly	at	their	own	collective	expense.	(Ibid,	3.)	
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There	 is	 indeed	proudness	and	also	 ironic	self-mocking	behind	 the	 identification	with	kiasuism	as	it	is	humorously	accepted	as	part	of	quirky	Singaporean	identity	(Brown	1998,	43-4)	and	the	rude	behavior	is	somewhat	understandable	as	common	sense	to	survive	in	competitive	society	of	Singapore	(Yao	2007,	148-9).	The	overall	intense	 competition	 and	 meritocracy	 in	 Singaporean	 society	 partly	 explains	 the	kiasu	behavior	and	the	need	to	be	the	first	and	best	in	life.	
	According	 to	 social	 scientist	 Kenneth	 Paul	 Tan	 (2003,	 417),	 Singaporeans	 have	turned	into	kiasu	workaholics	because	of	the	state’s	strong	focus	on	economics.	The	economic	and	global	discourses	of	national	identity	are	embodied	in	kiasu,	and	even	former	PM	Goh	Chok	Tong	has	stated	that	construction	of	pragmatic	and	ambitious	Singaporeanness	has	created	“a	less	attractive	national	identity”	(Hudson	2013,	30).	For	Hudson	it	is	not	only	the	individuals	who	are	kiasu,	it	is	the	whole	nation	that	is	driven	by	this	character	(ibid,	31).	In	other	words,	Singaporeans	are	conditioned	to	excel,	and	this	work	ethic	has	turned	out	to	be	almost	a	national	duty	(Nakashima	2004).		
	Based	on	my	observation	 in	Singapore,	 I	would	say	that	besides	complaining	and	being	kiasu,	behaving	correctingly	and	obedience	could	be	analyzed	as	Singaporean	traits	 too.	 Former	 PM	 Goh	 Chok	 Tong	 saw	 a	 littering	 incident	 after	 an	 outdoor	concert	as	a	serious	threat	to	Singapore,	as	he	stated:	“…our	reputation	as	one	of	the	world’s	cleanest	cities	is	going	down	the	rubbish	chute…	Cleanliness	is	a	character	thing.	It	shows	who	you	really	are”	(Mitton	2015).	
	Littering	 and	 jaywalking	 are	 the	 most	 common	 offences	 people	 commit	 in	Singapore.	The	fact	that	Singapore	has	such	strict	penal	code	and	the	possibility	to	get	 fined	 for	 some	 minor	 offences	 has	 generated	 astonishingly	 well-behaving	population.	 In	 addition,	 PM	 Goh’s	 comment	 about	 cleanliness	 as	 a	 character	implicates	how	Singaporeans	are	expected	to	know	how	to	conduct.	
	STOMP	(Strait	Times	Online	Mobile	Print)	is	a	news	website	where	people	can	post	their	own	stories	and	pictures	online.	It	is	a	common	joke	that	if	you	do	something	considered	socially	inappropriate	in	a	MRT,	such	as	not	giving	up	your	seat	for	older	
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people,	you	can	get	“Stomped”.	This	means	that	someone	will	post	a	photo	of	you	online	to	humiliate	your	bad	behavior.	The	 funny	thing	 is	that	people	are	always	claiming	and	ensuring	that	those	who	behave	in	unacceptable	way	in	public	are	not	Singaporeans.	Once	 I	was	 talking	 loudly	 on	 a	phone	 for	 the	whole	bus	 ride	 and	realized	how	it	was	probably	rude	and	inconsiderate	towards	other	passenger,	as	usually	the	atmosphere	in	public	transportation	is	very	discreet.	I	mentioned	this	to	my	 local	 friend,	and	he	 just	said	 that	no	one	cares	since	 I	am	 foreigner.	 I	am	not	expected	to	behave	accordingly	anyway.	
	The	 importance	 of	 correct	 behavior	 is	 well	 noted	 on	 government-level,	 as	throughout	the	50-year-history	there	has	been	a	plethora	of	campaigns	to	advice	people	for	proper	conduct.	I	have	never	seen	such	extensive	efforts	to	guide	people	to	 behave,	 think	 and	 act	 in	 certain	 way	 as	 in	 Singapore.	 The	 campaigns	 have	reminded	people	to	keep	Singapore	clean	and	not	to	 litter	or	spit,	encouraged	to	have	healthy	lifestyle,	wash	hands	properly,	raise	productivity	in	workplace	and	be	
a	good	neighbor	(Lim	&	Kah	2013).	
	One	 campaign	 that	 caught	 my	 eye	 immediately	 after	 moving	 to	 Singapore	 was	“Graciousness	in	public	transport”.	On	MRT’s	and	buses	there	were	big	posters	of	Hushush-Hannah,	 Stand-up-Stacey,	 Move-in-Martin,	 Give-away-Glenda	 and	 Bag-Down-Benny	who	advised	people	to	give	up	their	seats	for	old,	put	your	bag	down	to	 give	 space,	 and	 to	be	 considerate	while	 talking	with	 someone.	This	 excessive	guidance	for	how	to	be	polite	and	good	citizen	was	very	overwhelming	for	me.	My	Singaporean	friends	took	these	campaigns	mainly	as	jokes,	even	though	one	friend	mentioned	that	when	entering	the	MRT	“people	 learned	to	stand	aside	only	after	years	of	education”.	Some	say	that	Singapore	has	been	remarkably	successful	in	this	"war"	against	disagreeable	behavior	(Gomes	2001).	
	In	 summary,	 I	 argue,	 that	 this	 behavior,	 whether	 complaining,	 kiasu	 or	 proper	conduct,	 are	part	 of	 the	 cultural	 capital	 one	 is	 supposed	 to	have	 in	 order	 to	be	regarded	 as	 true	 Singaporean.	 These	 characters	 give	 a	 cultural	 meaning	 for	 a	Singaporean	 nation	 as	 they	 are	 used	 to	 conceptualize	 and	 concretize	
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Singaporeanness.	 Nationalism	 is	 about	 displaying	 cultural	 self-consciousness	(Kapferer	1989),	and	in	Singapore	this	seems	to	be	one	way	to	do	it.	
6.3 Negotiations	of	national	being	
I	have	demonstrated	how	behavior	and	characteristics	may	form	a	basis	for	national	culture	that	binds	people	together	as	a	nation.	This	culture	is	also	connected	to	the	dominant	national	discourses	and	demands	of	being	Singaporean.	This	means	that	Singaporeanness	is	negotiated	in	the	space	between	these	two	spheres	of	national	identification	where	 the	different	 conceptualization	of	 the	nation	meet.	Gupta	 &	Ferguson	(2001)	write	how	local	identities	often	conform	to	national	categories.	In	Singapore	people	 link	specific	personal	behavior	to	national	 framework	and	thus	conceptualize	their	otherwise	complicated	national	identification.	
	Anthropologist	 Konstantinos	 Kalantzis	 (2014)	 has	 studied	 the	 production	 of	difference	 in	Crete	by	analyzing	 the	 conditioned	 character	of	Sphakian	nativism,	which	is	dependent	on	dominant	discourses	in	Greek-Cretan	context.	He	focuses	on	what	kind	of	subjectifications	the	embodiment	of	a	stereotypical	form	enables,	and	concludes	 that	 given	 national	 traditions	 are	 critically	 evaluated	 among	 the	Sphakians,	 who	 have	 their	 own	 terms	 and	 criteria	 to	 define	 their	 stereotyping	traditions.	By	examining	these	negotiations	over	cultural	dominance	and	definitions	we	can	better	understand	the	process	of	national	subjectification.	
	Sociologist	Craig	Calhoun	says	that	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	public	discourse	of	nation,	because	it	is	a	source	of	social	solidarity,	mutual	commitment	and	shared	interest	(2002,	97).	In	Singapore	the	state	tries	to	bind	the	people	together	with	the	idea	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 economic	 imperative,	 but	 in	 the	 everyday	 level	 the	solidarity	may	come	from	somewhere	else.	On	the	other	hand,	by	participating	in	production	 of	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 people	 also	 experience	 solidarity	 and	belonging	to	a	nation	(cf.	Herzfeld	2005,	2).	For	example,	the	acknowledgement	of	authoritanism	in	Singaporean	life,	adopting	the	idea	of	lack	of	identity	and	turning	pragmatic	 discourse	 to	 kiasu	 behavior	 express	 the	 negotiation	 of	 nationalism	between	the	state	and	the	people.	
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In	her	ethnographic	classroom	research	Li-Ching	Ho	(2010)	summarizes	that	the	Singaporean	students	provided	similar	accounts	of	Singaporeanness	and	historical	narratives.	She	claims	 that	 the	 inclusive	nature	of	 the	national	discourses,	which	emphasizes	 unity,	 consensus,	 and	 harmony	 partly	 produces	 this	 shared	understanding.	 Ho	 points	 out	 that	 the	 students	 seemed	 to	 avoid	 addressing	controversial	 issues,	 and	 they	 did	 not	 contest	 the	 ideas	 of	 racial	 harmony,	meritocracy,	 and	 need	 for	 progress.	 (Ibid.)	 Also	 historian	 Liew	 Kai	 Khiun	commented	 on	 Living	 with	 Myths	 seminar	 on	 21st	 of	 November	 2014	 that	Singaporeans	tend	to	fit	their	experiences	to	the	dominant	discourses,	and	they	are	not	 questioning	 or	 coming	 up	 with	 any	 alternatives	 easily.	 Liew	 claims	 that	Singaporeans	 are	 fitting	 themselves	 and	 their	 life	 experiences	 to	 the	 official	
Singapore	 Story	 so	 that	 e.g.	 older	 Singaporeans	 are	 not	 capable	 of	 retrieving	memories	that	wouldn’t	fit	into	the	Story.	(Liew	2014).	
	The	same	logic	applies	to	the	different	ways	to	conceptualize	Singaporeanness.	The	understandings	are	always	negotiated	in	the	in-between	space	of	the	state	and	the	people,	in	the	interplay	of	discourses.	Calhoun	(2007,	40-1)	claims:	“…it	is	a	sociological	misunderstanding	to	think	that	the	reality	of	nations	depends	on	the	accuracy	of	their	collective	self-representations.”	
	In	 other	 words,	 the	 idea	 that	 nations	 are	 not	 real	 because	 of	 their	 artificial	construction	should	be	criticized.	If	the	ideas	are	repeated	in	discursive	way,	they	already	became	partially	 real.	 It	 is	another	question	 if	 they	are	 contradictory	or	problematic,	but	that	does	not	make	them	less	real.	It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	different	ways	to	conceptualize	a	nation	go	hand	in	hand,	in	negotiation	with	each	other.	They	are	 interwoven.	People	do	not	absorb	dominant	discourse	 in	 a	vacuum	but	they	are	fitted	into	their	existing	ideas	and	realities	of	the	nation.	
	The	 core	 issue	 here	 is	 the	 nationalist	 ideology,	 which	 is	 strongly	 linked	 to	 the	government’s	vision	of	ideal	Singaporean	nation	rather	than	to	popular	nationalist	sentiments.	 There	 are	 constant	 negotiations	 between	 cultural	 meanings	 of	Singaporeanness	 and	 the	 political	 efforts	 to	 maintain	 an	 effective	 nation-state.	(Hudson	 2013,	 11.)	 This	 configuration	 of	 Singaporeanness	 is	 a	 combination	 of	authoritarianism,	economic	imperative	and	pragmatism,	which	is	used	to	argument	
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the	unity	of	the	nation.	From	the	perspective	of	nation	building,	the	discourse	about	vulnerable	nation	may	serve	the	purpose	of	the	state’s	hold	over	its	people.	Yet	for	the	people	it	causes	an	unnecessary	national	identity	crisis.	
	
I	have	argued	 that	despite	 the	 idea	of	 lacking	national	 identity,	Singaporeans	are	able	 to	define	 themselves	and	 imagine	as	 community	 through	essentialising	and	stereotyping	 of	 Singaporeanness.	 In	 the	next	 chapter	 I	 continue	 considering	 the	interplay	of	dominant	discourses	and	everyday	understandings	of	Singaporeanness.	Instead	 of	 imagination	 of	 cultural	 coherence,	 I	 turn	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 internal	diversity	of	Singaporeanness,	and	how	that	is	confronted	in	terms	of	being	a	nation.	
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7 Mediated everyday nationalism
I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 state	 promotes	 an	 idea	 of	 vulnerable	 and	 weak	Singaporeanness	 because	 in	 terms	 of	 national	 ideology	 a	 diverse	 nation	 seems	impossible	to	control.	Thus	the	responsibility	to	strengthen	and	solidify	the	sense	of	national	belonging	is	put	on	the	people.	This	discourse	legitimates	the	government’s	excessive	efforts	to	promote	and	instill	nationalism.	Especially	young	Singaporeans	are	presented	as	deviants	with	moral	and	cultural	dilemma	what	comes	 to	 their	national	identification,	and	therefore	they	need	parental	discipline	(Koh	2007,	192).	The	 youth	 threatens	 the	 future	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 because	 they	 do	 not	 see	 a	connection	 between	 the	 nation	 and	 identity	 (Tarulevicz	 2010,	 33)	 and	 are	 thus	imagined	to	lack	the	national	identity.	
	Social	scientist	Ravinder	Sidhu	(2003,	190)	reminds	that	even	though	the	official	national	 discourse	 is	 obsessed	 with	 fixed	 national	 identity,	 the	 Singaporean	subjectivity	should	be	observed	as	dynamic	and	flexible,	especially	what	comes	to	the	younger	generation.	In	this	chapter	I	examine	how	my	informants	respond	to	the	demands	of	being	Singaporean	in	its	fixed	sense.	
	First	 I	 will	 examine	 the	 multicultural	 discourse	 and	 the	 negotiations	 of	Singaporeanness	 in	 face	of	diversity.	Hybridity	 is	 a	common	concept	used	 in	 the	previous	studies	about	Singaporeanness	as	it	thought	to	describe	well	the	nature	of	it.	However,	it	is	problematic	as	it	assumes	that	there	is	some	pure	or	authentic	form	of	identity	which	is	then	mixed,	and	that	is	exactly	how	the	state	also	argues	about	the	lack	of	national	identity.		I	want	to	postulate	that	this	is	not	necessarily	the	way	Singaporeanness	should	be	understood.	
	Instead,	 I	 will	 apply	 the	 concept	 of	 mediation	 to	 explain	 the	 construction	 of	Singaporeanness.	 Anthropologist	 William	 Mazzarella	 (2004,	 357)	 says	 that	mediation	 happens	 when	 people	 are	 both	 self-distancing	 and	 self-recognizing	themselves.	 This	 determination	 and	 indeterminacy	 structures	 the	 mediation	process	(ibid,	359).	The	negotiations	of	Singaporeanness	I	have	already	described	are	based	on	experience	of	coherence	between	the	Singaporeans.	Now	I	will	focus	
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on	 issues	that	the	government	sees	as	a	hindrance	to	the	unity	of	a	nation.	 I	will	argue	that	those	issues	are	in	fact	an	essential	part	of	Singaporeanness	in	its	popular	sense,	when	the	young	people	mediate	them	in	their	daily	lives.	
	To	finish	my	analysis	I	will	discuss	the	questions	of	local	&	global,	and	nationalism	
&	 cosmopolitanism,	 when	 put	 together	 will	 sum	 up	 my	 arguments	 about	Singaporeanness.	I	have	already	discussed	how	Singapore’s	interest	lies	in	building	an	economically	efficient	nation.	Singapore	illustrates	the	current	global	challenges	the	 nation-states	 face,	 as	 economic	 globalization	 and	 transnational	 migration	weaken	the	sense	of	a	place	and	nation	that	have	traditionally	defined	belonging	(Kluver	 &	 Weber	 2003).	 Singapore’s	 focus	 on	 economic	 growth	 and	 global	orientation	has	undervalued	the	importance	of	national	identification	and	locality.	
	
I	 argue	 that	 this	 “challenge”	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	 understanding	Singaporeanness	 from	 the	perspective	of	younger	generation.	Gupta	 &	Ferguson	(2001)	 criticize	 the	 common	 linking	 of	 locality,	 identity,	 culture	 and	 place	 and	suggest	instead	that	we	should	examine	the	process	where	a	space	is	constructed	and	 imagined	as	 a	concrete	 locality	 (ibid,	36).	Thus	 I	will	argue	 that	Singapore’s	global	orientation	is	centrally	involved	in	the	production	of	“local”	Singaporeanness.	This	further	contests	the	idea	of	spatially	fixed	national	identities.	
7.1 Essential	diversity	As	was	explained	in	chapter	4.2,	the	idea	of	unity	in	diversity	is	deeply	embedded	in	national	 discourse.	 My	 informants	 often	 agreed	 that	 their	 respective	 ethnic	categories	 matter	 in	 their	 institutionalized	 sense,	 but	 not	 when	 it	 comes	 to	friendships	 or	 their	 social	 circles.	 Instead	 of	 making	 boundaries	 between	Singaporeans,	 ethnic	 categories	 are	 in	 fact	 connecting	 Singaporeans	 in	 an	interesting	way.	Also	when	 I	discussed	with	my	 informants	about	the	meaning	of	ethnicity	and	race	for	in	Singaporeanness,	I	noticed	an	interesting	controversy:	they	were	at	the	same	time	able	to	imagine	and	deny	the	existence	of	Singaporeanness	in	terms	of	its	diversity.	
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The	official	unity	in	diversity	idea	was	very	present	in	my	informants’	speech	as	they	saw	ethnicity	as	a	source	of	cultural	diversity	and	as	something	that	shapes,	unites,	and	makes	up	the	Singaporean	national	identity.	
	“I	feel	 like	 it's	hard	to	make	a	distinction.	They	[ethnic	groups]	are	all	profoundly	connected	in	ways	that	I	find	difficulty	in	expressing	even	to	myself.	Maybe	I'm	too	"hippie"	or	just	blissfully	ignorant	to	understand	or	have	any	desire	to	understand	these	borders.	I'm	not	sure!	But	I	do	believe	all	of	these	"borders"	in	some	ways	help	shape	us	into	who	we	are	as	inhabitants	of	this	land.”	-	Amanda,	24	
	Singaporeanness	 is	understood	 to	be	 essentially	diverse,	which	 then	 shapes	 the	understanding	of	nationality	itself.	This	idea	came	up	in	various	conversations	I	had	with	my	informants.	Michelle,	21,	highlighted	that	“What	you	have	to	understand	is	that	we	are	all	Singaporeans!”	She	told	me	about	the	racial	harmony	day	celebrated	in	 schools,	 and	 how	 Singaporeans	 live	 peacefully	 side-by-side,	 even	 though	“[Singaporean-]Malays	are	a	bit	different,	but	that’s	okay”.	
	Some	wanted	to	remind	me	how	Singapore	is	a	complex	society	and	how	the	ethnic	groups	 are	 not	 as	 homogenous	 as	 assumed.	 Singaporean-Chinese	 people,	 for	instance,	consist	of	various	dialect	groups.	Rahmat,	31,	told	me	that	it	is	clear	that	most	Singaporeans	have	very	mixed	backgrounds	and	no	one	 is	genetically	pure	Malay	or	Chinese.	He	told	that	when	someone	starts	to	explain	his	family	history	to	him,	he	can	just	say,	“I	got	it	bro,	no	need	to	explain”.	
	However,	 having	 mixed	 background	 can	 also	 cause	 “an	 identity	 crisis”,	 as	 has	happened	 to	my	 informant	Andre,	25,	 whose	mother	 is	 Singaporean-Indian	 and	father	Singaporean-Chinese.	This	makes	Andre	 a	so-called	Chindian-Singaporean.	He	told	an	example	how	once	in	school	he	wrote	down	his	ethnicity	as	Chinese	and	the	teacher	objected	that	it	is	not	true	since	he	did	not	look	like	Chinese.	Andre	was	extremely	frustrated	for	the	fact	that	he	has	to	identity	with	an	ethnic	category.	
	Also	people	falling	under	the	category	of	“others”	might	need	to	constantly	prove	their	 Singaporeanness	 to	 other	 fellow	 Singaporeans.	 My	 Singaporean-Australian	contact	 told	 how	 she	 encounters	 discrimination	 because	 of	 her	 Eurasian	 roots.	Singaporean	girls	named	Julia	D’Silva	(2014)	and	Patricia	Tobin	(2015)	have	written	
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lengthy	 Facebook-posts	 about	 their	 frustration	 over	 explaining	 their	 respective	European	names	despite	looking	and	being	partly	Chinese-Singaporeans.	
	Singaporean-Indian	Elaine,	31,	instead	told	how	she	does	not	feel	like	belonging	to	Singapore	anymore	since	everybody	around	is	Chinese.	Most	of	her	relatives	have	emigrated	from	Singapore	as	they	feel	there	is	no	space	for	them	anymore	as	ethnic	Indians.	 This	 experience	 indicates	 how	 Singaporeanness	 has	 not	 gained	 supra-ethnic	nature	for	everybody.	This	is	more	often	the	feeling	of	minority	groups,	as	Singapore	is	seen	foremost	as	a	Chinese	society.	
	As	 mentioned,	 the	 immigration	 pattern	 strengthens	 the	 existing	 ethnic	 division.	There	are	plenty	of	Mainland	Chinese	but	also	 Indian	nationals	and	Malays	 from	Indonesia	 and	 Malaysia	 living	 in	 Singapore.	 When	 meeting	 new	 people	 or	 just	walking	on	the	street,	for	me	it	was	impossible	to	say	who	is	a	Singaporean	and	who	is	not,	since	you	cannot	make	any	assumption	by	the	looks.	However,	some	of	my	informants	 claimed	 that	 they	 do	 recognize	 the	 non-Singaporeans	 from	 their	outward	appearance.	Usually	this	does	not	have	anything	to	do	with	ethnic	looks.	
	It	is	also	worth	of	noting	that	this	common	ethnic	background	does	not	really	unite	local	 and	 foreign	 people	 in	 Singapore.	 For	 example,	 Singaporean-Chinese	 and	Mainland	Chinese,	or	Singaporean-Malay	and	Malaysian	Malay	may	feel	socially	very	distant	 from	 each	 other,	 even	 though	 they	 share	 the	 same	 ethnic	 and	 cultural	background	and	traditions	(Liu	2014).	When	Singaporeanness	is	seen	against	these	other	nationalities,	cultures,	and	their	way	of	life,	it	inherits	a	deeper	meaning.	This	is	 also	 connected	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 growing	 up	 in	 Singapore.	 The	 shared	territorial	 and	 national	 experiences	 of	 daily	 life	 unite	 Singaporeans	 more	 than	common	 ethnic	 background	 with	 others.	 This	 reveals	 the	 faults	 of	 general	nationalist	ideology,	which	assumes	that	people	should	share	certain	ancient	culture	or	traditions	to	feel	belonging	to	each	other.	Nationalism	can	be	based	on	various	commonalities,	and	above	all,	on	common	daily	life	experiences.	
	There	have	been	also	interesting	incidents,	like	the	“curry-gate”	few	years	ago	when	Chinese	 PR’s	 complained	 about	 their	 neighboring	 Singaporean-Indian	 family	
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cooking	 curry	 and	 the	 smell	 spreading	 in	 the	 building.	 After	 mediation	 the	Singaporean	family	agreed	to	cook	curry	only	on	days	their	Chinese	neighbors	were	not	at	home.	This	led	to	a	launch	of	a	campaign	“Cook	and	share	a	pot	of	curry”	to	promote	 the	 racial	 harmony	 and	 to	 criticize	 the	 foreigners	 inability	 to	 adapt	 to	Singaporean	society.	(Gomes	2014,	31.)	Many	of	my	informants	mentioned	this	to	me	 also	 as	 an	 example	 of	 multiculturalism	 in	 Singapore.	 Rachel,	 31,	 stated	 that	respecting	the	Singaporean	way	of	life	“…would	mean	no	complaining	or	throwing	a	hissy	fit	if	your	neighbour	is	cooking	some	awesome	curry”.	
	Essential	 part	 of	 being	 Singaporean	 is	 indeed	 to	 understand	 and	 cherish	 the	Singaporean	kind	of	multiculturalism.	However,	even	though	Singaporeanness	is	a	mixture	of	different	ethnic	cultures	and	difficult	to	define	without	those,	the	national	imagination	 also	 limits	 multiculturalism	 to	 Chinese,	 Indian	 and	 Malay	 ethnic	traditions	and	influences.	As	an	immigrant	society,	being	Singaporean	means	being	originally	from	somewhere	else,	but	from	the	given	cultural	backgrounds.	
	Another	 thing	 to	 remember	 is	 the	 physical	 location	 of	 Singaporean	 society.	 As	another	post-colonial	 state,	 Singapore	 is	 easily	 associated	with	other	 South-East	Asian	developing	countries.	However,	 living	 in	a	 thriving	and	shining	prosperous	city-state	 makes	 Singaporeans	 socio-economically	 very	 different	 from	 their	neighbors.	As	Rahmat,	31,	said,	“Malaysians	think	we	are	pampered	rich	kids”11.	This	might	also	affect	to	the	fact	that	materiality	and	infrastructure	are	valued	so	much	by	Singaporeans	since	this	distinguishes	Singapore	from	her	neighbors	significantly.		
	Usually	 the	awareness	of	nationality	grows	when	abroad,	and	 this	 is	particularly	true	 for	 Singaporeans;	 being	 Singaporean	 may	 sometimes	 lack	 meaning	 inside	Singapore,	but	outside	it	becomes	meaningful.	Abroad	one	can	refer	to	him/herself	just	as	Singaporean,	without	underlining	certain	ethnicity.	As	explained	in	chapter	4.2,	institutionalized	ethnic	categories	demand	Singaporeans	to	identify	with	given	racial	 groups.	 Chua	 (2003,	 60)	 argues	 that	 by	 claiming	 a	 Singaporean	 identity	
																																																								11	David	Henley	(1995,	288)	points	out,	that	also	in	Indonesia	culture	and	ethnicity	have	limited	relevance	for	nationalism:	Malays	in	different	countries	may	be	identical	in	cultural	terms,	but	there	have	separate	national	identities.	
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without	racial	definitions	is	to	take	a	political	position	against	the	state,	because	the	state	insists	the	people	to	stick	with	their	ethnic	identities	besides	the	national	one.	Especially	the	younger	generation	is	denying	ethnicity	as	marker	of	their	identity,	which	also	makes	it	seem	that	they	would	lack	national	identity	(Koh	2005,	77).	The	young	could	see	themselves	as	so-called	“ethnic	Singaporeans”	in	their	own	terms	and	 resist	 the	dominant	discourse.	This	 is	another	 reason	 for	 the	 state	 to	 target	youth	with	their	various	efforts	to	instill	the	national	identity.	
	The	 idea	 of	 unity	 in	 diversity	 is	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 understanding	 of	Singaporeanness,	 and	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 understand	 and	 cherish	 this	 diversity.	However,	 the	 diversity	 also	 creates	 a	 space	 where	 a	 Singaporean,	 supra	 ethnic,	national	culture	may	emerge	in	its	own	way.	The	problem	is	that	the	state	does	not	recognize	 this	 popular	 idea	 of	 being	 Singaporean	 without	 ethnic	 affixes.	 By	disregarding	the	possibility	of	supra	ethnic	identities,	the	state	is	also	hindering	the	development	of	uniquely	Singaporean	national	culture	and	identity.	Herzfeld	(2005,	5)	writes	how	sometimes	the	state	denies	popular	practices	which	might	disrupt	state’s	principles,	but	which	would	also	be	vital	 for	 the	state’s	continuation.	Also	Mazzarella	 (2004,	357)	describes	how	nation	can	become	dependent	mediations	and	contingencies	that	it	ultimately	denies.	In	Singapore	this	would	mean,	that	the	state	 should	 recognize	 the	 grass-root	 national	 sentiments	 and	 embrace	 them	 in	order	to	strengthen	the	future	generation’s	sense	of	national	belonging,	
7.2 	Speaking	and	eating	the	nation	
I	had	a	conversation	about	Singaporean	multiracialism	with	my	friend,	and	he	was	joking	 how	 “we	 Singaporeans	 just	 like	 our	 things	 rojak12”.	 I	 saw	 an	 interesting	metaphor	and	pun	behind	this	sentence,	as	 it	can	refer	 literally	to	two	 important	multicultural	features	in	Singapore,	language	and	food,	through	which	Singaporean	cultural	 identity	and	collective	solidarity	are	sometimes	expressed	(Gomes	2014,	31).	Some	say	that	those	are	two	of	the	small	things	that	unite	diverse	Singaporeans	and	 also	 good	 examples	 of	 mediated	 features	 of	 Singaporean	 culture.	 They	 also	make	 imagining	 Singaporeanness	 easier	 and	 thus	 contribute	 in	 construction	 of	national	culture.	
																																																								12	Rojak	means	mixed	in	Malay	language.	
	76
First	I	will	discuss	about	the	widely	spoken	colloquial	language,	Singlish,	which	is	a	mixture	 of	 English,	 Malay,	 Chinese	 and	 Tamil	 words,	 expressions	 and	 grammar.	Sentence	“we	 like	our	things	rojak”	would	be	 just	one	example	of	the	way	to	use	Singlish.	 Often	 people	 mentioned	 how	 Singlish	 is	 the	 only	 thing	 uniting	Singaporeans.	 The	 capability	 to	 understand	 certain	 words	 and	 expressions,	 and	mastering	 the	 local	 English	 accent	 reveal	 a	 Singaporean	 amongst	 foreigners,	whether	in	Singapore	or	abroad.	Hearing	someone	speaking	in	Singlish	accent	“you	feel	like	home”.	
	Both	old	and	young	Singaporeans	use	Singlish	in	daily	basis.	It	is	not	a	youth	slang	as	some	might	assume,	but	more	like	a	creole	language	developed	when	the	Chinese,	Malay	 and	 Indian	 people	 were	 interacting	 with	 each	 other	 in	 kampongs	 where	people	lived	side	by	side	in	squatter	houses.	Often	this	kind	of	patois	is	used	by	lower	classes	or	less	educated	people	of	society,	but	this	is	not	the	case	with	Singlish.	It	is	used	at	every	level	of	society	for	communication	between	Singaporeans	despite	the	fact	that	a	person	would	master	perfect	Standard	English	with	British	accent.	
	There	are	various	ways	to	use	Singlish	from	specific	food	and	drink	terminology	to	simple	non-English	particles	(lah,	leh,	lor	etc.)	at	the	end	of	a	clause.	There	are	also	several	words	to	refer	to	certain	kind	of	people:	uncle	and	auntie	for	older	persons	and	Chinese	words	 like	ang	moh	 for	Caucasian	 and	ah	beng/lian	 for	 stereotypic	uneducated	 person.	 Besides	 recognizable	 accent,	 the	 lexical	 order	 also	 marks	Singlish	as	broken	or	simplified	English.	
	
I	 have	 explained	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	 success	 of	 the	 nation	 for	 the	Singaporean	government.	Following	this	logic,	the	government	has	discouraged	the	use	of	Singlish,	as	it	would	“reduce	Singaporeans	employability	in	global	economy”	(Sidhu	 2003,	 189).	 In	 this	 sense,	 common	 language	 as	 basis	 for	 national	identification	is	denied	at	the	expense	of	Singapore’s	economic	and	global	stance	in	the	world.	The	government	has	had	“Speak	Good	English	Movement”,	as	the	local	colloquial	English	is	seen	to	threaten	Singaporeans	ability	to	speak	proper	English.	On	the	other	hand,	there	has	also	been	“Speak	Mandarin”	–campaign	to	unify	the	Chinese	dialect	groups,	and	to	foster	the	strong	diplomatic	and	economic	relations	
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with	China.	These	contradictory	expectations	for	cultural	and	national	identification	are	 yet	 another	 example	 of	how	 such	 a	 twisted	 logic	 exists	behind	 Singaporean	nationalism.	
	For	 me	 Singlish	 appeared	 as	 a	 distinct	 language	 since	 my	 informants	 actively	switched	between	Singlish	and	Standard	English	when	 they	 spoke	 to	me.	Before	going	to	the	field	I	even	tried	to	learn	some	Singlish	words	and	expression	thinking	it	would	be	necessary	 for	me	 to	know	 them,	but	 it	was	not.	The	 language	 is	 for	Singaporeans	and	I	was	not	expected	to	know	it.	Most	of	the	informants	did	not	even	use	any	specific	Singlish	expressions	with	me,	if	there	were	no	other	Singaporeans	around.	 Usually	 the	 language	 got	 through	 only	 in	 expressions	 of	 surprise	 or	frustration.	 An	 interesting	 case	 was	 my	 close	 Singaporean	 contact,	 who	 often	lamented	 how	 Singaporeans	 speak	 bad	 English,	 but	 she	 was	 constantly	 using	Singlish	expression	in	her	daily	speech.	It	might	be	that	the	usage	was	conscious	and	she	 does	 that	 in	 an	 ironic	 way,	 but	 for	 me	 that	 appears	 again	 as	 an	 interesting	negotiation	and	mediation	of	one’s	national	identification.	
	On	the	other	hand,	local	linguist	Debbie	Ho	(2006)	has	criticized	the	interpretation	of	Singlish	to	be	a	uniting	force	or	part	of	Singaporean	culture.	Instead	she	suggests	that	 Singlish	 is	 representing	 people’s	 rejection	 of	 both	 Western	 and	 Eastern	cultures.	She	examines	what	kind	of	cultural	identity	Singaporeans	express	through	language,	 and	 comes	 into	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 language	 issues	 reflect	 young	Singaporeans	experience	of	identity	flux	of	not	knowing	who	they	are,	and	to	what	beliefs	and	values	should	attach	to	themselves	in	order	to	belong	to	a	community.	This	creates	uncertainty	about	 their	cultural	 identity	and	 the	understanding	of	 a	nation.	Ho	argues	that	young	Singaporeans	are	reluctant	to	identify	with	the	West,	but	they	feel	also	removed	from	their	Eastern	Asian	roots	(Ibid,	18-21.)	
	
I	will	analyze	this	“identity	flux”	in	more	detail	in	next	sub-chapter,	but	here	I	just	conclude	 that	 I	 find	 Ho’s	 analysis	 rather	 interesting	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 most	 of	 my	informants	did	mention	Singlish	to	be	the	main	marker	of	their	national	 identity.	Could	 it	 be	 that	 since	 the	 language	 is	 the	 only	 one	 of	 the	 “classic”	 markers	 of	nationality	for	Singaporeans,	Singlish	might	be	thought	to	bind	people	together	as	a	
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nation?	 I	 would	 say	 that	 Ho’s	 interpretation	 is	 another	 example	 how	 national	identities	are	often	thought	to	be	fixed	and	clearly	defined	entities.		
	There	is	also	wide	food	and	beverage	terminology	in	Singlish.	Once	in	a	local	cafe	in	
a	shopping	mall,	 a	supposedly	American	 tourist	girl	was	 trying	 to	order	 a	cup	of	black	coffee	from	a	Singaporean	auntie	behind	the	counter.	However,	the	girl	kept	getting	coffee	with	milk	and	sugar	and	was	getting	really	frustrated.	And	so	was	the	auntie,	as	she	did	not	understand	why	the	girl	was	complaining	for	having	milk	and	sugar	in	her	coffee.	According	to	Singlish	food	and	drink	terminology,	ordering	“one	coffee”,	or	kopi	to	be	more	precise,	gives	you	sweetened	coffee	with	condensed	milk.	Obviously	the	girl	was	not	aware	of	the	Singaporean	coffee	terminology.	
	Above-mentioned	 word	 rojak	 (mixed)	 is	 also	 a	 traditional	 salad	 dish	 mixing	different	 fruits	and	vegetables.	Like	 the	 language	and	 the	people	 themselves,	 the	local	food	is	also	a	mixture	of	Malay,	Indian	and	Chinese	cuisines.	Singaporean	food	is	 a	 source	 of	 proudness	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 their	 language,	 being	 something	uniquely	 Singaporean.	Besides	 its	 significance	 in	 a	 daily	 basis	 (e.g.	 the	 common	question	 “have	 you	had	 your	 lunch/dinner	 yet”	 as	 “how	 are	 you”),	 Singapore	 is	known	for	being	the	mecca	for	foodies.	Many	Singaporeans	told	me	how	food	is	one	of	 the	only	 things	 they	miss	while	being	abroad.	One	cannot	 find	proper	noodles	elsewhere.	 Singaporean-Indian	Elaine,	30,	has	been	 living	 in	Finland	 for	 several	years	and	told	me	she	would	do	anything	to	have	restaurant	selling	chicken	rice	here	and	 is	 always	 craving	 for	 proper	 curry.	 After	 long	 explanation	 about	 politics	 in	Singapore,	also	UK-based	Ashley	finished	her	email	with	“…	and	remember	to	try	all	of	the	local	food.	My	personal	favourite	is	BBQ	Stingray	-	the	softest,	most	tender	fish	I	have	ever	tasted”.	
	Food	 is	 part	 of	 the	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 the	masterpiece	 of	 multiculturalism	 in	Singapore.	Like	language,	cuisine	is	one	of	the	few	things	where	the	mix	of	cultures	and	differences	are	more	of	an	asset	than	challenge,	taking	the	best	from	everyone	and	 forming	a	new	totality,	something	Singaporean.	 I	am	suggesting	that	Singlish	and	Singaporean	cuisine	being	rojak	can	be	seen	as	a	metaphor	for	understanding	the	nature	of	Singaporeanness	in	wider	level.	The	essence	of	Singaporeanness	is	the	mixture	and	the	variety	of	what	it	consists	of.	According	to	Singapore’s	constitution,	
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the	city-state	 is	multiracial,	multilingual,	multi-religious	and	multicultural,	which	guarantees	 that	 all	 groups	 are	 equal	 in	 front	 of	 citizenship,	 services	 and	infrastructure	 and	 that	 everyone	 has	 the	 same	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	(Ackermann	1997,	456).	Being	rojak	is	thus	the	predominant	and	essential	feature	of	Singaporeanness	not	only	in	official	level,	but	also	in	daily	life.	
	Ghassan	Hage’s	(1998)	interpretation	of	national	cultural	capital	is	again	relevant	concept	here,	as	certain	social	conduct,	lifestyle	and	habits	are	used	to	define	who	is	
a	Singaporean.	 I	have	already	 talked	about	how	 the	experience	of	growing	up	 in	Singaporean	 authoritarian	 and	 materialist	 society	 and	 adjusting	 to	 its	 kiasu	atmosphere	 is	 important	 for	 Singaporeanness.	 I	 am	 now	 adding	 the	acknowledgment	 of	 Singaporean	 multiculturalism,	 ability	 to	 speak	 Singlish	 and	respect	for	their	food	to	the	list.		
	After	all	this	the	state	still	sees	national	identification	problematic	for	Singaporeans.	The	obsession	with	imagining	coherent	nation	denies	this	kind	of	“mixed”	reality	of	national	identification	as	it	draws	strict	boundaries	for	national	identity.	There	is	no	in-between	form	of	identification	(Koh	2005,	77).	However,	in	immigrant	societies	like	Singapore	there	are	no	cultural	practices	that	would	not	be	a	mixture	of	various	ways	to	speak,	eat	and	live.	We	should	look	at	these	instances	of	Singaporeanness	as	mediated	features	that	are	an	outcome	of	identity	negotiations,	where	Singaporeans	construct	the	idea	of	their	national	being.	
7.3 Cosmopolitan	nation	Calhoun	(2008,	428)	has	defined	cosmopolitanism	as	“being	at	home	with	diversity”,	and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Singapore	 this	definition	 could	be	 applied	 literally.	Academic	discussion	about	cosmopolitanism	is	vast	and	I	do	not	intend	to	go	into	that	here.	The	concept	has	rather	loose	meaning	and	vague	definitions	nowadays.	However,	it	is	relevant	to	take	notice	of	the	usage	of	it	in	Singaporean	context,	as	Singapore	is	officially	 promoted	 as	 global	 and	 modern	 city-state	 whose	 citizens	 should	 be	cosmopolitan,	international	and	open-minded	for	diversity.	
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In	brief,	the	discussion	about	cosmopolitanism	I	follow	in	the	case	of	Singapore	is	the	questions	of	locality	and	globality.	Anthropologist	and	well-known	globalization	theorist	Arjun	Appadurai	wrote	in	199013	that	when	global	cultural	flows	come	into	contact	 with	 nationalist	 forms	 of	 culture,	 the	 hegemony	 of	 nation-states	 gets	challenged.	However,	the	recent	global	history	has	shown	that	this	has	not	been	the	case,	and	nations	 still	matter.	Gupta	&	Ferguson	 (1997)	have	 suggested,	 that	we	should	concentrate	on	understanding	how	locality	and	community	are	formed	and	lived	nowadays	in	midst	of	global	influences,	and	forget	the	idea	that	local	would	be	something	more	original	and	authentic,	opposed	to	global	(ibid,	6-7).	They	also	note	that	as	states	use	simplistic	ideas	of	national	identity	and	locality,	anthropology	can	highlight	the	nuances	of	daily	life	that	challenge	these	official	ideas	and	discourses	(ibid,	14.)	
	When	talking	about	public	housing	I	already	brought	up	the	issues	of	global	and	local	national	identification.	I	continue	now	to	analyze	how	the	global-local	–dichotomy	is	present	in	wider	debate	about	globalization	and	cosmopolitanism	in	Singaporean	context.	However,	my	perspective	 is	still	on	nationalism	and	how	the	nation	gets	understood	in	these	debates.	I	concentrate	on	how	Singaporeans	imagine	their	place	between	 the	essentialised	global	and	 local	 identifications,	and	how	can	everyday	nationalism	be	involved	in	these	negotiations.	
	Cosmopolitanism	does	not	go	well	together	with	classic	nationalist	ideology,	which	emphasizes	the	strong	rootedness	and	belonging	to	a	single	nation.	Singapore	has	tried	to	combine	these	two	approaches	resulting	 in	controversial	 idea	of	national	identity	being	both	cosmopolitan	and	patriotic	at	the	same	time.	Hudson	(2013,	40-1)	argues,	that	since	the	global	space	 in	Singapore	offers	these	different	 forms	of	cosmopolitan	belonging,	the	idea	of	a	nation	is	constantly	challenged.	The	dilemma	of	 Singaporeanness	 is	how	 to	be	 local	 and	 global	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 to	 fulfill	 the	demands	expressed	in	official	national	discourses.	
	
																																																								13	See	Arjun	Appadurai	1990.		Modernity	at	Large:	Cultural	Dimensions	of	Globalization.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minneapolis	Press.	
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According	 to	Sidhu	(2003),	 the	Singaporean	government	privileges	 the	economic	dimension	of	globalization	over	the	cultural	one.	This	means	that	the	state	wants	to	emphasize	Singapore’s	role	on	global	economy,	but	resists	global	cultural	influences	which	are	assumed	to	diminish	locality	and	Singaporeanness.	Singaporeans	have	to	have	a	spatially	fixed	national	identity	that	is	based	on	modernist	assumptions	of	national	 identities.	 (Ibid,	 169.)	 Aihwa	 Ong	 (2005,	 14)	 argues	 that	 from	 an	anthropological	 perspective,	 cultural	 globalization	 is	 a	 dialectic	 process	 where	common	dichotomies	like	global	and	local	are	sides	of	the	same	coin,	not	opposites.	This	insight	is	extremely	relevant	in	Singapore.	
	The	dichotomy	between	global	and	 local	has	 inspired	many	studies	 in	Singapore,	and	cosmopolitanism	is	a	popular	concept	used	both	among	academia	and	in	politics	of	 nation	 building.	 The	 former	 PM	 Goh	 Chok	 Tong	 himself	 made	 a	 distinction	between	heartlanders	and	cosmopolitans	in	a	National	Day	rally	speech	in	1999,	and	these	 two	 groups	 have	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 several	 studies	 of	 Singaporean	transnmigrants	(see	e.g.	Elaine	Ho,	Brenda	Yeoh,	Lily	Kong).	
	
I	 want	 to	 go	 beyond	 this	 dichotomy	 and	 ask	 if	 young	 people’s	 experience	 of	Singaporeanness	would	be	 something	between	 them,	 a	mediated	understanding.	Could	the	“cosmopolitan”	way	of	life	in	fact	be	a	Singaporean	way	of	life?	Is	there	a	national	aspiration	in	cosmopolitan	or	global	lifestyle?	Bhabha	(1990,	3)	suggests	that	when	 “reading”	 the	nation	we	 should	pay	more	 attention	 to	 the	 spheres	of	national	culture	from	which	alternative	perceptions	might	emerge.	Could	the	young	generation	of	Singaporeans	with	their	cosmopolitan	worldview	be	this	alternative	voice?	
	
I	have	 explained	 that	 the	 government	 is	 concerned	 about	 the	Westernization	 of	young	Singaporeans	minds	and	lives.	For	the	state	it	seems	that	particularly	younger	generation	 is	 lacking	 the	national	 identity	 since	 they	 are	more	 inclined	 towards	Western	values	and	lifestyle:	the	young	people	want	an	identity	“not	of	their	own”	(Koh	2005,	77).	The	competing	local	(Eastern	Asian)	and	global	(Western)	sources	of	interests	result	in	a	new	configuration	of	identities	(ibid,	68).	I	argue	that	as	young	
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people	 mediate	 these	 influences,	 they	 are	 able	 to	 conceptualize	 another	 kind	 of	Singaporenness.		
	The	dialogue	between	global	and	 local	actualizes	 in	young	Singaporeans	 lives.	 	A	friend	 of	 mine,	 a	 foreigner	 in	 Singapore	 himself,	 stated	 that	 in	 his	 opinion	Singaporeans	are	 “going	 to	Starbucks	and	 trying	 to	be	western	 ‘cause	 they	don’t	want	to	be	seen	as	Asian”.	This	goes	well	with	the	earlier	claim	of	Debbie	Ho	(chapter	7.2),	that	Singlish	would	indicate	people’s	anxiety	over	Eastern	and	Western	cultural	influences.	It	also	implicates	how	in	everyday	thinking	people	are	eager	to	associate	certain	practices	to	be	either	local	or	global.	
	As	I	started	the	fieldwork,	I	was	also	fascinated	by	the	mixture	of	Asian	and	Western	influence	 Singapore	 has,	 both	 in	 Singaporean’s	 lifestyles,	 and	 in	 the	 physical	landscape	 and	 infrastructure:	 the	 ultra-modern	 skyscrapers	 and	 futuristic	architecture	next	 to	 the	old	colonial	shop	houses,	hawker	centers	and	 local	HDB	buildings.	It	was	easy	for	me	to	adjust	to	the	daily	life	there,	as	it	was	not	too	Asian.	
I	felt	certain	social	sameness	or	closeness	to	the	young	Singaporeans	I	met.	At	the	same	 time	 there	 was	 something	 exotic	 in	 Singapore,	 as	 the	 Asianness	 was	 also	present.	
	
I	admit	that	I	was	committing	the	cardinal	mistake	of	anthropology:	essentialising	and	misinterpreting	the	idea	of	local	and	global,	Eastern	and	Western.	I	often	asked	my	informants	to	take	me	into	local	neighborhoods	meaning	that	I	did	not	want	to	see	 the	 touristy	 sights	 but	 something	 more	 Singaporean.	 	 This	 also	 gave	 me	 an	interesting	 insight	 on	 how	 my	 informants	 understood	 the	 meaning	 of	 local	 and	Singaporean.	I	did	find	myself	from	HDB	areas,	kopitiams	and	hawker	centers,	but	also	 very	 often	 from	 downtown	 hipster	 coffee	 bars,	 which	 I	 would	 put	 in	 the	category	of	global	or	Western.	One	girl	took	me	to	an	old	coffeehouse	in	Chinatown	to	taste	traditional	pastries.	She	was	surprised	when	 I	ordered	the	kopi,	the	 local	coffee	served	in	every	kopitiam,	as	she	had	not	had	kopi	in	ages.	She	preferred	café	latte,	and	probably	assumed	that	I	would	too.	I	started	to	wonder	what	the	reasoning	behind	these	assumptions	is,	both	the	girl’s	and	mine?	Why	is	ordering	kopi	thought	to	be	more	Singaporean	than	ordering	Caramel	Frappe	from	Starbucks?	
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The	point	I	want	to	make	it	that	the	essentialising	local-global-dichotomy	serves	as	an	interesting	basis	for	the	analysis	of	Singaporeanness	in	many	levels.	What	comes	to	the	physical	space,	it	is	important	to	remember	how	Singapore	is	an	intimate	city-space,	where	these	questions	might	get	very	concrete	meanings.	I	spend	quite	a	lot	of	time	in	an	area	called	Bugis	near	downtown	Singapore.	Besides	busy	road	there	are	 modern	 shopping	 malls	 but	 also	 smaller	 streets	 hawker	 stalls	 and	 street	vendors.	There	is	also	popular	Arab	Street	where	trendy	bars	and	cafes	stand	next	to	an	old	Malay	heritage	area	with	the	oldest	mosque	in	Singapore.	
	Next	to	Bugis	is	Rochor	Centre,	a	colorful	HDB	estate.	I	went	there	one	Saturday	and	walked	around	amongst	busy	market	stalls	and	Chinese	astrology	stands.	People	were	running	from	a	Chinese	temple	to	a	Hindu	temple	next-door	“to	maximize	the	luck”	as	my	 friend	explained.	Passing	by	a	void	deck	of	an	HDB	block	 I	noticed	 a	canopy	under	which	there	were	some	people	sitting	around	the	tables	and	eating.	Behind	them,	also	under	the	canopy,	there	was	an	altar	and	a	coffin.	I	realized	I	was	witnessing	 traditional	Chinese	 funeral	wake	held	on	 the	void	deck	 of	 a	 resident	building,	 next	 to	 a	 busy	 shopping	 street.	 Around	 the	 corner	 you	 can	 see	 the	skyscrapers	shining	in	the	sun	and	the	famous	skyline	of	Marina	Bay.	
	This	is	how	intimate	the	city-state	of	Singapore	can	get.	One	moment	you	are	in	the	heartland	of	Singapore,	seeing	people	do	their	daily	stuff	in	their	neighborhood,	and	next	you	are	having	the	most	expensive	drink	on	a	rooftop	bar	in	your	cocktail	dress.	These	kinds	of	experiences	are	often	interpreted	as	Singapore	being	between	east	and	west,	between	 local	way	of	 life	and	global,	cosmopolitan	aspirations.	What	 if	these	places,	situations	and	experiences	could	be	seen	 just	 a	way	of	Singaporean	life?	What	if	being	Singaporean	is	constructed	and	negotiated	in	these	spatial	and	temporal	situations	where	the	essential	characters	of	Singapore	meet?	Do	people	really	have	the	need	to	separate	these	experiences	of	being	more	Singaporean	or	less	Singaporean	way	of	doing	things?		
	Beng-Huat	 Chua	 (2000)	 has	 written	 a	 rather	 interesting	 analysis	 of	 young	Singaporeans	approach	to	modernity	and	Westernization	of	Singaporean	society.	He	describes	 how	 McDonalds,	 found	 on	 every	 corner	 of	 the	 city	 and	 HDB	 areas,	
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functions	 as	 a	popular	hangout	place	 for	young	 Singaporeans.	Chua	 argues,	 that	residential	conditions	(living	with	parents	in	HDB)	and	increased	affluence	drives	youth	 to	 spend	 time	 in	 downtown	 areas.	 Often	 the	 spread	 of	 multinational	 or	American	chain	restaurants	is	seen	as	a	sign	of	“Westernization”,	but	Chua	argues	that	 in	Singaporean	context	they	have	gotten	highly	 localized	meanings	as	young	people	 have	 adopted	 them	 as	 their	 free	 time	 spaces.	 Chua	 interprets	 this	 as	familiarization,	or	as	I	would	say	Singaporeanisation,	of	an	American	space	in	the	city.	I	see	this	also	as	a	good	example	of	how	reputed	local	and	global	spaces	might	in	fact	be	mediated	 in	a	sense.	Globalization	and	 localization	are	one	process	and	part	of	each	other:	the	local	is	the	spin-off	of	the	global	(Ong	2005,	14)	
	On	the	other	hand,	sometimes	yet	abstract	but	still	so	real	local-global	–dichotomy	turns	out	to	be	quite	bizarre.	Already	in	early	November	the	famous	shopping	street	Orchard	 Road	 started	 to	 fill	 up	 of	 extravagant	 and	 ostentatious	 Christmas	decorations.	I	saw	more	reindeers,	Santa	Clauses,	snowflakes,	Christmas	trees	and	garlands	than	ever	back	at	home	in	Finland	or	anywhere	else	where	people	actually	celebrate	this	kind	of	Christmas.	It	did	not	make	sense	to	me.	Why	did	they	have	all	these	symbols	of	Nordic	winter	and	Christmas	under	the	palm	trees	in	+30	degrees?	Sidhu	(2003)	argues	that	Christmas	on	Orchard	Road	 is	a	good	time	and	place	to	analyze	Singapore’s	contradictions,	as	these	“arctic	heterotopias”	are	“a	symbol	and	reminder	of	the	importance	of	Northern	Hemisphere”	to	Singapore	(ibid,	170).	
	Even	though	the	state	sees	Westernisation	threatening	young	Singaporeans	national	identification,	the	vision	of	global	and	modern	city	demands	the	upholding	of	the	Western	presence	in	Singapore.	Singaporeans	then	have	to	figure	out	their	position	in	these	spaces,	which	are	imagined	to	be	contradictory,	even	though	it	would	not	necessarily	have	to	be	so.		The	static	idea	of	what	Singaporeanness	might	be	clashes	with	young	people’s	everyday	life.	Chang	(2012,	703)	asks,	if	these	kind	of	“collective	transnational	 activities	 and	 cosmopolitan	 spirit”	 could	 in	 fact	 reflect	 national	character	 and	 identity	 of	 Singaporeans.	 He	 also	 emphasizes	 how	 cosmopolitan	identity	reflects	the	dissonance	between	old	and	young	generation	of	Singaporeans,	as	they	may	have	very	different	aspirations	and	interest	in	their	national	lives	(ibid,	693).	Chang	argues	that	the	state	has	not	been	able	to	respond	to	the	globalization	
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so	 that	 it	 would	 make	 sense	 in	 terms	 of	 nation	 building.	 Singaporeans	 might	conceive	an	identity	beyond	the	nation-state,	but	the	nationalist	discourse	does	not	give	a	reason	to	do	that,	since	it	denies	the	possibility	of	mediated	construction	of	identity	(ibid).	
	In	summary,	cosmopolitanism	 is	rather	misused	concept	 in	Singapore.	What	 is	 in	fact	civic	nationalism	is	interpreted	as	cosmopolitanism.	I	have	argued	that	the	so-called	cosmopolitan	way	of	life	could	be	a	Singaporean	way	of	life,	if	the	nationalist	discourse	gave	space	to	this	kind	of	national	identification.	It	is	identifiable	that	both	the	popularity	and	theoretical	definitions	of	nationalism	and	cosmopolitanism	are	limited	in	their	usefulness	in	the	context	of	Singapore.	The	fact	that	nationalism	and	cosmopolitanism,	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 each	 other’s	 opposites	 has	 led	 me	 to	 the	conclusion	that	Singaporeans	could	be	seen	somewhere	 in	between	of	these	two.	The	 cosmopolitan	 elements	 of	 this	 civic	 nationalism	 may	 become	 part	 of	understanding	the	nation,	as	the	interesting	complex	situation	in	Singapore	shows.	
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8 Conclusion
“Sovereign	 states	are	 invented,	but	people	 living	under	 their	 rule	and	efficiency	are	real	with	their	real	life	experiences”	(Tayei	Selasi	2014)	
	In	this	thesis	I	have	explored	the	significance	of	national	identification	and	national	thinking	 in	 a	 multicultural	 setting.	 Inspired	 by	 anthropological	 theories	 of	nationalism	I	have	demonstrated	how	the	Singaporean	nation-state	is	imagined	to	exist.	 I	 have	 moved	 between	 the	 normative,	 state-driven	 and	 popular	 national	discourses	to	analyze	how	my	informants	understand	the	nation	in	Singapore,	and	how	 they	 conceptualize	 and	 experience	 Singaporeanness.	 By	 observing	 the	everyday	practices	that	represent	dominant	discourses	my	aim	has	been	to	better	understand	how	people	experience	and	understand	a	nation.	
	In	the	beginning	I	stated	two	research	questions.	The	first	question	was	“What	kind	of	daily	experiences	and	ideas	unite	people,	creating	affinity	and	mutual	feeling	of	being	 one	nation?”	To	 answer	 this	 I	have	presented	 three	different	 instances	 of	Singaporeanness:	i) The	shared	experience	of	growing	up	and	living	in	Singapore’s	specific	socio-political	reality	creates	a	sense	of	national	belonging	that	is	also	affected	by	that	reality.	ii) The	imagination	of	the	nation	as	culturally	coherent	but	at	the	same	time	essentially	diverse	is	a	result	of	complex	negotiations	of	national	identification	between	the	state	and	the	people.	iii) The	global	Singaporeanness	is	also	a	localized	identity	but	this	aspect	of	young	Singaporeans’	lives	is	not	recognized	in	state-level.	The	second	question	was	“How	are	these	experiences	and	ideas	related	to	the	state’s	efforts	and	discursive	practices	to	build	a	nation?”	My	aim	has	been	to	explain	that	the	Singaporeanness	is	imagined	and	constructed	in	the	negotiations	of	the	state’s	efforts	and	people’s	ideas.	The	above	instances	of	Singaporeanness	are	thus	closely	related	to	the	state’s	efforts	to	build	a	nation.	
	The	 dominant	 discourses	 suggest	 that	 Singaporeans	 should	 work	 hard	 for	 the	national	unity	since	it	is	imagined	to	be	always	under	threat.	This	creates	a	constant	
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feeling	 of	not	being	 a	plausible	nation,	 and	 subsequently	 the	 inability	 to	have	 a	national	 identity.	 Discourses	 are	 also	 used	 to	 legitimate	 the	 authoritarian	 rule,	which	 creates	 nationalized	 life	 experiences.	 Due	 to	 the	 same	 discourse	 of	vulnerability,	the	society	is	driven	by	pragmatic	values	and	economic	motives.	This	is	 reflected	 in	 people’s	 “Singaporean”	 behavior,	 which	 is	 recognized	 as	 part	 of	common	Singaporean	culture.	At	the	same	time	the	managing	of	diversity	and	ideal	national	 identity	 gets	 different	 meanings	 in	 everyday	 level	 of	 life,	 and	 these	mediated	 meanings	 eventually	 from	 the	 foundation	 of	 global	 but	 local	Singaporeanness.	
	As	 Velayutham	 (2007)	 summarizes,	 the	 state	 defines	 Singaporeans	 national	identification	 as	 incomplete	 process	 and	 even	 hinders	 it	 by	 misrecognizing	 the	grass-root	national	sentiments	of	the	people.	Young	Singaporeans	are	especially	in	cultural	limbo,	where	they	do	not	associate	themselves	clearly	either	to	be	Eastern	Asian	or	Western.	 In	addition,	 the	state	has	provided	 its	people	with	all	modern	comforts	and	high	standards	of	living,	but	Singaporeans	are	reproached	not	to	have	affective	ties	to	the	nation.	(Ibid,	35.)	
	My	main	argument	has	been	that	the	Singaporeanness	my	informants	express	and	experience	 differs	 from	 the	 ideal	 national	 identity	 and	 belonging	 that	 the	government	wants	to	promote.	Young	people	have	their	own	personal	way	to	be	Singaporean,	which	makes	their	sense	of	national	belonging	significant	for	them.	At	the	 same	 time	 the	 official	 national	 discourse	 feels	 empty	 and	 forced.	Singaporeanness	is	negotiated	in	the	space	between	official	demands	and	people’s	own	definitions	of	what	Singaporeanness	is.	
	Homi	Bhabha	(1990)	claims	that	nation	is	an	ambivalent	way	to	understand	cultural	representations.	However,	to	be	able	to	imagine	a	community	to	exist,	there	has	to	be	identifiable	meanings	attached	to	it	(Hall	1992).	I	have	examined	what	kinds	of	things	 provide	 feelings	 of	 solidarity,	 familiarity	 and	 belonging	 for	 Singaporeans,	while	 they	 simultaneously	 imagine	 that	 Singaporeanness	 does	 not	 exist.	 I	 have	demonstrated	that	the	Singaporeans	are	able	to	define	and	identify	themselves	by	several	 ways:	 mastering	 Singlish,	 understanding	 the	 Singaporean	 diversity,	
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behaving	 in	 certain	 expected	 way,	 respecting	 the	 materiality,	 and	 sharing	 the	experience	of	the	socio-political	realities	of	living	in	Singapore.	These	are	some	of	the	 identifiable	 meanings,	 common	 experiences	 and	 imagined	 features	 of	Singaporean	nation.	When	people	actively	reproduce	these	ideas	of	community	in	their	talk	and	actions,	the	nation	can	exist.	
	All	 in	all,	the	 imagined	Singaporeanness	 is	produced	 in	negotiations	between	the	state	and	 the	people.	The	various	ways	 to	 conceptualize	 the	nation	are	evolving	together	in	the	same	space.	I	have	demonstrated	how	the	state	uses	several	different	discourses	 to	build,	 control,	and	produce	an	 ideal	nation	 for	 itself.	 In	 the	 state’s	terms,	Singapore	might	appear	as	disunited	and	diverse	but	in	popular	terms,	being	Singaporeans	might	make	sense	in	the	everyday	life.	For	example,	the	state	and	the	people	understand	the	idea	of	cosmopolitan	Singaporeans	quite	differently.	I	have	argued	that	while	the	state	sees	cosmopolitanism	as	a	necessary	quality	of	people,	for	the	young	people	it	is	part	of	everyday	Singaporeanness	creating	unnecessary	dilemma	for	their	national	identification.	
	Singaporeans	do	have	some	sort	of	nationalist	feelings,	whether	as	Singapore	being	their	home	or	as	a	place	that	has	given	them	good	 living	conditions.	Is	Singapore	really	 then	 a	 post-colonial	 nation-state	 that	 needs	 to	 imagine	 its	 existence	 as	Anderson	 has	 proposed,	 and	 how	 the	 government	 obviously	 also	 sees	 it?	 As	 a	multiethnic	 and	 cosmopolitan	 city-state,	 Singapore	 differs	 fundamentally	 from	many	other	post-colonial	countries	 that	have	had	 similar	nation-building	efforts.	Instead	of	having	the	need	to	become	economically	independent	from	the	colonial	powers,	Singapore	has	maintained	the	strong	relations	and	has	taken	advantage	of	them.	 However,	 the	 government	 still	 uses	 strong	 post-colonial	 nation-building	rhetoric.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 young	 people’s	 understanding	 of	 Singaporean	 nation	reveals	that	there	is	a	feeling	of	Singaporeanness	stemming	from	the	daily	lives	and	everyday	experiences.	Sometimes	the	state,	and	even	the	people	themselves,	do	not	recognize	 it	as	 a	sense	of	national	belonging.	 In	addition,	 the	concerns	about	 the	future	reflect	that	the	confidence	on	the	strength	of	the	nation	is	not	so	firm.	
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Gupta	 &	 Ferguson	 (2001)	 write	 how	 local	 identities	 often	 conform	 to	 national	categories,	and	how	national	thinking	also	combines	a	place	and	identity	as	if	they	would	naturally	go	together.	Theoretically	my	aim	has	been	to	show	how	intimate	and	daily	life	is	connected	to	understanding	of	nation	and	national	belonging,	as	I	have	moved	between	micro	and	macro	 level	of	nationalism.	 In	wider	perspective	this	means	that	nationalism	is	not	only	a	state-driven	force	that	aims	to	homogenize	people	in	the	local	level,	but	it	also	creates	differentiated	identities,	which	get	their	meaning	in	global	level	and	become	part	of	people’s	personal	daily	life.	
	Multi-ethnic	states	challenge	the	theorizing	of	nationalism.	This	case	study	about	Singapore	shows	how	a	poly-ethnic	state	endeavors	to	build	a	nation.	However,	the	state	 might	 fail	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	 build	 a	 nation	 if	 it	 tries	 to	 follow	 the	 classic	definitions	of	nation-states.	The	nationalist	sentiments	in	Singapore	are	not	based	on	common	ethnic,	cultural,	religious	or	 linguistic	background	straightforwardly.	Instead,	 there	 is	 a	 nascent	 Singaporean	 national	 culture	 arising	 from	 the	 multi-ethnic	 grounds.	 People	 often	 have	 to	 negotiate	 their	 agency	 in	 midst	 of	 official	national	definitions	 (Kalantzis	2014),	which	also	 implicates	 that	nationalism	 is	 a	multilevel	issue:	a	feeling	or	desire	people	have	to	belong	to	a	group,	or	an	ideology	that	guides	actions	and	thinking.	
	National	categories	are	surprisingly	significant	in	our	daily	lives	even	though	some	have	predicted	they	would	not	matter	anymore.	Whether	seen	as	imagined	or	real,	whether	 we	 feel	 the	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 them	 or	 otherwise,	 nations	 produce	national	thinking,	which	creates	feelings	and	experiences	that	are	true	in	our	daily	life.	I	have	tried	to	give	an	insight	to	this	matter	with	an	example	from	Singapore,	where	nation	is	both	artificially	created,	but	also	developed	in	the	experiences	and	instances	of	the	daily	life.	
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